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Judicial Review and Constitutional
Stability: A Sociology of the U.S. Model
and its Collapse in Argentina
By JONATHAN MILLER*

I. Introduction
Constitutional trends in the world today reveal a strong movement
among new democracies to provide for judicial review.' The precise

model may vary from that of the United States, with many countries preferring to send all constitutional issues to a single court and some providing
for review before a law takes effect.3 However, no one can doubt the basic
trend toward review exercised by a judicial or quasi-judicial organ. Given

the fractious nature of political competition, the most obvious reason for
the rise of judicial review is that pluralist societies require a respected in-

stitution or institutions to resolve disputes over the interpretation and ap* Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. This article was
taken from a larger work that was successfully defended as a J.S.D. dissertation at Columbia Umversity School of Law. The author would like to thank the members of his
dissertation committee, Professors Martha Fineman, Alejandro Garro and R. Kent Greenawalt, his Argentine colleagues Professors Julio C. Cueto-Rda and Hernmn Gullco, and
the many faculty members at Southwestern University School of Law who offered valuable comments. The author would also like to thank Jerome Feldman and Fang-Lian
Liao for their research assistance, and the Buenos Aires law firms of Bianchi, Mijura &
Galarce, Marval, O'Farrell & Mairal, and de la Rila & Diaz Cant6n for the use of their
offices and libraries. Carol Weiner and David McFadden of the Southwestern Umversity
School of Law Library and Ana Marfa Agilero and Mariana del Carril of the Argentine
Supreme Court Library provided invaluable reference assistance. Finally, the most constant, detailed editorial advice was provided by Carina Judith Miller, the author's wife.
1. See, e.g., BuLG. CoNST. arts. 149-50; CZECH REP. CoNsr. arts. 83, 87, 95(2); EsT.
CONST. art. 149; Lrni CONST. arts., 102, 110; SLOvW. CONSr. arts. 158, 160-61; UKR.
CONST. art. 147. Translations of all of these Constitutions may be found in
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORM (Albert P Blaustem & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., 1997).
2. See, e.g., ITALY CONST. art. 134; F.R.G. Basic Law arts. 93, 100; Constitutions of
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., FR. CONST. arts. 61-62; ALG. CONST. arts. 153, 155; Russ. CoNsr. art.
125(2).
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plication of the rules binding them together. Further, absence of a judicial
arbiter risks the transformation of reasonable constitutional disagreements
into festering political disputes which threaten the legitimacy of those in
power.' Without a constitutional arbiter independent of the ruling legislative or executive body, political leaders not only face few institutional constraints on their exercise of power, but may also suffer a loss in terms of
public perception of the legitimacy of their authority Moreover, sometimes societies require reinterpretation of constitutional rules to accommodate new social needs, and courts may legitimize modification of the rules.
Pluralist societies require organs able to legitimate or disapprove fundamental change when faced with groups prejudiced by the changes.5
Although scholarship on judicial review is practically endless, little
attention has been given to its sociological foundation. That is unfortunate, because the actions and success of any political institution depend on
the authority that it commands, and the source of authority wielded by an
institution may vary enormously even when countries have identical political systems. The actions, concerns and weaknesses of a judiciary that sees
itself as the rational interpreter of a text will be completely different from
one that sees itself as a charismatic authority free of textual restraints,
which m turn will be different from a court that sees itself as restating
timeless traditions, or a court that sees itself as dependent on a foreign
model for authority Moreover, the type of authority exercised by a court
must match the expectations of the most politically significant groups in
society, or the court will find its own legitimacy in danger. Discussion of
the "countermajoritanan difficulty" in the United States, concerning the
propriety of allowing unelected judges to second-guess decisions of elected
officials, skirts on the edges of this problem but does not quite touch it.
The fundamental sociological problem is not whether one approach toward
constitutional interpretation is superior to another in terms of participatory
democracy, but the social legitimacy of what is taking place in the eyes of
all those who have political relevance in the society 6
4. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 36, 38 (1960).
5. See id at 52, 65.
6. Some critics of constitutional interpretation that frees itself from the restraints of
a rigid reading of the text or original intent have expressed concern for maintaining the
judiciary's institutional legitimacy, but arguments that a restrictive reading of the Constitution is necessary to maintain judicial legitimacy never move beyond the level of mere
assertions. ERwiN CHEMERINSKI, INTERPRETING THE CONSTrrUTION 133-34 (1987). None
of the critics or proponents of open-ended constitutional interpretation have offered either a model or empincal evidence to back up their claims.
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Tins article will use Max Weber's Sociology of Law as a starting
point for developing a sociology of judicial review. The model will note
that while constitutional courts may initially rely upon various sources of
legitimizing authority, over time, changing societal needs and political balances force courts to look beyond such foundations as constitutional text
and the framers' intent if they are to perform a significant role in keeping
the social peace. The trick, however, is acquiring this capacity without
losing either legitimacy or independence, and that trick may prove very
difficult in many societies that use a model based on U.S. judicial review.
While judges may comply with societal demands and reinterpret the constitution to suit current conditions, once they move beyond textually based
interpretation they may also find themselves lacking alternative sources of
authority to place constraints on a popular Executive. In most societies
courts enjoy less charisma than an elected Executive, and hence will find
themselves on the losing side in any battle with the Executive where the
Court cannot point to clearly established rules.
Once the model is established, it will be applied to Argentina in order
to show how judicial review may lose its effectiveness over the long term.
Argentina presents one of the longest traditions of judicial review in the
world, dating back to the 1860s. Judicial review enjoyed enormous initial
success, with many important decisions curbing conduct by the ExecutiveZ
Moreover, until the 1930s, the Argentine Supreme Court derived its
authority from interpretation of the constitutional text and from U.S.
precedent. A focus on the language of the Constitution enabled the Court
to develop extraordinarily consistent caselaw in key areas such as freedom
of the press, freedom to engage in commercial activity, and property rights.
During most of this period, the Court applied itself to the rigid protection
of a clearly established set of rules.
This changed in the 1930s, and the Court adopted a judicial philosophy roughly comparable to legal realism. However, once the Court started
down that path, it gradually lost the ability to say "no" to the Executive in
an authoritative fashion, and it never developed the authority to design new
constitutional restrictions on executive authority. By the mid-1940s, Argentine society could no longer live with its old constitutional bargain and
there was broad support for the Executive and Congress to address eco7 See generally Jonathan M. Miller, Courts and the Creation ofA "Spiritof Moderation" Judictal Protection of Revolutionaries in Argentina, 1863-1929, 20 HASTiNGs
INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 231 (1997) (analyzing the Supreme Court's insistence on fair
treatment of revolutionaries and the political opposition).
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normc and social problems through what were previously regarded as unconstitutional methods. At the same time, while the Argentine Supreme
Court had already begun to respond to social pressures to move beyond the
constitutional text on important issues, in practice its flexibility also undercut its authority The Court gradually lost its ability to insist on textual
interpretation because social needs had vaned too much from the impositions of the text and the intent of its framers. Yet it also became much
more difficult for the Supreme Court to assert itself, because politicians
were aware that any restrictions imposed by the Court were of the Court's
own making and doctrinally groundless. The issue has only sharpened in
recent years, despite democratizing trends in other aspects of Argentine
politics.
Some references to Argentine history will be inevitable. The period
of the Supreme Court's greatest success corresponds to the period from
1862 to 1930, when Argentina, despite numerous attempted rebellions,
enjoyed constitutional stability' By contrast, from 1930 through 1983 Argentina endured numerous military governments. But the problems of the
Court even during periods of democratic rule since 1930, indicate that
something more than military coups was at work. The most serious event
in the Supreme Court's decline, the impeachment and removal from office
of all but one member during proceedings in 1946 and 1947,' occurred
during a newly elected civilian government under Juan Per6n. The Court
since 1990 has suffered a particularly striking loss of prestige since President Carlos Menem expanded its membership in order to pack it."0 This
article will not focus on the Supreme Court's response to Argentina's
military coups of 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1973 because, although the Supreme Court continued to function during military governments and during the first two coups without a change in membership, the
basic arguments of this article on the relationship between interpretive
techniques and judicial authority can be developed without an analysis of
those periods.
Obviously one case study with occasional references to the United
States does not "prove" a sociological model of judicial review, but the
8. Significant failed revolts occurred in 1874, 1880, 1890, 1893 and 1905, not
counting many small provincial uprisings. For a succinct discussion of this period, sea
DAVID ROCK, ARGENTINA 1516-1987, 118-213 (1987).
9. Discussed infra pp. 166-72.
10. Law No. 23.774, [1990-A] A.L.J.A. 64 (B.O. Apr. 16, 1990), expanded the
membership of the Argentine Supreme Court from five to nine.
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model's explanatory value for Argentina's judicial history is sufficiently
strong to offer an encouraging basis for comparative research in general.
Section H1will develop a sociological model of judicial review that is sufficiently general to apply across cultures. The model focuses on the sources
of authority that a judiciary may invoke and the inevitable pressures upon a
judiciary to respond to social needs when engaged in constitutional interpretation, as well as the difficulties a judiciary may face in maintaining social authority when it invokes what is essentially a "charismatic" authority
free from textual restraints. Section I will then examine Argentina's experience with judicial review in light of the model, focusing on the sources
of authority that were available to and invoked by Argentine judges at different points in Argentine history First, free speech and the protection of
property and commercial activity will be examined over an extended period to establish how the Supreme Court's interpretive techniques changed
over time and the practical effect of a more "responsive" judicial approach
on constitutional protections and the authority of the Court. Then the Supreme Court's general loss of authority will be examined and compared to
the authority of the United States Supreme Court. The article will conclude that a move toward "responsive" interpretation that depends on the
interpreter enjoying at least limited charismatic authority is probably inevitable over time, but when the shift towards responsive interpretation occurs, unless society recogrnzes judges as endowed with an element of
charismatic authority, the courts will run a risk of losing their independence.
11. A Sociology of Judicial Review
A. Courtsand the Fosteringof Mutual Security and Legitimacy
In order to create a model of the forces affecting the authority of judicial review that can be used across different cultures, it is necessary to establish a common denominator of constitutionalism and the role that judicial review may offer in providing stability. The Brazilian Constitution of
1988, for example, contains 245 articles and has already been amended on
over a dozen occasions." The Argentine Constitution, which was comparatively stable during most of the period from 1860 through 1994, con-

11. CONsnTuicAo FEDERAL [FEDERAL CONSTITUTION] (Brazil). The text of the constitutional amendments to the Brazilian Constitution can be found in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE COUNTRIES OFTHE WORLD, supra note 1.
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tains 129 articles after its 1994 reform and incorporates by reference the
full text of ten international human rights declarations and treaties as enjoying constitutional status.' 2 Not only do these constitutions far exceed
the U.S. Constitution in their scope and detail, but they contain many provisions that are primarily aspirational in character. Given this variation
and complexity, constitutionalism must be defined according to a common
denominator of common functional goals before discussing comparative
judicial review
Robert Dahl's classic work on political development, Polyarchy, offers useful definitional starting points, though this article will progress in
an entirely different direction. 3 In his book, Dahl defines polyarchy as a
system where a broad portion of society is permitted to participate in the
selection of government officials in free and competitive elections. 4 This
definition, while narrow as a statement of political objectives-because it
excludes considerations such as social equality and entitlements-is nevertheless descriptive of a form of government that most political thought
today regards as a basic societal objective. The aim is responsive government and the protection of those rights necessary to obtain responsive government, such as the right to vote, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and freedom of expression. Treating "polyarchy" as an operational
definition of democracy, and "democratic development" as the process of
developing and maintaining democracy, will keep the discussion which
follows within manageable bounds without precluding considerations of
social equality from entering into later stages of the analysis. With the

12. CONSTITUCI6N ARGENTINA [CONsT. ARG.] art. 75, § 22.
13. While the discussion that follows uses ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY (1971) as a
starting point, most of this article is irrelevant to his concerns. Dahl argues that the most
common sequence of transformation to democracy among the longest established democracies involved initially opening the political system to competitive politics among the
oligarchy, followed by a gradual widening of participation. Id. at 36. Tolerance and

mutual security could develop more easily among a small elite sharing similar perspectives than among a large and heterogeneous assortment of participants. Id. at 37. Now
groups invited to join the electoral process, or more likely, who push their way in, find a
working system of collective security already in place. Id. at 36. According to Dahl, it is

much easier to socialize new groups into an existing system of mutual security than to try
to create a system from scratch among disparate forces. Id. at 34, 36-38. The Argentine
experience of the 1940s, where President Juan Per6n brought the working class into the
political system but ignored many of the rules that had previously governed Argentine
politics, may actually undercut Dahl's argument.
14. Id. at 1-6. DAHL, supra note 12, at 10-11 also points out that for many purposes
this definition is excessively narrow.
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goal being democracy as polyarchy, it is then possible to ask what conditions favor the development and maintenance of democratic institutions
and what role courts play in that process.
Central to a democratic system defined in terms of open competitive
elections is the requirement that governments tolerate their opponents.
Dahl offers several axioms that may be reduced to the following proposition:
The likelihood that a government will tolerate an opposition increases
as the expected costs of toleration decrease and the expected costs of suppression increase. 5
A government supported by interests fearful of ruthless suppression
should the opposition come to power will likely ruthlessly suppress the opposition to maintain its power. A government that suffers little or no
cost-whether in terms of social reprobation, loss of political support or
insurrection-should it decide to repress its opposition, will likely do so.
A government which faces a cost if it represses the opposition will carefully weigh: (a) the benefits to itself of repressing the opposition against
(b) the cost of acting repressively, plus the risks it faces if it fails to repress
the opposition.
Dahl then notes a fundamental consequence of his proposition. Societies seeking democracy must create a high level of mutual security between those in power and the opposition. 6 A party in power will be more
willing to tolerate an opposition when it knows that in the event of the opposition taking power, clear political rules will protect vital interests of the
group or groups constituting the governing party, and that it will have the
opportunity to run again should it lose control of a branch of government
in an election. If a ruling party fears permanent displacement because
members of the opposition, once in power, will resort to hegemony-as
many governments in Latin America claimed regarding leftist opposition
parties during the Cold War'--then it will take repressive measures.
However, if clear political rules bar suppression of the opposition, suppression of the opposition in spite of those rules may have run a high political cost. Persons not typically affiliated with the opposition may decide
15. Id. at 15.
16. d at 16.
17. In Argentina, the Argentine Supreme Court made this argument in "Partido
Obrero," CSJN 253 Fallos 133, 158 (1962) and "Fernndez de Palacios," CSJN 278
Fallos 287, 299 (1970), justifying repression of the extreme left on grounds that the extreme left did not accept the democratic system.
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to oppose the government. Even the very forces of suppression at the government's service may become less reliable as members of the government's security forces question the legitimacy of the government's conduct.'"
If a high level of mutual security between those in power and the opposition is a key element of democratic development then the next question
is how to establish the necessary level of mutual security Dahl does not
address the issue of the types of governmental institutions that contribute
to the establishment of mutual security, but under the U.S. model at least,

that has been the function of the Constitution and the courts. While courts
are not the only institution able to contribute to feelings of mutual security
among political actors, increasing those feelings would appear to be an important part of the function of judicial review If a governing oligarchy is
concerned about the willingness of the opposition to maintin open and
competitive elections once in power, its comfort level should be raised by
the existence of constitutional provisions for elections, free speech, freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and a working system of judicial
review of any violations. If a governing oligarchy is concerned that the

18. The cost of toleration and/or suppression of government opposition may depend

on other variables besides the level of mutual security, a possibility which Dahl's
streamlined model does not identify. Two variables which come to mnd in the context
of developing countries are the effect of unifying social customs and the effect of foreign
interference. Unifying social custom and the degree of development of disparate social
and economic interests may theoretically affect the costs calculated by the government in
deciding whether to tolerate or suppress its opposition. The cost of mintaming a hegemony is low when reinforced by tradition, and few disparate interests have been able to
develop. However, the development of market economies in most states has already created a strong tendency toward dispersion of economic and social interests away from traditional structures, and the tendency is likely to increase. While the Dahl model does not
work when society does not contain a variety of competing social and economuc groups,
most societies today satisfy this condition.
Foreign interference is harder to deal with under Dahl's model, since foreign intervention
may affect the calculations of the class or faction in power. When the economic interests
of the governing elite depend on foreign cooperation and that cooperation will be at risk
should the opposition come to power, then the cost to the elite of toleraling the opposition rises. When the foreign intervention consists of criticizing a government for human
rights abuses and the governing elite depends on foreign cooperation, then the cost to the
governing elite of suppressing the opposition will increase. Foreign intervention, except
when exceptionally blatant, will usually operate at the margins of the calculations of political actors, however. Situations where foreign intervention makes the level of mutual
security irrelevant inevitably involve so blatant a level of interference that the country
has lost a significant degree of its sovereignty, and discussion of the development of
democratic domestic institutions becomes meaningless.
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opposition will seek to redistribute its property, a clause in the constitution
protecting property rights and judicial review of violations should contribute to the oligarchy's willingness to accept a regime change. This approach is certainly consistent with The Federalist,where Hamilton and
Madison both describe the federal courts as arbiters designed to maintain
the peace of the Umon. 9 One of the central images of the U.S. judiciary is
that of a conflict resolver, maintaining the social peace through its decisions. 2
If polyarchy-the establishment of peaceful democratic government
through free elections-is the goal, constitutionalism may be described as
the rules necessary to create a sense of mutual security. In fact, in using
this minimalist concept of a constitution, one can usefully substitute the
words "rules of mutual security" for "constitution". A constitution consists of those rules and procedures that are agreed upon as the basis for
peaceful participation m the political process. Likewise, legitimate conduct, at least through the eyes of a political actor, is conduct that conforms
to the political actor's perception of the prevailing rules of mutual security.
A legitimate government is one that comes to power in accordance with the
viewer's perception of the prevailing rules of mutual security and maintains its conduct within those rules. A rule of mutual security will often
appear in the text of a nation's constitution, but it need not!' Constitutions
may be partially or entirely unwritten. Rules of mutual security may deal
with substantive rights such as the right to property if such rights are necessary to achieve acceptance of the political system by those with wealth.
The rules may also deal with entitlements such as a free primary education
or a right to social security benefits if such entitlements are a condition for
acceptance of the political system by lower income groups. In such a system, courts may usefully serve as the arbiters of the interpretation of the
rules.
19. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); Tim FEDERALIST No. 39 (James
Madison). See also BLACK, supra note 4, at 158. Tocqueville likewise stresses the role
of the U.S. federal courts in maintaining social and political peace. ALEXiS DE
TOCQUEVILLE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 156-57 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1945).
20. See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND PoiiricAr ANALYSIS 8, 17

(1981).
21. A typical example could be the unwritten rule that Presidents should serve no
more than two consecutive terms, a rule established by George Washington's decision to
serve only two terms, and lasting until Franklin D. Roosevelt. In reaction to Roosevelt,
the rule then became formalized in Amendment 22 to the U.S. Constitution.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol121:77

Charles Black has offered one of the best known discussions of the
U.S. Supreme Court as a legitimizing institution.' He begins by discussing "legitimacy" in terms similar to those offered here, asking what leads
individuals to consider' the government as a constitutional structure
"authentic and of right," and with the axiom that a government will not be
regarded as legitimate unless its actions are "authorized."24 Then he notes
the problem of maintaining legitimacy, arguing that the "one indispensable
ingredient in the original and continuing legitimation of a government must
be its possession and use of some means for bringing about a consensus on
the legitimacy of important government measures."' The mere fact that a
government is a government of limited powers creates conditions ripe for
questioning the legitimacy of its actions, since individuals affected will
often feel that the government has acted beyond the scope of its powers.
Further, since constitutional language is by necessity very broad, it will
also inevitably lead to disputes about the legitimacy of government actions.26 Courts provide a mechanism for individuals to air their claims of
illegitimate government action, and given their day in court, litigants will
accept the decision of the tribunal as a statement of the legiltimacy or illegitimacy of the government's action.27
At a minimum, arbiters decide disputes. Judges, however, as the arbiters maintaining the rules of security upon which legitimate government
is built, set precedents which substantiate the legitimacy of the political
system. Dahl, in an article on the U.S. Supreme Court written long before
Polyarchy, comments that the main achievement of the U.S. Supreme
Court has been one of conferring legitimacy on the fundamental policies of
the political coalition in power." Moreover, according to Dahl, the Supreme Court has rarely stood up to politically important government policies, 29 a position that other scholars have taken issue with." However, no

22. BLACK, supra note 4.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 37
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40-41.
Id. at 49-52.

28. Robert Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a NaPUB. L. 279, 294 (1957).
tional Policy-Maker,6 J.
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Roger Handberg & Harold F Hill Jr., Court Curbing, Court Reversals,

and JudicialReview: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 L. & SOC'Y REV 309, 321
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one challenges the proposition that the Supreme Court will often constitutionally legitimate government policies, and even Dahl would likely admit
that the Court's legitimating authority depends upon the public's perception of its independence from other branches of the government. A puppet
court can hardly confer legitimacy 3' There is scholarly consensus that
U.S. Supreme Court decisions confer legitimacy and help establish the
constitutional structure, and that such functions have an impact far beyond
the disposition of individual cases and controversies. 2
B. The Legitimacy of the Legitimizer
If the model of judicial review went no further than what has been described thus far, the solution for any country seeking constitutional stability would seem quite simple: establish a constitution that provides mutual
security for all politically relevant groups and establish a court system to
enforce the established rules. However, such a model is seriously limited
m two ways. First, the model is static and implicitly assumes that judges
apply rules previously set out by the parties to the dispute-rather like resolving a contract dispute where the contract provides all rules applicable
to the relationship between the parties. In practice, the rules evolve. Second, the model assumes that the rules of mutual security and the court
system--an enormous assumption, and one whose dynamic may also
change over time.
Max Weber's Sociology of Law begins to fill these gaps. While
Weber's work studies rules of law and its authority in more general terms
than constitutionalism alone, many of his observations apply to the constitutional sphere and offer a useful springboard. Weber emphasizes the pre(1980); Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM.

POL. SCL RaV. 50, 50, 60-63 (1976).
31. Ronen Sharir, "Landmark Cases" and the Reproduction of Legitimacy: The
Case of Israel'sHigh Courtof Justice, 24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 781, 800 (1990) cites DAHL,

supra note 13, at 282, as implicitly acknowledging the importance to the Supreme Court
of at least creating the impression that it occasionally decides in favor of political minorities, and his article demonstrates the importance to a Court of showing that it can decide cases against the government if it is to enjoy the legitimacy necessary to allow it to
ever confer legitimacy; see also BLACK, supra note 4, at 53.
32. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 4, at 78-80 giving the example of the U.S. Supreme
Court's early decisions in favor of a broad interpretation of the powers of the federal
government, and at 64-66 gives the example of the Supreme Court's decisions legitinuzing the governmental structures created by the New Deal after initially opposing them;
JESSE H. CHOPER, JuDIcIAL REviEw AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRocEss 83-122

(1980).
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dictability supplied by law as essential to the growth of commercial relations and capitalism--because it provides the security necessary for econolmc growth. The best environment for the pursuit of economic selfinterest is an environment that allows the rational calculation of the result
of one's dealings with others, which is only possible with the security of
law 31 To maximize predictability, law must be separated from political
and social pressures and follow regular procedures-thus achieving autonomy from any social goals not already expressed by the legislator in the
law itself.' This autonomous law reaches theoretical perfection as it becomes increasingly rational-as legal scholars find themselves increasingly able to state the legal solution to problems in a way that eliminates
any contradictions within the law and increases predictability. Legal rationality "represents an integration of all analytically derived legal propositions m such a way that they constitute a logically clear, internally consistent, and, at least in theory, gapless system of rules, under which, it is
implied, all conceivable fact situations must be capable of being logically
subsumed lest their order lack an effective guaranty "'
The legitimacy of authority in the rational, autonomous legal system
that Weber describes depends "on a belief in the legality of enacted rules
and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands."3 Returning to the terminology of the last section, at this stage the
legal system enjoys the legitimacy of rules of mutual security being enforced as written. Despots and demagogues find themselves equally bound
by the constraints of a legal system which opposes them with the responses
of "a technically rational machine" uninfluenced by their policy goals."
Because judges and the law operate autonomously as a self-contained system, they operate free of government control. Further, the most essential
of the rules of mutual security may enjoy a natural law status in the sense
that they owe their status as law not to any positive legal enactment but to
33. 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 847, 883 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., University of California Press, 1978) (1968); see also David M. Trubek, Max
Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972 Wis. L. REV 720, 740 (1972); Sally
Ewing, FormalJustice and the Spirit of Capitalism:Max Weber's Sociology of Law, 21
L. & Soc'Y REV 487,490 (1987).
34. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOciETY INTRANSITION: TOWARD
RESPONSIVE LAW 58-59 (1978). The term "autonomous law" used in this section is taken
from their work and used in the same way. Id. at 76-77.
35. 2 WEBER, supra note 33, at 656.

36. lid. at 215.
37. 2id. at811.
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a teleological or religious status beyond the power of ordinary political
authorities to confer or take away.3 '

Weber, however, also adds a dynamic element, describing a rational,
autonomous legal system as subject to inevitable transition toward what
some sociologists have termed "responsive law."' First, because while the
formal justice of legal rationality offers freedom for individuals to pursue
their interests within the law it also legalizes and protects unequal distributions of economic power,' paving the way for conflicts with religious
ethics and political expediency. According to Weber, the best deal for an
economic elite is a rational and autonomous legal system which is expensive enough for litigants to involve de facto denegation of justice for the
poor, and which at the very least protects the elite's advantages.4 "New
demands for a 'social law' to be based upon such emotionally colored ethical postulates as 'justice' or 'human dignity,' and directed against the very
dominance of a mere business morality" arise as economically disadvantaged classes gain a political voice.42 In the private law realm, arguments
of economic duress and gross disproportion between contractual promise
and consideration begin to be heard. 43 The generality of rules and uniforrmty of application provided by a rational, autonomous legal system
guarantees that office holders will refrain from turning their offices to personal advantage and private citizens will not feel themselves in a position
of dependence toward office holders. However, since law is also a mechanism for the distribution of power, the system works to the detriment of
those without economic and social power. The working class will wish
distributive justice that reinterprets the law in its favor, not blind justice
that ignores its interests.

38. 2 id at 867 (offenng the definition of natural law used here); 2 id. at 789-92,

809-10, 855-67, also noting the role of religious law as a stage in the development of rational, autonomous legal systems; cf. ROBERTO MANaABEMRA UNGER, LAw INMODERN

Socmn' 76-86 (1976) (arguing that natural law is a necessary precursor to positive law
in a pluralist society).

39. NoNs & SELZmNcK, supra note 34, at 76-77.
40. 2 WEBER, supra note 33, at 812.
41. 2 id at 814; see also Ewing, supra note 33, at 507; David Trubek, Max Weber's
Tragic Modermsm and the Study of Law m Society, 20 L. & Soc'Y REV. 573, 593-97
(1986).
42. 2 WEBER, supra note 33, at 886.
43. 2id
44. Unger, supra note 38, at 179-80.
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Second, the expansion of a welfare ideology and economc interventionism in the modem bureaucratic state will lead the government to wish
judges to advance its instrumental ends.45 The government will seek to recruit the legal profession to advance its policies, and the legal profession,
feeling straight-jacketed by techmcal, machine-like approaches to law, will
often wish to comply A government seeking to establish mandatory
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance requires courts willing to bend traditional notions of contract law and freedom of contract to
accommodate the new schemes. A government combating terrorism may
require broader judicial acceptance of the work of undercover agents.
Moreover, lawyers themselves will wish to bring the law in line with social
values.' Even if the law does not provide special treatment for an aged
widow who signs a long-term contract to purchase overvalued, speculative
investments, members of the legal profession who share the values of society at large will wish to read the law so as to provide it.
Third, even commercial interests will often wish to escape the confines of a rational and autonomous law that does not respond to their actual
practices and needs. "[P]nvate parties are aimed at economic results and
oriented towards economically determined expectations" 7 which may differ from the law's determination of the legal relationship between the parties.4" Once the law seeks to increase its logic and predictability to the jurist, it loses predictability for the lay person.49 Moving beyond Weber to
the constitutional sphere, one would also expect commercial interests to
seek a changed economuc relationship with the State according to prevalent
economic conditions. Laissez-faire may be attractive in one period, while
in other circumstances State regulation or subsidies may be preferable. If
either a laissez-faire approach to economic rights or State intervention has
been built into the rules of mutual security, a change in the rules will be
required if a shift in the economic environment leads commercial interests
to seek a changed relationship with the State.
Weber does not, however, consider the legitimacy of a legal system
that lacks the justification that it merely applies pre-established rules of
mutual security Autonomous law enjoys legitimacy as the embodiment of

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See 2 WEBER, supra note 33, at 886, 893-94; Ewing, supra note 33, at 507.
2 WEBER, supra note 33, at 886-88.
2 id. at 885.
2 id. at 885, 893.
2 id. at 855.
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the system of mutual security that a pluralist society requires for stability.
If law, and more, particularly a constitution, is seen as embracing society's
essential precepts and as the force maintaining mutual security, then it
cannot be disturbed. ° Courts that seek to respond to social values external
to the legal system lose the justification that they merely enforce the rules
of mutual security While politically unstoppable social forces may clamor
for legal instrumentalism to advance social values and government policies, changes in the law through litigation also results in winners and losers, and the losers will question the legitimacy of the change. The problem
of legitimacy becomes even stronger when, as is often the case, some of
the rules of the system of mutual security are perceived as having natural
law roots, making any change a change in theoretically unchangeable law.
The more responsive a legal system becomes the more serious its problem
of legitimacy
Moreover, it is by no means certain that social classes disadvantaged
by the distributive effects of formal approaches to law will improve their
5
situation once judges begin to consider social policy in applying the law 1
A socially conservative but instrumentalist judiciary could easily prove
more harmful to their interests than an autonomous, mechanical one. The
classes dissatisfied with the distribution of economic and social power under the prevailing system of autonomous law face a Hobson's choice.
They may attack rule formalism and call for judicial decision-making that
responds to their social objectives; but if they do so, unless they also control the judiciary, they may open the door for adventures by a judiciary un52
sympathetic to their interests.
A judge trained to treat the law as autonomous from outside influences might respond to activist criticisms that any change in fundamental
norms must be sought through constitutional amendment. But an amendment process, particularly when treating fundamental issues, may be impossible as a practical matter even for a powerful political majority. First,
the formal process of constitutional amendment in a written constitution
must inevitably be cumbersome if the constitution is to assure permanent
rules of mutual security A constitution too easily amended provides little
security The very difficulty of meeting the requirements for constitutional
50. Cf. SAMUEL P HUNTINGTON, POUrICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SocIETIEs 101
(1968); UNGER, supra note 38, at 65 (making a very similar point but in the context of
societies trying to move away from unchanging natural law).
51. 2 WEBER, supranote 33, at 893.
52. UNGER, supra note 38, at 190.
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amendment may allow a determined minority to block changes that have
become essential for the political tranquillity of society Second, the constitution may have religious or natural law roots or a senu-sacred status
making it resistant to the formal amendment process, regardless of the
strong political need for change. In that event, the amended constitution
may lack the acceptance enjoyed by the original document. Third, the
writing of a new constitution or the substantial amendment of an old one is
an extraordinary act for society, requiring enormous politic,d energy and
often acts of revolution or insurrection. It took an uprising of English barons against King John to produce the Magna Carta of 1215 and the Civil
War to produce the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to
the U.S. Constitution. The process of seeking a constitutionad amendment
may cause serious political insecurity as the forces seeking change seek to
demonstrate that they represent a supermajority entitled to change the
rules, and the political minority feels previously untouchable interests
threatened.
Some might be tempted to argue that the legitimacy problem is so serious that judges should never seek to replace a rational, autonomous legal
system with a responsive one.53 Even long time advocates of responsive
legal decision-making like Philip Selzmck, who helped coin the term "responsive law" to describe law interpreted so as to respond to social needs,'
temper their call for more responsive systems of judicial decision-making
with the caveat that the system itself must first be basically :;ecure.55 The
catch, however, is that the forces calling for responsive judicial decisionmaking may well be inexorable. While social classes which find themselves disadvantaged by a society's rules of mutual security may think
twice before allowing judges whom they perceive as the collaborators of
the privileged class engage in responsive lawmaking, the status quo of the
existing, autonomously applied rules of mutual security will also prove unacceptable. Furthermore, the social groups in society that are politically
relevant, their relative weight, and the distribution of political power are
likely to change over time. If a constitution was written during a period of
53. Th1is, of course, is essentially the position of the strict constructionists. See, e.g.,
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
143, 159-60 (1990); Antonin Scalia, Onginalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV.

849, 854 (1989).
54. NoNET & SELZNICK, supra note 34, at 76-77.
55. PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH:
PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 464 (1992).
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oligarchic democracy and if political participation has since broadened,
although the new political participants may initially accept the existing
system of mutual security as a condition for entering into the political process, they are also likely to express increasing frustration with rules that
allow greater concessions to the old elite than its present political power
warrants. Given that effective constitutions often prove very difficult to
amend, the problem of maintaining legitimacy becomes strikingly complex. Unless the rules of mutual security evolve, they may lose their effectiveness, since increasingly large segments of society may find themselves unwilling to accept the constitutional bargain and therefore no
longer consider the government and its policies to be legitimate. In such
circumstances, courts cannot act as arbiters enforcing the rules of mutual
security because the rules themselves are unacceptable. Yet if the constitution does evolve through the interpretive techmques of the judiciary or
other societal institutions, the mterpretr-who previously depended on
the legal rationality of autonomous law- likewise runs the risk of losing
both legitimacy and the ability to confer it.
While Weber's work does not deal directly with the problem of legitimacy in a system of responsive law, he does offer a basis for extrapolation. Weber's Sociology of Law analyzes law primarily in the context of
what he refers to as "rational" grounds of legitimate domination, or government that rests "on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right
of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands."'m
However, Weber also describes two other types of legitimate domination--"traditional" domination and "charismatic" domination.
Under
traditional grounds of domination, authority rests on "an established belief
in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them.'SS Under charismatic grounds of domination,
authority rests on acceptance of the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of a particular person and corresponding acceptance of the
56. 1 WEBER, supra note 33, at 215.
57. 1 id. Weber's division of authority into only three types, traditional, rational,
and charismatic, is probably incomplete. As this author has delevoped in other work, an

additional source of authority in Argentina in the nineteenth century was the talisman of
the U.S. Constitution and U.S. constitutional practice, see Jonathan Miller, The Authority
of a Foreign Talisman: A Study of U.S. ConstitutionalPractice as Authority in Nineteenth Century Argentina and the Argentine Elite's Leap of Faith, 46 A. U. L. REV.
_ (1997), but it is not necessary to elaborate on this variant for the purposes of tlus
article.
58. 1 WEBER, supranote 33, at 215.
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decisions and laws established by that person. 9 The individual exercising
charismatic authority either enjoys the ability to exercise authority outside
the limits of formal legal rules or tradition or--essentially the same
thing-sets and revises the rules governing his authonty and that of others
himself. Weber also notes that none of the three types of donunation-rational, traditional or charismatic-is often found in 'pure' firm' While
one form of donunation may frequently prevail, societies often exhibit all
three types of domination.6'
Autonomous law and rational domination go hand in hand. Government officials govern by virtue of the authority vested in them by law and
correspondingly must abide by the law. However, what societies think of
as autonomous legal authority often involves a mix of rational and traditional domination. A belief in the legality or illegality of particular conduct may come to be established and habitual, which makes it partly traditional.62 Or, tradition may come to acquire a legal aspect, as in the British
Constitution, where customs that have attained the authority of tradition
have also come to be regarded as binding and guaranteed as law 63 Once it
becomes sufficiently mgrained, a legal norm which achieves the status of
tradition may become extremely difficult to change because it derives
authority from traditional as well as rational grounds.61 By contrast, the
common law system enjoys exceptional flexibility through a combination
of charismatic, traditional and rational authority In the conmnon law system judges openly establish new norms and show little concern for logical
legal construction m the sense of the law forming an autonomous, coherent
whole. Precedents enjoy their greatest authority when the judge writing
the opinion enjoys exceptional respect,' and when the rules they establish
correspond to social needs.'
What Weber does not argue explicitly, though it naturally follows
from his work, is that to the extent that any legal system seeks to offer re59. 1id.
60.
61.
62.
63.

1id. at 216.
1id.at 262-63.
1id. at 263.
See 1 id. at 323.

64. See 1 id.
65. 2 id. at 891.
66. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWalfe Howe ed.,

1988) (1881) ('The life of the law has not been logic: it has been expenence.");
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 102 (1921) ("[Tlhe juns.
tic philosophy of the common law is at bottom the philosophy of pragmatism.").
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sponsive judicial decision-making that breaks down the autonomous nature
of law, it perforce becomes charismatic. Legal authority in a responsive
system no longer rests on the law alone but on the special ability of the
judge to harmonize competing social and governmental interests. Therefore the legitimacy of a legal system that seeks to operate responsively depends directly on the extent to which the society in which it operates is
willing to concede to judges independent charismatic authority. Part of the
secret to democratic development-which depends on the establishment of
accepted but evolving rules of mutual security-is the development of
some legal institution with a charismatic element.
Admitting the need for a charismatic element in order to achieve a responsive legal system need not imply the adrmission of a democratic or undemocratic element, but merely the existence of a person or persons with
some ability to change the rules of the game. An elected leader in a purely
populist democracy, with no restrictions on his conduct following election,
enjoys a comparatively pure form of charismatic authority.l Such a leader
rules because he has been "elevated" by popular acclaim. It is only the
establishment of a law or a constitution that begins to establish the system
as a rational one and begins to allow pluralist forces to operate with confidence in the existing of rules of mutual security. Elected charismatic
presidents with few institutions capable of restraining their authority are
quite common in developing countries, but government by a powerful,
charismatic Executive offers scarcely more security than government by an
unelected dictator.
One can easily foresee enormous difficulty in selecting judges in a responsive legal system. In a rational, autonomous legal system, choosing
judges is comparatively easy because the parties to the pact providing them
with mutual security know that the judiciary must limit itself to the terms
of the law. By the same token it is comparatively simple for two companies to choose an arbitrator to decide a business dispute when both sides
agree that the contract between them will provide the entire set of applicable rules. However serious difficulties in choosing an arbitrator will inevitably emerge if the parties, whether to a system of mutual security or a
contract, agree that the arbitrator should also enjoy the authority to change
the terms of their agreement. As the scope of discretion widens, the range
of persons acceptable as neutral arbiters will narrow. Admittedly the very
concept of a rational, autonomous legal system where correct "legal" an67. 1 WEBER, supra note 33, at 266-67.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol121:77

swers can be found contains an element of myth. Language, by its nature
contains multiple meanings, possesses grey areas falling between classifications, and fails to deal with previously unknown situations. But even
admitting the existence of areas where the rational interpreter will have
difficulty producing an answer, a well-written text can provide an answer
in many situations, and arbiters who confine themselves to the interpretation of a text will have their discretion much more circumscribed than arbiters who do not. The rational interpreter is both a clearer restraint and a
more circumscribed threat to a populist Executive than a socially responsive but textually unfettered judiciary
Further, judges who attempt to exercise charismatic authority but who

in fact lack society's backing to exercise such authority will find themselves lacking in political support. In the event of conflict between the judiciary and an elected Executive when both are trying to exercise charismatic authority, one would expect the Executive, if at least moderately
popular, to have a strong advantage in societal support. Particularly if
elected directly by the people, the Executive can point to his election as
establishing his legitimacy, while the judge who has moved beyond the
constitutional text can no longer honestly point to legal authority as the
source of his legitimacy and thus lacks the Executive's charisma. Unless
judges are either very good at using legal citations to hide the fact that they
are acting charismatically, or unless the judiciary enjoys so exceptional a
level of respect m society that it has indeed acquired its own basis of charismatic authority, judges who act charismatically will run into serious difficulties when they clash with other branches of government. The outcome
of such a clash is likely to be the replacement or packing of the judiciary or
recognition by judges that they can only act charismatically when they do
so in support of an official or officials who are the true holders of charismatic authority-usually the elected national Executive, because the Executive, unlike the judge, has been elevated from his peers by an election.
Weber, while not discussing the problem in terms of ability to exercise
charismatic authority, does note that judges stripped of rational approaches
toward law and the "sacredness of the purely objective legal formalism"
will likely find themselves turned into an arm of govern ment bureaucracy 68
Once the process of executive domination of the judiciary begins, it
may be extraordinarily difficult to reverse. A judiciary able to move be68. 2 id. at 893-94. See also Ewing, supra note 33, at 510.
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yond the constitutional text m its interpretation is both a greater prize and a
greater threat than a judiciary limited to the rational authority of interpretation of a text. As textual restraints on judicial decision-making disappear, it becomes harder to select an arbiter acceptable to all parties. If
judges respond to their perceptions of social needs in deciding cases and
accordingly take positions on econormc, political and social issues that politically favor either the government in power or its opposition, the Executive may feel that in order to protect itself it needs to pack the judiciary
with judges committed to the government's program. Moreover, the
problem will be especially serious m an economically developing country.
Constitutional issues vital to the Executive's program or political survival
will appear with greater frequency m a developing country than in a developed country because development by definition involves changing economic, political and social structures, and hence more frequent disputes
over rules of mutual security.
Further, if the dommantjudicial philosophy and scholarly community
admit that the law does not function autonomously but must be interpreted
in light of social needs, the interpretation even of recently revised constitutional texts will require some charismatic authority, and the judiciary
will find itself unable to respond to executive pressure by insisting that the
law is clear. In the worst of cases, rule of law may all but disappear, as the
bureaucracy comes to enjoy ever increasing discretion and an ever widening gap emerges between legal texts and actual practice. Of course, judges
who exercise charismatic authority solely as dependents of a charismatic
Executive are unable to guarantee or confer legitimacy on rules of mutual
security, because the public will perceive them as lacking independence.
Moreover, the Executive under such circumstances will ultimately suffer
from the decline in the level of mutual security caused by the decline in judicial authority.
By reading Weber in light of society's need to develop a system of
mutual security and yet respond to societal changes, a model with the following essential features of the role of law in political development may be
established:
(1) In its early stages of opening itself to political competition, a society
may benefit from clearly established rules of mutual security (whether
written or unwritten) and the secondary legal norms based thereon, enforced by an independent judiciary which interprets the law in an
autonomous manner, independent of societal concerns and pressures not
already incorporated into the law. If widely accepted and enforced, law
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increases the legitimacy of government, raises the cost to the government of illegally repressing the opposition-because illegal conduct
causes the government to lose legitimacy-and decreases the risk to the
governing elite of allowing the opposition to come to power.
(2) Over the long term, systems of autonomous law are unstable.
Eventually political forces change, social and economic concerns
change, and the rules of mutual security must evolve with those
changes. These rules may evolve in one of two ways: (a) through constitutional amendment or a new constitution; or (b) through judicial
abandonment of autonomy in favor of a responsive legal system which
refines the rules of mutual security and the secondary norms based
thereon to incorporate social values and political realities not otherwise
part of the law.
(3) Constitutional amendment, assuming it exists as a political possibility, may itself create instability. The amendment process may lead to
the questioning of existing rules of mutual security before agreement
exists as to the new rules to replace them. Further the resulting amendments, even if passed according to constitutional requirements for
amendment, may lack the acceptance required to function as true rules
of mutual security.
(4) Responsive judicial decision-making which seeks to modify the rules
of mutual security may face a serious problem of legitimacy. If the judiciary or a similar institution is able to continuously refine the rules of
mutual security so that political actors feel that security and legitimacy
are maintained, then the judiciary has performed a vital function for the
maintenance of stability in a pluralist society. However, actually performing this trick is another matter since once courts abandon the realm
of autonomous law, one would expect them to lose their own natural
source of legitimacy.
(5) Courts which seek to refine the rules of mutual security but lack well
established charismatic authority in society will likely fall captive to
branches of government more readily recognized as possessing charismatic authority-which in turn elimnates the value of courts as guardians of the rules of mutual security.
The manner in which a society provides for future modification of its
rules of mutual security will be key to its long-term stability and is one of
the most fundamental and difficult problems of democratic development.
The problem is fundamental because it can be counted upon to arise as political and social forces realign themselves and old rules become obsolete
(a development all the more frequent in countries undergoing rapid eco-
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nomic and social change). The problem is difficult because of the paradox
of allowing an institution established under rules of mutual security, and
charged with stopping the Executive and legislature from exceeding their
authority, to modify the very rules upon which its legitimacy depends. Because of the paradox, models of judicial review in a responsive legal system must contain a charismatic element which will often seem at odds with
the rational nature of the rest of the political system, and may contain deliberately enigmatic elements which hide the charismatic nature of the
authority exercised. Such models, because they often conceal their real
nature, will also be exceptionally difficult to transplant between cultures.
One caveat must be added. If charismatic authority is understood as
authority based on the special character of the person exercising it, it may
be rooted in turn m a variety of different phenomena that might also be
thought of as sources of authority Charisma may be achieved through
elections, through coalition building, through a talent for giving voice to
fundamental social values, through religious pronnence, through an image
of fairness cultivated by listening to all parties in a dispute, or through
other methods. This Article will make only a limited effort to differentiate
the elements that enter into the successful exercise of charismatic authority
by judges. But that limitation does not undercut the central point of this
Article, that judicial review that views law as autonomous from social and
political needs will ultimately fail, but the authority of judges m a responsive legal system is extremely fragile, since the rational authority of
autonomous law is easier to establish than the charismatic authority of responsive law To the extent that a solution exists, it must lie in the creation
of a charismatic judicial authority using elements already available in the
particular society which foster charismatic authority.

I.

Argentina as an Illustration

Argentina offers a dramatic illustration of the inevitability and dangers of responsive judicial decision-making. Argentine constitutionalism
successfully established many important rules of mutual security between
the 1860s and 1930-a success that is especially striking given the dictatorships and civil wars that affected the country from independence in
1810 until the 1860s.69 Judicial review in Argentina was nonexistent prior
to 1863, yet almost instantly established itself as a major force m Argen69. See generally ROCK, supra note 8, at 79-131 (describing the politics and civil

wars of the period).
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tine politics. One of the reasons that it was so successful was because the
U.S. Constitution and U.S. constitutional practice enjoyed strong authority
among Argentina's political elite in the nineteenth century, creating greater
support for the new constitution than would have been enjoyed by a purely
Argentine creation.70 However once Argentina adopted a Civil Code in
1869, the authority of the U.S. Constitution gradually took a back seat to
classic Continental views of autonomous, rational law An autonomous,
rational approach toward constitutional law domnnated Argentine constitutional caselaw with very positive consequences for Argentine civil liberties, until the 1930s, when the Court began its major shift toward responsive law, which eventually resulted in both weakened constitutional
protections and a weakened Supreme Court.
The case study that follows will describe Argentina's initial shift to
autonomous law as its dominant mode of legal analysis, and then its shift
in turn toward responsive law Any number of areas of constitutional law
could be chosen to illustrate Argentina's shift from autonomous law to responsive law The focus here will be on freedom of the press and regulation of econormc activity, since these are two areas where the Supreme
Court's pre-1930 caselaw is particularly clear-cut, as is its subsequent
shift.
A.

The RationalistTransformation

In the late nineteenth century, Argentina underwent a shift toward an
autonomous, rational view of the law Approaches toward law based on
natural justice and equity were abandoned, and legal education shifted
from practical training to legal science. Prior to adopting a Civil Code,
Argentina was comparatively uninfluenced by the autonomous, rational
approach toward law of continental Europe. The Civil Code, seen by Argentine progressives as part of modernization, represented a sharp shift toward rational legal authority and changed the way lawyers thought.
Continental legal culture has not remained static since the Napoleonic
Code was promulgated in 1804, and its characteristics have vaned from
country to country 71 However, under their traditional paradigms, all the
70. See Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman,supra note 57 at _.

71. Nineteenth century continental rationality took two main forms. In France, particularly during the early decades after promulgation of the Civil Code, nineteenth century judges and scholars emphasized exegesis, a focus on the structure, language and
grammar of the Code, but with little reference to earlier practice. In nineteenth century
Germany, an important historical school focused on historical analysis to explain the
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Continental legal systems have been seen as striving for logically derived,

context-free norms to be rationally applied by judges without reference to
values and concerns not present in the civil code3n The system epitomizes
what Weber describes as rational authorityn' Civilians assumed that a
"right" answer existed to every legal problem, and that the judge was prin-

cipally a technician deducing the answer from the various provisions of the

civil code. 4 The model values certainty and ignores any need for judicial
responsiveness to social conditionsjs Today, continental Europeans have

moved toward a more socially responsive approach of the law.l Legal realism that regarded consideration of social needs as part of the judicial

function began to find an academic niche in France in 1899 with Frangois
7' and in Argentina in 1905, with Carlos
Gny's Mithode d'interpretation,
8
Octavio Bunge's El Derecho. However, Gdny's work only had a gradual
affect on French legal culture," and Bunge's legal realism still met strong
motivation behind Code provisions. Both insist that there is a "right" answer that
emerges from an existing body of law. See Alexander Alvarez, Dominant Legal Influences of the Second Half of the Century, in THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW INTHE
NINETEENTH CENTURY 31, 39-41, 43 (1918); JOHN P DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF TE LAW
392,452-56 (1968).
72. See

JOHN MERRYMAN,

TiE CIvIL LAW TRADITION 64-65 (2d ed. 1985); see also

RENt DAvID & JOHN E. BRIERLY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 66, 67
(1985) (noting that French codification had the unintended impact of ushering in legal
positivism).
73. TRUBEK, supranote 33, at 724,730.
74. MERRYMAN, supra note 72, at 29, 36-37, 81-82.
75. MiIIAN R. DAMAsKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY: A
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS

37 (1986);

ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING

OFTHECiviLLAw 134-36 (1981).

76. See generally Mitchel de S.-O.-'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial
Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325 (1995) (describing how the
traditional view of U.S. scholars of the French judiciary is outdated, and that practice
today is much closer to legal realism); REN9 DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE,
SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 161-67 (Michael Kindred trans., 1972) (1960) (discussing
teleological interpretation under French law under which the mearung of a statute may
vary according to the needs of the times).
77. FRANCOIS GgNY, MtrHODE D'INTERPRETATION ET SOURCES EN DROrr PRiVI PosHnI
(Pans, A. Chevalier-Marescq & Cie. 1899) (this work begins with a critique of autonomous, rational methods of interpretation and then develops the alternative of judicial decision-making that considers societal needs); see also LASSER, supra note 76, at 1344-45
(describing G6ny's book as a "realist-style critique" and noting that Gdny has now become mainstream acadermc thought in France).
78. CARLOS OCTAVIO BUNGE, ELDERECHO (1905).

79. Cf DAWSON, supra note 71, at 392-94 (writing in the 1960s, he describes French
judges and scholars as reluctant to move beyond rational approaches toward the law even
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resistance m Argentina through the 1960s, even
8 0 though autonomous law
had long been abandoned by the Supreme Court.

Argentina did not follow an autonomous, rational approach toward
law prior to its adoption of a Civil Code in 1869 First, separation of powers did not exist in colonial Spanish America, and politics from the 1820s
through 1860 was too chaotic a mix of civil war and dictatorships to produce useful precedent. Judges of the colonial audiencias, which had an

appellate function, were members of the Crown bureaucracy and often exercised executive as well as judicial functions.8 They frequently considered the interests of the Crown when interpreting legal norms,82 and hence

had only lirmted interest in legal rationality General Juan Manuel de Rosas, the caudillo (warlord) who governed the Province of Buenos Aires in
the 1830s and 1840s, did more than require judges to take governmental
3
interests into account; he decided all important cases himself.
Second, prior to codification, Argentine judges enjoyed a variety of

potential sources of law, including recourse to societal perceptions of fairness through natural law and equity Prior to the adoption of the civil code
it was often extremely hard to know what the civil law in Argentina was,
then); DAVID, supra note 76, at 167 (noting that G6ny failed in his ambition to have jurists openly acknowledge that they often must move beyond the legislative text).
80. The resistance to legal realism is best demonstrated in a book by one of Argentina's most prominent jurists, SEBASTIAN SOLER, LA INTERPRETACI6N DF LA LEY (1962).
It is also striking that Argentina's most promnnent civil law scholar in the period between
World War I and World War II, Raymundo M. Salvat, describes Gdny's work at the beginning of his treatise, but interprets it very conservatively, as saying that while a judge
can look at life in society to interpret the law when the law is unclear, a judge can never
go against the text of the law. I RAYMUNDO M. SALVAT, TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL
ARGENTiNO 3 (1917). G9NY, however, explicitly leaves this point open, noting that there
may be times and societies where it is necessary for judges to ignore the positive law
when it goes against important social needs. G9NY, supra note 77, at § 183. Even in the
1980s one can encounter statements in judicial opinions on the limited interpretive freedom of judges. See, e.g., L.B., V.A. c/G.D., CNCiv., Section C, 117 E.D 512 (1986).
"Rol6n Zappa," CSJN 308 Fallos 1848, 1854 (1986) offers a rare example of the Supreme Court in the 1980s refusing to examnne political and social exigency and taking a
rational approach toward the law.
81. See RICARDO ZORRAQUIN BECO, LA ORGANIZACI6N JUDICIAL ARGENTINA EN EL
PERIODO HISPANico 25-26, 143-47 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter "ORGANIZACI6N JUDICIAL"];
see also C.H. HARING, THE SPANISH EMPIRE IN AMERICA 129-37 (1947); RICARDO
LEVENE, INTRODUCCI6N A LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO INDIANO (1924), reprinted in 3
OBRAS DE RICARDO LEVENE 99 (Acaderma Nacional de Histona, 1962).

82. Id.
83. JOHN

LYNCH, ARGENTINE DICTATOR, JUAN MANUEL DE ROSAS,

1829-1852, at

169-70 (1981). This was also the situation in most other Argentine provinces until 1852,
see ZORRAQUfN BECO, ORGANIZACION JUDICIAL, supra note 81, at 215.
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let alone to view it as a collection of logically derived rules." In the colonial period, the Viceroyalty of the River Plate was governed by the Recopilaci6n de Leyes de los Reynos de Indias (1680) (Recompilation of the
Laws of the Kingdoms of the Indies)-a distillation of hundreds of thousands of royal colonial regulations -, post 1680 regulations, and Castilian
law that itself consisted of a poorly organized and incomplete recompilation of royal ordinances and assorted compilations focusing mainly on civil
relations.' The most important compilation of civil law, which covered
many of the areas that would later be covered in the civil code, was the
Siete Partidas(which rmght be loosely translated as the "Seven Acts" or
"Seven Sections"). 6 But while the Argentine Civil Code contains norms
derived from the Siete Partidas,methodologically the two are completely
different. The Siete Partidaswere completed by the early fourteenth century, many centuries before rationalism became a significant influence on
Spanish legal thought."a They are products of the scholasticism of the
Middle Ages, and focus as much on general social and ethical precepts and
explanations for them, as on concrete norms. Thus the Siete Partidasexplain why the King should be honored and respected (he is God's representative and maintains order),8 the nature of justice (giving to each his
due), 9 and even the nature of friendship (shared goodwill and love that
makes law unnecessary).' ° While there are many specific rules in areas
such as the sale of goods,9 civil procedure,' and family law," those rules
84. VICTOR TAU ANZOATEGUI, LA CODIFICACI6N EN LA ARGENTINA (1810-1870) 315
(1977); see also KENNETH KARST & KErH ROSENN, LAw AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN

34-35 (1975) (noting the difficulty of identifying the applicable law throughout
the Spanish colonies).
AMERICA

85. Dalmacio V6lez Sirsfield, Elfolleto del Dr. Alberdi [hereinafter "Folleto"], EL
1868, reprinted in DALMACIO VtLEZ SAtSFIE.D, PAGINAS
MAGISTRALEs 174, 179 (Alberto Palcos ed., n.d.); see also I RicARDo ZoRRAQuIN BEdc,
HisTORIA DEL DERECHO ARGENTiNO 216 (1966) [hereinafter "HISORiA"].
86. 1ZORRAQUIN BEc0, HisTORiA, supranote 85, at 216.
87. TAU ANZOATEGUI, supra note 84, at 41-47. Most of the Siete Partidaswere
NACIONAL, July 25,

drafted at the direction of King Alfonso X of Castile at the rmddle of the thirteenth century, developing their final form early in the fourteenth century. 1 ZORRAQUIN BEcO,
HISTORiA, supra note 85, at 55. The definitive official edition was only published in

1555, 1 idat 57.
88. Las Siete Partidas, Partida 2, Tftulo 1, Leyes 1-8 (Gregono Lopez ed., 1555).
89. ld., Partida 3, Tftulo 1, Ley 1.
90. Id., Partida 4, Titulo 27, Ley 1.
91. Id, Partida 5, Tftulo 5.
92. Id, Partida 3.
93. Id., Partida 4.
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are complemented by a general concern for ethics. Judges saw their function more in terms of achieving equity in accordance with moral and re-

ligious standards than in applying technical legal norms,9 which were confusing anyway 95 Further, the Siete Partidas,while dealing with many

fields, was never seen as excluding all other sources of law. Local custom
and specific legislation often took precedence.96 The combination of multiple sources of law and general natural law concepts gave colonial judges
enormous flexibility in judicial decision-making. 7
Independence in 1810 increased Argentina's exposure to liberal

European influences, but the change in legal thought only occurred gradually 98 There was no overhaul of Argentina's civil legislation prior to the
drafting of the Civil Code, and a great deal of colonial civil legislation

continued in force up until 1869, when the Civil Code came into effect."
Until the 1850s, most Argentine judicial decisions offered little more than
a statement of conclusions,"° making it difficult to determine the relative

94. See ZORRAQuIN BECO, ORGANIZACXON JUDICIAL, supra note 81, at 25, 26-27.
95. V61ez Sdrsfield, the author of Argentina's Civil Code, noted that the confused
nature of Argentine law prior to codification in practice meant expanded judicial power.
V9LEz SARsFiELD, FOLLEro, supranote 85, at 179-80.
96. 1 ZoRRAQUIN BEC0, HISTORIA, supranote 85, at 56-57.
97. Bernardino Brava Lira, Arbitno judicialy legalismo. Juez y Derecho en Europa
Continental y en Iberoaminca antes y despuis de la codificacidn, 28 REVISTA DE
HISTORIA DEL DERECHO "RICARDO LEVENE" 7, 8-9 (1991). This flexibility is not unique
to Argentina during this period, even among civil law jurisdictions. For example,
DAWSON, supra note 69, at 372 notes that the abundance of sources of law available to
judges in pre-Revolution (and pre-Napoleonic Code) France gave judges there a great
deal of freedom; cf. DAVID, supra note 76, at 8-9 (noting the importance of judge-made
law and equity in pre-Revolution France).
98. See generally TAU ANZOATEGUI, supra note 84, at 65-364 (the entire book is
primarily devoted to tracing the development of the ideologies that led to Argentina's
adoption of a civil code).
99. See Jost. SARTORiO, LA LEY 50, at 36 (2d ed. 1955); see also V9LEz SARSFI3LD,
FOLLETO, supra note 85, at 179 (arguing for replacement of the confused colonial legislation then in force); Congreso Nacional, Diartode sesiones de la Cdmara de Senadores,
Session of Sept. 25, 1869, at 825 (statement of Senator Mitre) (making the same point
during the debate over passage of the Civil Code).
100. Victor Tau Anzogtegui, Acerca de la fundamentacidn de las sentenclas en el

derecho patno, 8

REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO DE HISTORIA DEL DERECHO

181, 182 (1957).

This is also confirmed by a cursory review of the holdings of the Archivc General de In
Nac16n of judgments rendered during the first half of the nineteenth century. The lack of
reasoned judicial decisions is not very surprising when one considers that reasoned judicial decisions did not become common in France and Germany until the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. See DAWSON, supra note 71, at 374; see generally id, at
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weight of equitable concerns as opposed to legal rationality. However
concerns with equity and natural justice remained strong enough so that
the Argentine Supreme Court referred to them in several decisions in the
1860s.101 The Supreme Court in the 1860s did not see itself as bound to
legal rationality

Codification marked a shift toward an autonomous, rational approach
to the law The very process by which the Civil Code was written and
adopted demonstrates this change. Argentina's Civil Code was written by
Dalnacio Vlez S.rsfield, generally recognized as the leading Argentine

private law expert of his day." 2 President Mitre chose him by decree in
1864 to single-handedly draft the Code," and he wrote it over four years
with little assistance from any other Argentine scholar. He received enormous help from foreign sources, however. Vdlez Sdrsfield was wedded to
the idea of a "scientifie" code and the concept that an ideal code could be
designed by choosing from among the best of foreign codes and foreign
authors. In the preface that he sent to the Minister of Justice in 1865 with
the first book of the Code, he begins by listing the foreign models and

scholars that he most heavily relied upon and then notes that in the general
absence of original Argentine norms, he felt free to refer to "scientific law"

375-86 (discussing French judicial decisions) and 437-40 (discussing German judicial
decisions).
101. "Mendoza y Hermano c/Provincia de San Lufs," CSJN 3 Fallos 131 (1865)
(noting that equity disfavored the plaintiff in that case, and using that consideration to
limit the plaintiff's damages); "Fisco Nacional d/varios comerciantes de Mendoza,"
CSJN 5 Fallos 74, 85-86 (1868) (applying natural law and equity to refuse to require
merchants to pay import tariffs, because the tariffs had already been paid to the rebel
leaders of an unsuccessful rebellion and it was the government's fault that it had lost
control of the local border crossings); "Fisco Nacional c/vanos comerciantes de San
Juan," CSJN 5 Fallos 155, 165-66 (1868) (same as previous case). Felipe S. Perez also
notes the contrast between the Supreme Court in the 1860s and the Court in the 1920s on
the use of equity, citing "Cabot," CSJN 7 Fallos 305 (1869), in which the Court invoked
equity as grounds for discharging an individual from criminal liability, as an example of
use of equity to temper the law, and contrasting it with "Guan c/Provincia de Jujuy,"
CSJN 155 Fallos 302 (1929), where the Court rejected equitable arguments as outside its
competence. 1 FELiE S. PEREZ, TRATADO SOBRE LA JURISPRUDENCIA DE LA CORTE
SUPREMA CON TRANSCRIPCI6N DE LOS FALLOS 303-04

(1941).

102. The classic biography of Dalmacio Vdlez Sfrsfield, which also describes the
writing of the Civil Code, is ABEL CHANETON, HISTORIA DE VWLEZ SARSEIEW (1937).
103. Decree of Oct. 20, 1864, 5 Registro Oficial 170. Law No. 36, art. 1, June 9,
1863, [1852-1880] A.D.L.A. 357, 357, authorized the executive to select committees to
draft the Civil, Penal and Mimng Codes.
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as his primary source."° Almost every article of the code contains a footnote to a foreign code or commentator as its source.'
He did not regard
his role as one of developing uniquely Argentine solutions to Argentine
problems, but of encountering the best rule available in the world of com-

parative law, with "best" understood in terms of acceptance by leading international scholars and coherency within his overall model."°
V61ez Sdrsfield completed the Civil Code during the presidency of

Domingo Sarmiento, and consistent with the view of the Code as a technical enterprise, President Sarniento pressed for Congressional sanction of
the Civil Code in an up or down vote with no opportunity for amendment."° Mitre, then an opposition Senator, agreed, arguing in the Senate

that since the civil code was a scientific work, Congress had no choice but
to accept it as a whole. Just as Congress could not review the astronomical

calculations of a surveyor in fixing a border or the work of scientists in
calculating the precise weights and measures of the metric system, it could
0 8 "Congress has ennot appropriately review the proposed Civil Code."

trusted the drafting of the civil code to men of science because it is a scientific operation."'" Mitre insisted that V61ez Sdrsfield be taken at his
word when he insisted that the Code "is not innovative."' ' While an innovative Code rmght require review by Congress, one that restrains itself to
104. Dalmaco Vdlez Strsfield, Nota de remzst6n del proyecto de c6digo civil [hereinafter "Nota"] (June 21, 1865) (letter accompanying presentation of the first book of the
draft civil code sent to Eduardo Costa, the Minister of Justice) in DALMACIO VLEZ
SARSFIELD, PAGINAs MAGISTRALES 157, 158 (Alberto Palcos ed., n.d.).
105. These footnotes appear in most editions of the Argentine Civil Code. See, e.g.,
C6DIGO CIVIL DE LA REPOBLICA ARGENTINA Y LEGISLACI6N COMPLEMENTARIA (Editorial
Abeledo-Perrot, 21st ed. 1984).
106. See V6lez Sdrsfield, Nota, supra note 104, generally, and especially at 158 (no
single statement in V61ez Sfrsfield's introduction asserts this proposition, but it is clear
from its general tone, which goes out of its way to cite leading authorities and to show
that his work is up to date, orderly and coherent). Interestingly, Juan Bautista Alberdi,
the most important intellectual force behind the Argentine Constitution, harshly attacked
V61ez Sfirsfield's "scientific" approach for ignoring Argentine reality and needs, in a
pamphlet, El proyecto de c6digo civil para la Reptblica Argentina (1868) reprinted in 7
OBRAs COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI 80 (Buenos Aires, La Tribuna Nacional
1886-1887). V6lez Sirsfield replied in Folleto,supra note 85.
107. TAU ANZOATEGUI, supra note 84, at 351; 2 CHANETON, supra note 102, at 147-49
(1937) (both indicating that the push for an all or nothing vote on the Civil Code came
from the executive).
108. Congreso Nacional, Diano de sesiones de la Cdmara de Senadores, Session of
Sept. 25, 1869, at 825 (statement of Senator Mitre).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 826.
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the best that legal science has to offer does not."' The key to a good code
is a thorough review of the state of the field, and V6lez Srsfield could be
counted on for that. "[W]ith our hand placed on our conscience we can
say that there is nothing to invent in the field, and that there is no lawyer
who can search out more science . than the science that Dr. V6lez has
encountered.
"2 In the end the Argentine Civil Code passed Congress
as a closed package in September 1869, only a month after subrmssion." 3
A code need not be "scientific" to involve an autonomous, rational
approach toward the law, but there is little question that a "scientific" code
establishes such an approach and seeks to limit judicial discretion. Read
together, two articles of the Argentine Civil Code illustrate this particularly
well. Article 17 of the original Civil Code of 1869 provided:
Laws cannot be derogated in whole or in part, except by other laws.
Usage, custom
or practice cannot create rights except when the laws re4
fer to them."
Similarly, article 22 provides:
Anything not stated explicitly or implicitly in an article of this code
provision
cannot have the force of law in civil law, even if a similar
5
might have earlier been in force as a law or a special law."1
Anything extraneous to the Code, be it usage, custom, practice or
history is Irrelevant to judicial decision-makang." 6 Moreover, even on specific issues, the Civil Code eliminated judicial discretion that had existed
under prior law. For example, as a general rule judges were barred from
continuing to grant restitution as an equitable remedy for persons who performed a service m the absence of a contractual obligation," 7 and the Code
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. TAu ANzoATEGUI, supra note 84, at 403-04; 2 CHANETON, supra note 102, at
147-49.
114. C6DIGO CIvIL, art. 17, text according to Law No. 340, Sept. 29, 1869, [18521880] A.D.L.A. 505, 507. This article was amended in 1968 by Law No. 17.711, art. 1,
[XXVHI-B] A.D.L.A. 1810, 1811 (B.O. Apr. 26, 1968).
115. C6DIGO CiVIL, art. 22.
116. See 2 CHANETON, supra note 102, at 412-16 (criticizing the way Civil Code, art.
22 has led to exaggerated rationalism and neglect of caselaw responsive to social needs).
117. Raymundo Wilmart, Las leyes nuevas sobre alquileres, 22 REVISTA ARGENTINA
DE CmNciAs PoLtricAs 440, 443 (1921); CIvIL CODE, art. 899, text according to Law No.
340. This was modified in 1968, as Civil Code art. 907, to allow judges to award damages based on equitable considerations, and in analyzing such considerations to consider
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ended prior practice under which a party could be released from contractual obligations when1 8 circumstances dramatically changed and made the
contract too onerous.'

Changes in legal education immediately followed. Argentine legal
historians have generally recognized that codification fomented a gradual
change m the national legal mentality to regard judges as mere technicians,
blind to the social consequences of the law 119 Prior to the Civil Code, legal education in Buenos Aires consisted of three years of theoretical education at the University of Buenos Aires followed by three years of practical instruction in the courts."' The course of practical instruction in the
courts was established in 1815, prior to the creation of a Law Department
at the University of Buenos Aires, and for much of the period until the

1860s, that practical instruction was probably the most significant element
in legal education. The practical training was offered through what was
called the Academia de Jurisprudencia, supervised by the Court of Appeals. Students were required to attend court sessions regularly and argue
cases before instructors as though they were counsel.' The Law Depart-

ment of the University of Buenos Aires was not established until 1822, and
for most of the period through the early 1850s, the program consisted of
the relative wealth of the parties. Law No. 17.711, Apr. 26, 1968, [XXVIII-B] A.D.L.A.
1810, 1816.
118. WILMART, supra note 117, at 443; C6DIGO CIVIL [C6D. CIV.], art. 1198 (1869)

(Arg.). Article 1198 was amended in 1968 by Law No. 17.711 to allow judges to relieve
a party of contractual obligations due to changed circumstances that make performance
excessively onerous, Law No. 17.711, Apr. 26, 1968, [XXVIII-B] "A.D.L.A. 1810, 1817.
119. See, e.g., TAU ANzoATEGui, supra note 84, at 29-30; BRAVA LIRA, supra note 95,
at 14-17; see also 2 CHANETON, supranote 102, at 412-16, 418.
120. RICARDO ZORRAQUIN BEC0J, MARCELINO UGARTE (1822-1872) 26 (1954); see
also MARIA ISABEL SEONE, LA ENSERANZA DEL DERECHO EN LA ARoENriNA 58 (1981)
(noting three years spent at the University); AGUSTIN PESTALARDO, HISTORIA DE LA
ENSEFRANZA DE LAS CIENCIAS JURIDICAS Y SOCIALES EN LA UNIVERSIDAD DII BUENOS AIRES

37 (1914) (noting three years spent at the Academia).
121. Proyecto de creaci6n de una Academia de Jurnsprudencia(Feb. 25, 1814) and
accompanying regulations established by the Cknara de Apelaciones, tftulo 4, arts. 1-4,
21 (Nov. 25, 1814) [hereinafter "Acaderma Regulations"], in RICARDO LEVENE, LA
ACADEMIA DE JURISPRUDENCIA Y LA VIDA DE SU FUNDADOR MANUEL ANTONIO DE CASTRO

161, 169-70 (1941); RICARDO LEVENE, ANTECEDENTES HIST6RICOS SOBRII LA ENSE&ANZA
DE LA JURISPRUDENCIA Y DE LA HISTORIA DEL DERECHO PATRIO EN LA ARGENTINA 26-27
(1949); 1 NORBERTO PI&ERO & EDUARDO BIDAU, ANALES DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS

AIRES 58 (1988); ZORRAQUIN BECO, supra note 120, at 26. At the conclusion of the
course at the Academia students took two exams, one in which they wrote an opinion in a
case pending before the Court of Appeals and one in which they were required to explain
the terms of a statute. Academia Regulations, tftulo 4, arts. 15-16, supra, at 169;
ZORRAQUfN BECO, supra note 120, at 26.
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presentation of a thesis1" and completion of only two courses, a general
course on civil law and a natural law course on public law.iu
The plan of studies began to improve in the 1850s, after the overthrow
of General Rosas, and to change dramatically starting m 1865--as V61ez
Sdrsfield was at work on the Civil Code. V6lez Sdrsfield's Civil Code began to have an impact even before it was completed. Copies of completed
portions began to circulate m the University's civil law course,"' and study
122. TAU ANzoATEGuI, supra note 84, at 228.
123. While the Law Department of the University of Buenos Aires was initially established with four courses, during most of the period through the 1850s only two were offered, and during most of the 1830s and 1840s when General Rosas was in power, both
of these were taught by the same person. See PESTALARDo, supra note 120, at 36-39;
VICENTE OSVALDO CuToLo, EL PRIMER PROFESOR DE DERECHO CIVIL DE LA UNIVERSIDAD
DE BuENos AmS Y sus CONTINUADORES 14, 24-25 (1948) [hereinafter "EL PRIMER
PROFESOR DE DERECHO CIVIL"]; VICENTE OSVALDO CUTOLO, LA ENSERANZA DEL DERECHO
CIVIL DEL PROFESOR CASAGEMAS DURANTE UN CUARTO DE SIGLO

(1832-1857) 29 (1947)

[hereinafter "LA ENSERANZA DEL DERECHO CIVIL"]; VICENTE OSVALDO CUTOLO, LA
FACULTAD DE DERECHO DESPUIS DE CASEROS 10-11 (1951) [hereinafter "LA FACULTAD DE
DERECHO"]; 1 PinERo & BIDAU, supra note 121, at 58, 85, 140. The first of these
courses, Derecho Natural y de Gentes (Natural Law and the Law of Nations), was essentially a course in the natural rights of man vis a vis the state and the rights of states
against each other. See PESTALARDO, supra note 120, at 37-41; see generally ANTONIO
SAtNZ, INsTrrUCIONES ELEMENTALES SOBRE EL DERFCHO NATURAL Y DE GENTES (Ricardo
Levene ed., 1939) (1822-23) (this is the first text used for the course). The second
course, Derecho Civil (Civil Law), vaned according to the professor, emphasizing either
Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism, EL PRIMER PROFESOR D DERECHO CiviL, supra, at 14;
PESTALARDO, supra note 120, at 39, 44-45; TAU ANZOATEGUI, supra note 84, at 223-224;
or texts based on Justinian's INsTrrUTEs and the SIETE PARTIDAS, Cutolo, LA ENSEAANZA
DEL DERECHO CIVIL, supra, at 39; PESTALARDo, supra note 120, at 51-54; TAU
ANZOATEGUI, supra note 84, at 227. While Bentham's work favors codification, before
the 1860s Umversity of Buenos Aires students did not study the important Continental
civil law scholars of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century as a significant part of
their legal education. See 2 CHANETON, supra note 102, at 340, 419; see also TAU
ANZOATEGUI, supra note 84, at 203, 279-80 (noting that the works of the leading Continental civil code commentators did not begin to circulate substantially in Argentina until
the rmd-mneteenth century); CUToLO, LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO, supra, at 41, 46 (student theses on civil law topics in the 1850s relied almost entirely on traditional Spanish
sources). Moreover, Bentham's work was likely studied more for its philosophical pnnciples than as a source of concrete legal rules to be incorporated into an Argentine Civil
Code. While Bentham's work circulated widely in Latin America and argued for codification, most of what circulated seems to have been proposals for drafting codes and descriptions of the principles of utilitarianism, not specific legal rules governing civil relations. See generally MIRIAM WnLIFORD, JEREMY BENTHAM ON SPANISH AMERICA 15-30
(1980) (discussing the circulation of his work on codification); itd. at 20-21, 37, 39, 12627, 130-31 (discussing correspondence with Argentine President Bernardino Rivadavia
on proposals for codification and legislation).
124. 2 CHANETON, supra note 102, at 343.
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of civil law was expanded to three years of courses in 1865,'15 and four
years in 1875, one year for each book of the Code.2 6 Even more Important, civil law courses began to offer a mechanical approach emphasizing
exegesis of Code provisions based on the structure of the Code and extensive use of French commentators. 2 7 Legal education's past focus on natu2
ral law all but disappeared. 1
By the nud-1870s. Argentine legal education had transformed itself
from a practical education in the courts combined with study of philosophy, natural law, and non-systematic study of some civil law concepts, to
five years of legal science focused primarily on the Civil Code. The old
requirement of three years of training in the courts disappeared entirely.2 9

125. PESTALARDO, supranote 120, at 81; 1 PIRERO & BIDAU, supranote 121, at 141.
126. 2 CHANETON, supranote 102, at 344.
127. PESTALARDO, supra note 120, at 101-05; see generally 2 CHANETON, supra note
102, at 343-59 (offering a short history of the teaching of civil law at the University of
Buenos Aires from codification through the early twentieth century); TAU ANZOATEGUI,
supra note 84, at 352-53, 358-64 (noting the changes at the University of Buenos Aires
in the 1860s caused by the movement toward codification). While starting in the 1890s
there would be demands for correction of the exaggerated emphasis on exegesis of the
Civil Code as the centerpiece of legal education, even reformers tended only to add a
concern for exarmning areas for possible reform of the Civil Code, with no significant
change in how the law was understood to operate. For example, Juan Antonio Bibiloni
led a movement to teach the Civil Code more critically, with greater emphasis on areas
for reform, 2 CHANE ON, supra note 102, at 349-56, and he enjoyed some success, but
the consequence was a more, not less, theoretical approach toward the law. 2 id. at 35659.
128. Derecho Natural y de Gentes, a natural law course that had made up half the curriculum during most of the Law Department's first thirty years, gradually became transformed in the 1860s and 1870s into a modem course on International Law, with only
limited interest in natural law issues. See PESTALARDO, supra note 120, at 126-31.
Starting in 1874, International Law was taught by Amancio Alcorta. Id. at 130. Amancio Alcorta's text, CUtso DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL POBLICO (1886) upholds the position that international law is based on natural law, see, e.g., 1 id. at 2-4, 11-12, but offers
a discussion of other schools of thought, id. at 64-98, and focuses on the history and development of international legal rules, not on developing the natural law origins of social
and international relations.
129. The course of study at the Academa de Junsprudencia was first shortened to two
years, in 1857, 1 PIfRERO & BJDAU, supra note 121, at 141, and then eliminated entirely
in 1871, replaced by a course in procedure at the University of Buenos Aires. Pestalardo, supra note 118, at 84; SEONE, supra note 120, at 81. A similar Acadenua in the
city of C6rdoba also closed in the 1870s. Id. The University of C6rdoba, Argentina's
other major law school in the nineteenth century, went through a transforrnation toward a
Continental legal education very similar to that of the University of Buenos Aires. See
TAU ANZOATEGUI, supranote 84, at 352-58.
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B. JudicialRationalismand its Decline
Not surprisingly, the legal mentality ushered in by codification also
affected the Argentine Supreme Court. From the 1870s through the
Court's impeachment in 1947, there are no examples of the Court using
equity or natural law to assist it m the resolution of a case. In fact, the
Court explicitly divorced itself from any equitable tradition. For example,
in 1929, in an action brought by indigenous villagers near the Bolivian
border who sought return of communal lands around their village, the
Court decided against the plaintiffs, asserting that while it appreciated the
injustices suffered by the villagers:
[I]t is not within the radius of its powers, marked by the Constitution
and the laws, to offer a remedy; since unlike the Federal Supreme Court of
the United States, which according to section 2 of article III of the Constitution extends its jurisdiction "to all cases in law and equity" in accordance
with the English tradition of the common law
[the Argentine judiciary
lacks the power and competence [to decide cases based on] pure equity,
except when it can enter in as an interpretive element, not as a legal argument, in its pronouncements. 13°
Further, while the Court leaves the door open for use of equity as an
interpretive element-whatever that means-no cases appear where the
Court states that it does so.
Argentine scholars have sometimes pointed to the period between
1903 and 1929, the dates that Antonio Bermejo served on the Court, as the
period of maximum economic liberalism on the Court. 3 ' Bermejo was an
important member of the conservative elite, serving in both houses of Congress and as Minister of Justice and Public Instruction prior to appointment
to the Court, and serving as President of the Court starting in 1905.2 Like
the U.S. Supreme Court during the same period, the Bermejo Court often
elaborated principles of laissez faire capitalism in its decisions.'3

130. "Guan c/Provincia de Jujuy," CSJN 155 Fallos 302, 317 (1929).
131. Julio Oyhanarte, Histona del Poder Judicial, Todo es Histona, No. 61, May
1972, at 100-03; see also JUAN GONZALEZ CALDER6N, No HAY JoSTIcIA SIN LIMERTAD 42-

44 (1956) (describing Bermejo as pushing the Court into a more prominent role, starting
with "Hileret c/Provincia de Tucumin," CSJN 98 Fallos 20 (1903), a key case, discussed
infra Il.B.2.a, that demonstrated the Court's commitment to economic liberties).
132. 1 VICENTE OSVALDO CUTOLO, NUEVO DICCIONAPJO BIOGRAFCO AROENTINo 42425 (1968).
133. OYHANARTE, supra note 131, at 103.
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However, the Argentine Supreme Court's mentality went beyond econonuc liberalism to embrace rationalism more generally As one Argentine
scholar has perceptively pointed out, there was an important generational
shift on the Supreme Court around the turn of the century. "' Until Bermejo, all the leading judges on the Supreme Court graduated from law
school before the 1869 sanction of the civil code and the changes that implied for Argentine legal education. Bermejo graduated in 1876.135 It is
probably not a coincidence that in Hileret ciProvincta de Tucumdn,' 3 the
most important case decided during Bermejo's first year on the Court, the
Court offered a more explicit endorsement of rationalism tham ever b'efore.
The Court derided constitutional arguments that failed to focus on "the text
of the Constitution,
the needs and desires of the time when [the Constitution] was written," the way it has been understood in "historical
documents" such as the records of the Convention and writings by publicists of the period like Juan Bautista Alberdi, and judicial decisions interpreting the above.'37 In the succeeding years, the Court practiced what it
preached.'
The Court that Bermejo joined had already shown it;elf willing to
stand up to the President and Congress. It had sharply challenged a president in 1893 by requirng that he free a leading opposition politician who
had just led an attempted revolt-ruling that he was protected by Congressional immunity as a Senator-elect. 39 In 1892 it had forced the President
to back down when he illegally deported opposition politicians."" In 1888,
it had temporarily blocked the most ambitious building project in the City
of Buenos Aires to date-the creation of the Avenida de Mayo boulevard-by holding that its planned financing mechanism involved uncon-

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 99.
Id.
98 Fallos 20 (1903), analyzed infra at notes 258-59.
"Hileret c/Provincia de Tucumdn," supra note 131, at 47-48.

138. The Court in Hileret, id., focuses first on the text of the Constitution, examining
various articles in relation to each other, id. at 36-39, 42, 46-47, then on statements at the
Constitutional Convention of 1853, id. at 48, and finally on statements in Alberdi's
work, id. at 48-49.
139. "Alem," CSJN 54 Fallos 432 (1893). This case is analyzed at length in Miller,
Courts and the Creationof a "Spirit of Moderation,"supra note 8, at 302-13.
140. "Paez," CSJN 48 Fallos 17 (1892); "Leguizamon," CSJN 48 Fallos 27 (1892).
This case is discussed in Miller, Courts and the Creation,of a "Spirit of Moderation,"

supra note 8, at 278-81.
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stitutional takings of property 41 It even forced Congress to free a journalist whom Congress had ordered held in contempt."' The two areas that
most stand out, however, and that became particularly prominent during
the Bermejo Court, are: (i) freedom of the press; and (ii) freedom to engage m commercial activity and protection of property. These are areas
where the Court took exceptionally firm rational stances and where the
Court most sharply shifts ground once it abandons an autonomous, rational
approach toward law.
1. Protectionof the Press
In general terms, Argentina's press thrived under the protection of
autonomous law and declined under the indeterminacy of responsive law.
Argentina enjoyed an exceptionally vibrant press in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century, which is especially striking given the complete absence of any opposition press under General Rosas during the 1830s and
1840s. 4 1 Foreign visitors consistently remarked on the variety, freedom
and power of the press.1" La Prensa, which was politically independent
and a sharp critic of electoral fraud by the government, had an international network ofjournalists. La Nacton, a major newspaper run by former
president Bartolom6 Mitre, like Mitre was almost always in opposition to
the government in power and played a major role in inciting an unsuccessful revolt in 1890. A third paper, La Vanguardia,was run by the Socialist
Party, and never saw a capitalist government it liked.1t5 Only the anarchists faced serious persecution. It is impossible to say that substantial
freedom of the press would not have existed in the Court's absence, but the
141. "Mumcipalidad de la Capital c/Elortondo," CSJN 33 Fallos 162 (1888).
142. "Acevedo," CSJN 28 Fallos 406 (1885). This case is analyzed in Miller, The
Authority of a ForeignTalisman, supranote 57, at
143. LYNCH, supra note 83, at 158.
144. GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, NOTAS DE VLAJE POR AMERICA DEL SUR 105, 114-18 (Miguel Ruiz trans., 1911, Hyspamenca 1986); THOMAS TURNER, ARGENTINA AND THE
ARGENTINES 35-36, 240-41 (1892); see also JAMES BRYCE, SOUTH AMERICA,
OBSERVATIONS AND IMPRESSIONS 344 (1913); WinXAM H. KoEBEL, MODERN ARGENTINA,
THE EL DORADO OF To-DAY 78 (1907); A. STUART PENNINGTON, THE ARGENTINE
REPuBuc 281 (1910); ADOLuo POSADA, LA REPCBLICA ARGENTINA: IMPRESIONES Y

CoMENTARIOS 46-48 (Hyspam6nca 1987) (1912); see generally C. GALVAN MORENO, EL
PERIODISMO ARGENT o 212-45, 297-453 (1944) (describing the variety of newspapers

existing in Buenos Aires and the rest of the country, focusing manly on the second half
of the nineteenth century).
145. See generally TURNER, supra note 144, at 35-36 (discussing the leading Buenos
Aires newspapers).
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number of cases in which the Supreme Court held in favor of the press
would seem to indicate that the Court played an important role.
There are two articles in the Argentine Constitution of 1860 concerning the press. Article 14 provides that the inhabitants of the Nation enjoy a
list of rights "subject to laws regulating their exercise," mad among the
rights listed is the right "to publish one's ideas through the press without
prior censorship." Until the 1930s, however, this article was far less important than article 32, which provided that:
The federal Congress shall not dictate laws that restrict the freedom of
the press or establish over it federal jurisdiction.
Until 1932, the Court consistently interpreted Article 32 as establishing a flat bar on any federal restriction or penalties for publications by the
press, including both civil and crminal liability, and a bar on any federal
judicial jurisdiction.
Article 32 was one of numerous changes proposed by the Province of
Buenos Aires at a Convention in 1860 that specified reforms to the Constitution of 1853 as a condition for its ratification by the Province.146
While a subsequent national Convention incorporated the article into the
Constitution without debate, the article was extensively discussed at the
Buenos Aires Convention that proposed it. The article emerged from the
Convention's Drafting Committee, where it had the support of V6lez Sfrsfield and future presidents Mitre and Sarrmento, and two principal reasons
were given for the change. First, the Drafting Committee was concerned
about the continued independence of the Buenos Aires press under a national government.'47 Buenos Aires, which had remained separate from the
Argentine Confederation formed by the rest of the country from 1853-60,
was concerned about repression by a hostile national government controlled by the other provinces. The Drafting Committee noted with alarm
that the President of the Argentine Confederation, General Justo Jos6 de
Urquiza, had already responded to criticisms from a pro-Buenos Aires

146. See generally SANTos P AMADEO, ARGENTINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 36-42

(1943) (analyzing the results of this Convention and its historical background).
147. Sesiones de la Convenc16n del Estado de Buenos Aires, encargada del examen de
la Constituc16n Federal [hereinafter "Buenos Aires Convention"], Informe de la Co.
misi6n Examinadora de la Constituci6n Federal, in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONST1rUYENTHS
ARGENTINAS 773 (Emilio Ravignani ed., 1937); El Redactor de la Comlsa6n examinadorade la Constitucidnfederal in 4

at 976.

ASAMBLEAS CONSTrTUYENTES ARGENTINAS,

suspra,
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newspaper in C6rdoba by writing to the Governor of C6rdoba and asking
him to repress the paper.'48
Second, the Drafting Committee presented the article as necessary to
bring the Argentine Constitution further into line with that of the United

States.'49 The Committee understood the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, "Congress shall make no law . abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press

"as barring any federal legislation that affected

the press." This view had substantial support in the United States at the
time. Following the passage of the Sedition Act of 1798, which only remamed in effect for three years, Jefferson and other DemocraticRepublicans took the position that the Constitution banned all federal legislation affecting the press, leaving all legislation on speech and the press
in the hands of the states.'
Moreover, this position was also maintained
by both John C. Calhoun and Daniel Webster during legislative debates in
1836.52 Joseph Story described the constitutionality of federal legislation
on the press as an open question," and it was not until 1919, in the Espionage Act cases that prosecuted propagandists who obstructed army recruitment, that the U.S. Supreme Court definitively held that the First
Amendment allowed federal legislation crimmalizing statements in the
press." The U.S. Constitution, referring to making "no law
abridging
148. EL REDACTOR DE LA COMIsI6N EXAMINADORA DE LA CONSTITUCI6N FEDERAL, su-

pra note 147, at 976; see also V Santa Marta v. La Argentina, Juez del Cnmen de la
Capital Federal,1 REVISTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS POLTIcAs 803, 805 (1910) (citing
remarks by Elizalde at the Buenos Aires Province Constitutional Convention of 1870 indicating that art. 32 of the Constitution was motivated by fears caused by President Urquiza's letter to C6rdoba calling for suppression of an anti-government newspaper);
Francisco Durd, Libertad consutuctonal y licencta prdctica de la prensa, 13 REVISTA
ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS POLInCAS 329, 341 (1916) (same); Tomis Jofr, [Untitled footnote comment on Rolla v. Kaiser], I JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA 356, 361 n.188 bis
(1918) (same).
149. Informe de la Comisi6n Exammnadora de la Constituci6n Federal,supra note

147, at 773; EL REDACTOR

DE LA COMisI6N EXAMINADORA DE LA CONSTITUCI6N FEDERAL,

supra note 145, at 976.
150. See supranote 149.
151. LEONARD W LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 301-08 (1985) (making the ar-

gument on both First Amendment and Tenth Amendment grounds).
152. Lindsay Rogers, FederalInterference with Freedom of the Press, 23 YALE L.J.
559,569, 570 (1914).

153. 3

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§

1885 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833).
154. The contention that the First Amendment barred federal legislation regarding
publications in the press was definitively laid aside in Frohwerk v. United States, 249
U.S. 204, 206 (1919) and Schaefer v. UnitedStates, 251 U.S. 466, 477 (1920) (both con-
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the freedom of speech or of the press" may certainly be read as an absolute
bar on federal legislation regarding the press, and unlike the U.S. Supreme
Court during World War I, which focused on the reasonableness of the

regulation in light of the circumstances,"5 the Argentine Supreme Court
focused on the language of the text.
The Argentine Court decided several dozen cases between 1863 and
1930 that focused on the federalist considerations of article 32. The cases
fall into two categories. First, in at least a dozen cases prior to 1930 the
Supreme Court held that the federal courts could not exercise crinmal jurisdiction over the press, even when the federal government had a strong
interest in the matter. 5 6 This bar included both the traditional criminal
categories of defamation, false accusation of a crime, and contempt toward
cernming publications during World War I that violated the Espionage Act); see also
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (allowing Espionage Act prosecutions
so long as the statements made "create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent"). Thc U.S. Supreme
Court only addressed the First Amendment in tangential ways prior to World War I, for
example, in cases in which the Court upheld limitations on the use of the mails. See generally David M. Rabban, The FirstAmendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514,
524-33 (1981).
155. See 249 U.S. at 52; 249 U.S. at 206-09.
156. "Argench," CSJN 1 Fallos 130 (1864) (crimnal defamation of chief of police);
"Procurador Fiscal c/Laforest," CSJN 3 Fallos 371 (1866) (sedition); "Moreno," CSJN
10 Fallos 361 (1871) (contempt toward a federal judge); "Jofr6," CSJN 17 Fallos 110
(1875) (contempt toward a federal judge); "Acevedo," CSJN 30 Fallos 112 (1886) (dispute between the federal courts and the local courts of the federal capitad over who has
jurisdiction in the case of contempt toward the President, resolved in favor of the exclusive jurisdiction of the local courts); "Gorostiaga c/Garcfa Aguilera," CSJN 33 Fallos
228 (1888) (crimnal defamation of a member of Congress); "Procurador Fiscal
c/Correa," CSJN 85 Fallos 246 (1900) (crinunal contempt toward a federal judge); "Robles c/Cornejo," CSJN 100 Fallos 337 (1904) (cnrmnal defamation of the Vice Consul of
Spain); "Carreras c/Director del Diano "La Libertad"," CSJN 106 Fallos 416 (1907)
(crimnal defamation of the Peruvian Consul in Rosario); "Salva," CSJN 114 Fallos 60
(1910) (resolving jurisdictional dispute against the federal courts and in favor of the local
courts of the Federal Capital in the case of a publication in an anarchist newspaper
threatemng the President and calling for violence in violation of Law No. 7029-the Social Defense Law of 1910); "Procurador Fiscal de Tucumdn c/del Prada Salgado," CSJN
129 Fallos 279 (1919) (criminal defamation of the federal prosecutor in Tucumfn);
"Girela," CSJN 129 Fallos 381 (1919) (resolving jurisdictional dispute against the federal courts and in favor of the local courts of the Federal Capital in a case of sedition under Law No. 7029); "Murad c/Iturralde," CSJN 137 Fallos 5 (1922) (no original Supreme
Court jurisdiction in case of crmnal defamation action brought against the General Consul for Spain and the Ottoman Empire); "Iturralde," CSJN 138 Fallos 381 (1923) (no
federal jurisdiction in case of a criminal defamation action brought against the General
Consul for Spain and the Ottoman Empire); Contra "Calvete," CSJN I Fallos 297
(1864) and rehearing, CSJN 1 Fallos 340 (1864).
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a public official, as well as criminal sanctions for seditious statements that
call for acts of violence or the overthrow of public authorities." Criminal
liability could exist in these areas, but only under provincial jurisdiction.
Cases involving defamation of members of Congress, contempt of a federal
judge, threats to the President, and defamations of Ambassadors and committed by Ambassadors, all were denied federal jurisdiction in spite of the
obvious federal interest in the cases.'5
Second, in numerous cases the Court also asserted that Congress
lacked legislative jurisdiction over the press even when the relevant federal
provision was applied by provincial courts.15 9 The Supreme Court's firmness on this issue was particularly striking in the context of the division of
federal and provincial legislative jurisdiction established by the Constitution. The Constitution in article 67, section 11," charged Congress with
writing national civil, commercial, criminal and mining codes, to clear up
the confusion of colomal legislation and obtain legislative uniformity. 1 '
However, at the insistence of the Province of Buenos Aires at the Constitutional Convention of 1860, the section was amended so that Congress'
authority to draft the codes did not alter the jurisdiction of the federal and
provincial courts, with ordinary matters under these codes enjoying exclusive provincial jurisdiction."
This combination of federal legislative authority with provincial judicial authority produced highly anomalous results when considered together
with the article 32 prohibition on Congress from exercising legislative
authority over the press. The criminal code broadly criminalized much
conduct, such as defamation and contempt toward public authorities, without specifying whether the conduct must take place through the press or
through other means of communication, such as letters or speech; however,

157. Id..
158. Id.
159. "Sabondo c/Kaiser," CSJN 124 Fallos 161 (1916); "Rolla c/Kaiser," CSJN 127
Fallos 273 (1918); "M~ndez c/Vald~z," CSJN 127 Fallos 429 (1918); "Segovia
e/Herrera," CSJN 128 Fallos 175 (1918); "Sotullo c/Scotti," CSJN 130 Fallos 121
(1919); "Paimero d/Gandara," CSJN 131 Fallos 282 (1920); "Rosas c/Bar6n," CSJN 131
Fallos 395 (1920).
160. CoNsT. ARG. art. 67, § 11 (1860), previously CONST. ARO. art. 64, § 11 (1853).
161. Congreso General Constituyente de la Confederac16n Argentina, Session of Apr.
28, 1853, in 4 ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS, supra note 147, at 528-29
(statement of Gorostiaga).

162. Constitutional Convention of 1860, Session of May 7, 1860, in 4 ASAMB.LEAS
147, at 864.

CONSTITUYENTES ARGENrINAS, supranote
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because Congress was prohibited from passing legislation affecting the
press, the Supreme Court blocked all attempts to apply the Criminal Code
to articles written in the press.'61 Statements made orally or in a letter
could be prosecuted by provincial courts applying the Criminal Code, but
the identical statement made in the press was protected.' The result was
that each province was responsible for its own law of defamation, sedition
or contempt of public officials when such conduct took place through the
press, and federal officials who sought to bring actions aganst the press
were subject to the linutations of provincial laws and courts. The only exception to the bar on federal jurisdiction was in the case of the Federal
Capital and sparsely populated Federal Territories, where Congress acted
as a local legislature and the provisions of the criminal code were held to
apply to the press by virtue of Congress' power as the local legislative
authority "65 Under the Court's approach, even major government initiatives such as the So6ial Defense Law of 1910,'" a crackdown on anarchists
passed in response to anarchist bombings and growing fears of anarchist
influence on labor, should not have had its provisions on propagation of
violence through the press applied outside the Federal Capital and the Territories. 16 7
One reason the Supreme Court decided so many free speech cases was
because its caselaw m this field was so frequently challenged. The interest
of the Buenos Aires elite in art. 32 substantially changed once President
Mitre took over the federal government in 1862. Buenos Aires negotiated
the 1860 constitutional changes just after having suffered defeat on the
163. See, e.g., 2 JUAN A. GONZALEZ CALDER6N, DERECHO CONsTiTUCIONAL
§§ 519-20 (2d ed. 1923) (in support of the Supreme Court's caselaw);
RODoLFo RIVAROLA, DERECHO PENAL ARGENTINO § 16 (1910) (criticizing the failure to
ARGENTINO

apply the Cnrmnal Code to the press).
164. See 1 GERMAN J. BIDART CAMPOS, TRATADO ELEMENTAL DE DERECHO
CONSTrrclIONAL 278-80 (1986).
165. "Antilli," CSJN 119 Fallos 231, 247-48 (1914) (applying the Social Defense
Law, Law No. 7029, against the press in the Federal Capital).
166. Law No. 7029, June 30, 1910, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 787.
167. The Supreme Court never addressed the constitutionality of a prosecution by a
provincial court of a violation by the press of the Social Defense Law. In "Bnz," CSJN
115 Fallos 255 (1912), the Supreme Court held that the Social Defense Law should be
treated as part of the Criminal Code for the purpose of federal jurisdiction, meaning that
the federal courts lacked jurisdiction to hear prosecutions under the law. In "Girela,"
CSJN 129 Fallos 381 (1919), the Supreme Court resolved a dispute between a Buenos
Aires provincial court and a federal judge over who has jurisdiction over a violation of
the Social Defense Law by the press in favor of the provincial court, but the issue of
whether the law could be constitutionally applied was not addressed.
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battlefield by the rest of the provinces, united under the Constitution of
1853. However, though defeated, Buenos Aires remained strong enough to
insist on constitutional reforms as a condition of its acceptance of the Constitution, and in the wake of its military defeat, its interests required protection of its autonomy 1 In the free speech area, that meant protecting its
press from the federal government. Two years later, after a battlefield
victory by Buenos Aires that began a period of Buenos Aires domination
of the rest of the country, the interest of the now nationally dominant Buenos Aires elite m the protection of federalism likewise changed. It is not at
all surprising, therefore, that President Mitre's administration, in spite of
his own participation on the Committee that drafted the 1860 reforms, supported the 1864 prosecution of a newspaper editor for defamation of the
Buenos Aires police chief, 69 the case that led to the Supreme Court's first
decision barring the federal courts from trying such cases.' " Fellow
Committee member Domingo Sarnmento showed similar inconsistency
once he became President, unsuccessfully calling for federal legislation
and jurisdiction against "abuses and crimes" of the press.' Having established their dominance, the Buenos Aires elite became critics of rigid application of article 32.
The changed political perspective comes out very clearly in the arguments of article 32's opponents. Interestingly, in the early twentieth century the two leading critics of the Supreme Court's caselaw on article 32,
168. See Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman, supra note 57, at

-

(dis-

cussing Buenos Aires' military defeat in 1859 at the hands of the Argentine Confederation, the resulting treaty with the Confederation, and the various constitutional changes
that Buenos Aires insisted upon).
169. The case was filed at the specific request of the Minister of Justice. "Argench,"
CSJN 1 Fallos 130, 130 (1964).

170. The lower federal court held that the language of article 32 and the intention of
the delegates at the Buenos Aires Convention of 1860 was to bar jurisdiction, 1 Fallos at
142-44, and the Supreme Court confirmed the lower court's decision "according to its
reasoning," without writing its own opinion, 1 Fallos at 148. Nevertheless, this decision
of the Supreme Court would be frequently cited in its later cases. "Procurador Fiscal
c/Laforest," CSJN 3 Fallos 371, 372 (1866); "Procurador Fiscal c/Moreno," CSJN 10
Fallos 361, 363 (1871); 'Procurador Fiscal c/Correa," CSJN 85 Fallos 246, 251 (1900);
"Salva," CSJN 114 Fallos 60, 68 (1910); "M6ndez c/Valdft," CSJN 127 Fallos 429, 440
(1918).

171. Dormngo F Sarrmento, Mensaje del Presidente de la Repiblica, Domingo F
Sarmiento, al Abrir las Sesiones del Congreso Argentino en Mayo de 1874, in 3 H.
MABRAGAIRA, Los MENsAjFs 363, 373-75 (1910). This statement is cited in "Segovia
d/Orellana Herrera," CSJN 128 Fallos 175, 197 (1918) (opinion of the Procurador General).
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Rodolfo Rivarola and Jos6 Nicolfs Matienzo, were also the two leading
political scientists of their time, with their reputations established not
through their work as jurists as much as their books on recent Argentine
political history 172 Both were men less immured m autonomous, rational
law than most of their generation and their arguments tended to echo each
other. 73 One of the clearest summaries of their position may be found in
an opinion by Jos6 Nicolfs Matienzo as Procurador General, the chief gov-

ernment prosecutor before the Supreme Court and the head of all federal
prosecutors m the country 17 Matienzo presented his position directly or
172. Matienzo's principal work is EL GOBIERNO REPRESENTATIVO FEDERAL EN LA
(2d ed. 1917), which focuses primarily on the centralized nature
of the Argentine political system and its use of electoral fraud, but also offers a short critique of autonomous law, complaining that "[t]he concept of the Argentine judge seems
to be that the end of the law is the law itself and not the happiness or common interest of
men," id. at 314. Rodolfo Rivarola's book, DEL R9GIMEN FEDERATIVO AL UNITARIO:
ESTUDIO SOBRE LA ORGANi7_ACI6N POLITICA DE LA ARGENTINA (1908), is likewise a political study of electoral fraud and the centralization of power in Argentine politics, see,
e.g., id. at 278, 282, 291-94, 322-23, and while he also wrote a treatise on general prnREPOBICA ARGENTINA

ciples of Argentine civil law, he makes the point at the start of his book that "a Code
cannot perpetually contain and compress society within its mold" but rather "has been
created to apply to society's needs." 1 RODOLFO RIVAROLA, INSTiTUCIONES DEL DERECHO
CIVIL ARGENTINO 2 (1901). The most important mainstream constitutional law scholars
supported the Supreme Court's caselaw, JOAQUIN V GONZALEz, MANUAL DE LA
CONsTrrucI6N ARGENTINA § 673 (1897); 2 GONzAiL CALDER6N, supra note 163, at §

521; but cf.Jos6 Manuel Estrada, Curso de Derecho Constitucional(1895), in 4 OBRAS
COMPLETAS DE Jost MANUEL ESTRADA 235-38 (1927) (calling for federal jurisdiction
over the press when federal interests are affected).

173. Both Rodolfo Rivarola and Jos6 Nicolds Matienzo were part of a Commission
established by Congress in 1891 to reform the Criminal Code and joined in proposing
that Code include crimes committed by the press. Francisco Durl, Libertad constiltucaonal y licencia prdctica de la prensa, 14 REVISTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS POLITICAS
597, 615 (1917). Rivarola voiced his view of article 32 both in his own work, most notably in RODOLFO RIVAROLA, DERECHO PENAL ARGENTINO § 16 (1910), and by offering
space to critics of the rule in the journal he edited, Revista Argentina de Ciencias Polfti-

cas, e.g., Manuel Escobar, El perodismo argentinecon relact6n a la Constituci6n, 10
REviSTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS POLrITCAS 74 (1915); Francisco Durd, Libertad constitucional y licenciaprdcticade la prensa (pts. 1-9), 13 REVIsTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS
PoLucAs 329, 413, 530 (1916), 14 REViSTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS PoLricAS 18, 152,
255, 353, 597 (1917), 15 REVISTA ARGENTINA DE CiENCIAS POLTICAS 34 (1918) (a book
length article in nine parts). Matienzo's position is developed in Jost NICoLAs
MATIENZO, TEMAS POLITICOS E HIsT6Icos 123, 133 (1916), and in his opinions as Procurador General, discussed in the text. Further, the courts of the Province of Buenos Aires repeatedly refused to follow the Supreme Court's caselaw, requiring frequent appeals.
174. The functions of the Procurador General were never formally spelled out in full,
but in 1888 the Criminal Procedure Code did so in part, specifying that the Procurador
General.would act as the government's representative before the Supreme Court in cases
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by reference m eight different cases before the Court between 1918 and
1921.175 The two cases for which the opinion was originally written both
involved prosecutions by provincial courts that used the national Criminal
Code instead of milder local legislation to prosecute defamations,"7 ' but the
opinion broadly attacks both the ban on federal jurisdiction and the ban on
Congressional legislation.
Matienzo's opinion begins with a call for a politically responsive approach toward article 32 that is probably unique in argument before the
Argentine Supreme Court until that time. He argued:
[G]iven the National Judicial Power's function as the supreme guardian of individual liberties, there is an evident necessity not to abandon to
the fortune of provincial authorities a liberty so indispensable to republican
life like that of the press. I well understand that article 32 was added to the
Constitution in 1860 at the suggestion of politicians who were jealous of
the national authority of that period; but that motivation, which was not
placed in the text and which was not shared by the National Convention
which accepted tis amendment . so as not to hold back Argentine reconciliation .... cannot continue producing an effect across the years and

the centuries, when the circumstances have fundamentally changed and
when new generations have greater faith in federal judges than in those of
the province for all that pertains to the protection of constitutional liber77
ties.1

of original jurisdiction and appeals by federal prosecutors, and would act as the supervisor of all federal prosecutors. Law No. 2372, art. 116, Oct. 17, 1888, [1881-1888]
A.D.L.A. 444,451.
175. The opinion is printed in the Supreme Court's reports in "Segovia c/Orellana
Herrera," CSJN 128 Fallos 175, 202-18 (1918), but as noted id. at 202 n.1, was also presented by the Procurador General in the case "Mindez c/Vald6z," CSJN 127 Fallos 429
(1918). The opinion presented in Segovia is incorporated by reference in the Procurador
General's opinions in "Herrara c/Cardoso," CSIN 129 Fallos 66, 67 (1919); 'Trocurador
Fiscal de Tucumn edel Prada Salgado," CSJN 129 Fallos 279, 282 (1919); "Girela,"
CSJN 129 Fallos 381, 392 (1919); "Paimeiro c/Gandara," CSJN 131 Fallos 282, 284
(1920); "Rosas c/Bar6n," CSJN 131 Fallos 395, 396 (1920); "Agente Fiscal c/Diano
'Nueva Epoca."' CSJN 134 Fallos 378, 393 (1921). This level of persistence on the part
of a Procurador General, in spite of a clear rejection of his position by the Supreme
Court, was unprecedented.
176. "Segovia c/Orellana Herrera," CSJN 128 Fallos at 218; "Mindez C/Valdfz,"
CSJN 127 Fallos at 430-31.
177. "Segovia," CSJN 128 Fallos at 203-04 (opinion of the Procurador General).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol 21:77

Article 32 must therefore be read narrowly, leaving aside its circumstantial history, and must be interpreted in accordance with the other stan17
dards of the Constitution and with its spirit. 1
He then develops an approach with four key elements: (1) abandonment of the legislative history of article 32 as a guide because circumstances have changed; 179 (2) insistence that the Buenos Aires Convention
of 1860 does not provide good legislative history because the national
Convention that adopted its proposals accepted them as a complete package for the sake of national unity, and not for the reasons for which they
were proposed; 8 ' (3) insistence that article 32 be interpreted according to
present day needs, and the federal courts of his day were more trustworthy
than the provincial courts; 8 ' and (4) interpretation of the Constitution as a
82
harmonic whole.
Of the four elements, the first and the third take an explicitly responsive approach toward the Constitution, looking at present day needs. Matienzo emphasizes that the original fears that necessitated article 32 no
longer existed and that most people now considered the federal government the best protection of their constitutional liberties.'
The more rational elements of his opinion are much weaker and do not stand up to the
Court's consistent caselaw He attempts to re-read the 1860 constitutional
debates,'8" and to interpret the Constitution "harmoniously," focusing on
the fact that a bar on federal legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the
press is inconsistent with the Constitution's general scheme of placing ordinary cnminal legislation in the hands of Congress (since Congress is
charged with enacting national civil, commercial criminal and mining
codes),' 85 and of allowing the federal courts to exercise jurisdiction when a
federal interest is affected. 8 6 According to Matienzo, an interpretation of
article 32 leaving both legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the press in
the hands of the provinces stands apart from this general scheme of the
Constitution and therefore must be avoided. He cites U.S. commentators
178. Id.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 204, 214.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 204, 213-14.
Id. at 204, 214-17.
Id. at 213-14.

184. Id. at 205-07.
185. CONST. ARG. art. 67, § 11 (1860).
186. "Segovia c/Orellana Herrera," CSJN 128 Fallos at 214-17
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as authority for reading the Constitution "harmoniously,"'" and he insists
that if the Argentine Framers had wished to follow U.S. practice, then it
must also be recognized that the United States has no similar rule barring
federal jurisdiction.'88 The principal constitutional protection afforded the
press was the protection from restraints prior to publication offered by article 14.189
None of Matienzo's arguments were original," and the Court disposed of his reinterpretation of the constitutional history with extensive
quotations from Congressional debates analyzing the reforms of the Buenos Aires Convention of 1860'1 and with citations to past practice."9
Matienzo's insistence that the Buenos Aires Convention could not offer
evidence of the intent of the Framers simply makes no sense. While delegates to the National Convention that followed may have voted in favor of
the amendments in order to achieve national unity, the legislative purpose
behind the provisions was to remedy the concerns of Buenos Aires and
therefore to achieve the goals expressed by the drafters of the amendments.' 93 Moreover, the Court noted that if article 32 were not read as including a ban on legislative jurisdiction through the Criminal Code, then it
served little purpose. The press could be undercut just as effectively
through general provisions on defamation and sedition in the Criminal
Code as through a law specifically directed at the press."
But because Matienzo also represented part of a larger movement
away from legal rationality, the Court also offered its most explicit defense
of legal rationality to date.
[1]f with the passage of time the cause which gave rise to [the Constitutional provisions] has disappeared, that may justify the need or convenience for a reform of the Constitution on that point, but cannot influence the interpretation that judicial tribunals must give it, because the
Constitution is not modified through changes in the caselaw; neither can

187. Id.at 204 (citing Willoughby (no source given)).
188. Id.at 207, 212, 217.
189. Id.at 214.
190. All of Matienzo's arguments may be found in Durf, supra note 171.
191. "Mndez," CSJN 127 Fallos at 433-38; "Segovia," CSJN 128 Fallos at 220-25.
192. "Mdndez," CSJN 127 Fallos at 431-32, 439-41; "Segovia," CSJN 128 Fallos at
227-28.
193. See "Mendez," CSJN 127 Fallos at 439; "Segovia," CSIN 128 Fallos at 226-27.
194. "Mdindez," CSJN 127 Fallos at 432-33; "Segovia," CSJN 128 Fallos at 219-20.
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judges, in the name of interpretation of the law, invade the legislative
function.
[It is necessary to observe the elemental rule of interpretation
under which, upon investigating the origin and object of the law, it is necessary to proceed in disregard of the social factors or factors of other ongin, that in the course of time might indicate changes in its application,
since, as stated, if the laws were susceptible to automatic reform with the
passage of time and by the implicit action of the caselaw, they would
amount to a creation of judicial magistrates and not of the legislative
power. 195
Moreover, the Court accurately indicated that Matienzo and his allies
were simply wrong when they asserted that provincial legislation placed
the press at greater risk than federal legislation.'9 Perhaps because the
provinces were not accustomed to drafting criminal legislation, since all
other crinmnal legislation appears in the Criminal Code, the provinces
tended to treat abuses by the press, such as defamations, as petty offenses
subject to the same sorts of mnnor penalties as the petty offenses that normally fell within their legislative jurisdiction. Thus, while under the
Criminal Code a defamation consisting of an accusation that someone
committed a cnrnal offense could result in a jail sentence of one to three
years,"" the same crime committed through the press, and therefore sanctionable only under provincial law, was typically only subject to a fine. 9 '
The battle between Matienzo and the Court became a continuing one,
with Matienzo insisting, on his position in numerous opinions to the
Court." Not surprisingly, Rivarola's political science journal, Revista de
CienciasPoliticas,supported Matienzo, °i while JurisprudenciaArgentina,

the most important practitioner oriented journal and case reporter, sup-

195. "M6ndez," CSJN 127 Fallos at 438-39, and restated at 440. Repeated almost
verbatim in "Segovia," CSJN 128 Fallos at 225-26.
196. "Mdndez," CSJN 127 Fallos at 441-43; "Segovia," CSJN 128 Fallos at 229-31.
197. Law No. 1920, art. 178, Dec. 7, 1886, [1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 378, 392.
198. "Mdndez," CSJN 127 Fallos at 442-43; "Segovia," CSJN 128 Fallos at 230-31;
see also Editor's Note, M~ndez v. Vald6z, 2 J.A. 171, 172 n.120 (1918) (describing the
legislation on the press in each province).
199. Supra note 175.
200. Comentarto delfallo precedente, 13 REVISTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS POLITiCAS
164, 164 (1916) (commenting on "Sabondo c/Kaiser," CSJN 124 Fallos 161 (1916));
also see the articles from REvIsTA ARGENTINA DE CIENCIAS POLITICAS collected supra
note 173.
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ported the Court ° ' The debate had practical consequences. The years
1917-21 were politically combative, with serious anarchist and labor unrest
in major cities and attempts by President Hip6lito Irigoyen to use federal
interventions to take over the governments of most of Argentina's provinces in order to displace the traditional oligarchy.0 While the principal
critics of the Court's caselaw did not necessarily have partisan political
goals, application of the tough provisions of the Criminal Code and the
provisions on sedition of the Social Defense Law of 1910W would have
offered the federal government important tools against both the anarchists
and hostile provincial elites.
Moreover, when the Supreme Court finally did change its caselaw in
1932, it handed an important tool to a government that at that time was undoubtedly looking for ways of reigning in the press. The 1930s in Argentina are known as the "infamous decade" because the Argentine economic
elite, after supporting a coup in 1930 against a democratically elected,
populist government, governed through the early 1940s through extremely
blatant electoral fraud.0 So long as the Army supported the oligarchy, this
fraud was able to continue, but the political victims of the fraud naturally
protested, and Argentina's sense of restraint had not yet deteriorated to the
point where the country could be forced to live under a perpetual state of
siege (the constitutional provision that permitted the suspension of most
individual liberties during national emergencies).0
However, the Court in the 1930s showed a spirit of "responsiveness."
The civilian government that took over from the military in 1932 had allies
in the upper and professional classes that generated social pressures for a
crackdown on "excesses" by the press. The National Academy of Law, a
prestigious institution that gathered together the most prominent legal acadenucians in the country, called for a change in the Court's caselaw to
permit federal jurisdiction over the press in defense of national interests.'
In fact, the largest newspapers in the country repeatedly expressed concern

201. See JOFlt, supra note 148, at 361 n.188 bis; Editor's Note, supra note 198, at
172 n.120.
202. See ROCK, supra note 8, at 199-203.

203. Law No. 7029, arts. 7-11, June 30, 1910, [1889-1919] A.D.LA. 787,787-88.
204. See Roc, supra note 8, at 217; 2 CARLOS ALBERTO FLORIA & CtSAR A.
BELsuNcE, HisToRIA DE LOS ARGENTiNos 350,359,363 (1992).
205. CoNsT. ARG. art. 23 (1860).
206. Clodonuro Zavalfa, El Arttculo 32 de la Constitucidn Nacional, LA NACI6N,
Dec. 14, 1932, at 6.
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about the impunity of the press and supported the Matienzo position. 10
Further, the Court in 1932 lacked its most powerful advocate of autono-

mous, rational law Antonio Bermejo died in office in 1929 No one on
the Court m 1932 had sat on the Court during the debates with Matienzo

between 1918 and 1921, and the new membership was willing to drift
away from legal rationalism. The result in the area of freedom of the press
was greater power to the Executive to repress the opposition.
The case where the Court changed its caselaw, ProcuradorFiscal
c/Diarto "La Provincia",involved a newspaper in the City of'Santa F6 ac-

cused of incitement to commit rebellion. " 8 The newspaper was a supporter
of Hip6lito Ingoyen, the President deposed by the Army in 1930, and the
incitement to commit rebellion consisted of a vague statement on the right

of his displaced Radical Party to use force to regain power, and a statement
applauding the party's refusal to participate in that year's elections as
"revolutionary." 2' The fact that the newspaper was prosecuted in itself offers a striking contrast to the period just before the 1930 coup, two years

earlier, when continued and often vicious criticism of the President by
most of the press helped create the climate in which a coup could occur. 10
Prosecution of the Santa F6 paper, undertaken by the federal prosecutor,
was ordered by the Ministry of Justice on orders from the office of the

207. La Nacidn repeatedly called for the provinces to develop criminal provisions
controlling abuses by the press to avoid the impunity that would otherwise result. See,
e.g., Contrala libertadde prensa,LA NACI6N, May 8, 1932, at 6; La Libertadde Prensa,
LA NAcI6N, July 4, 1932, at 6; La Libertadde Prensa en las Provncias,LA NACI6N,
July 6, 1932, at 6; Legislacidn de Imprenta en La Rioja, LA NACION, July 20, 1932, at 6;
Delitos de Imprenta, LA NAC16N, Sept. 18, 1932, at 6; Los Delitos de Imprenta en Mendoza, LA NACI6N, Sept. 28, 1932, at 6; and La Prensa, the largest newspaper in the
country in terms of circulation, agreed, La Legislacidn Provincial sobre Imprenta, LA
PRENSA, Oct. 1, 1932, at 11. La Nacidn also strongly applauded the Supreme Court for
its decision in ProcuradorFiscalc/Diana "La Provincia",CSJN 167 Fallos 121 (1932),
discussed in the text. Un FalloTrascendental,LA NACI6N, Dec. 25, 1932, at 6; La Carte
Suprema ante el Pals,LA NACION, Dec. 26, 1932, at 6. La Prensa simply reported on the
decision without editorial comment, which is probably an indication that at the least it
did not disagree. No Importa Restriccidn de la Libertad de Imprenta Someter al Fuero
Federallos Delitos que Violan Leyes Nacionales,LA PRENSA, Dec. 24, 1932, at 13.
208. Procurador Fiscal c/Diano "La Provincia," CSJN 167 Fallos 121, 122 (1932).
209. See Los Tribunales Federales deben juzgar todos los delitos contra la Naci6n
cometidos por la Prensa,LA NACO6N, Dec. 24, 1932, at 11.
210. SUSANA G. CAYUSO & MARIA ANGtLICA GELLI, RUPTURA DE LA LEGITIMIDAD
CONSTITUCIONAL. LA ACORDADA DE LA CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA DE LA NACI6N DE

1930 39-42 (1988).
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President. 2 ' The federal judge in Santa F6 refused to hear the case, however,212 and a majority of the Court of Appeals affirmed, " 3 quoting extensively from the Supreme Court's statements on legal rationality in its debate with Matienzo.21 The Supreme Court's 1932 decision, however,
overrules its caselaw to support the Matienzo position and tracks portions
of his 1918 opinion.
The Court m 1932 was not in a position to flatly reject legal rationallty in favor of an explicitly responsive approach toward law. Too much of
its own authority still depended on rational authority. However it used the
concept of "harmonious" constitutional interpretation for essentially the
same effect. The Court argued that: (1) it was not possible that the federal
government was created without allowing it the tools for its own defense;2"5 (2) it was hardly possible that the defense of the federal government was to be entrusted to provincial authorities; 216 (3) freedom of the
press must never be permitted to compromise the stability of the government;2 17 and (4) article 32 may be understood as a ban on general legislation affecting the press, but leaving room for legislation and federal jurisdiction when the federal government or its officers were affected by a
publication.28 Harmonious interpretation in light of the broad ends of the
Constitution allows the federal government to take the steps necessary to
protect its interests.2 9 The Court largely iguored the legislative history of
the Buenos Aires Convention of 1860-though it did later include statements by Mitre, Sarmento and their cabinet members arguing in favor of
federal legislative and judicial jurisdiction (all statements made in the decade after Buenos Aires' victory over the Confederation). m
ProcuradorFiscal c/Diaro "La Provncia" definitively established

that the federal government could legislate and enjoy judicial jurisdiction
when federal interests were affected by the press, as when the press de-

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

167 Fallos at 122, 123.
Id. at 122-23.
Id. at 123-27.
Id at 126-27.
Id. at 139-40, 142.
Id. at 140, 142.
Id. at 141, 142.
Id. at 141, 142.

219. Id. at 142.
220. Id. at 142-44.
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fames a government official or incites rebellion."' It is hard to imagine a
more direct clash with a constitutional norm providing that "[tihe federal
Congress shall not dictate laws that restrict the freedom of the press or establish over it federal jurisdiction."' The decision both allowed. Congress
to legislate and allowed federal jurisdiction. But in fact the clash becomes
starker still in 1970, with a decision that held that the nat:ional Crirmnal
Code was generally applicable to the press regardless of the presence or
lack of a national interest. The rationale was that it made no sense to distinguish crimes like criminal libel or breach of privacy based on whether
they were published in a protected medium like the press or only involved
oral statements.'
Moreover, because crirnmal legislation is generally
written by Congress under its constitutional authority to draft a national
Criminal Code, the Supreme Court held that the Provinces were barred
from passing any legislation concerning the press, because that would create unconstitutional concurrent jurisdiction.' In the end, only Congress
has authority to exercise legislative jurisdiction over the press!
To understand how completely Argentine legal reasoning has changed
and what has happened to article 32 of the Argentine Constitution, it is
worth quoting from a comment by Professor German Bidart Campos in
support of today's caselaw If anyone might be cited as "the" mainstream
constitutional authority in Argentina during the 1970s and 1980s it is Professor Bidart Campos, a constitutional law chair at the University of Buenos Aires and former dean of the law school of the Catholic University of
Buenos Aires.' In his constitutional law treatise, Professor Bidart Campos begins by recognizing the Framers' intent to establish provincial leg221. See id. at 144. This caselaw as maintained in "Agente Fiscal en lo Criminal y
Correccional c/Directores de los Dianos 'Argentimsches Tageblatt' y Crftica,"' CSJN
169 Fallos 323 (1933) (granting a request by the German government for prosecution of

the directors of two newspapers for statements made criticizing the German Government-under a provision of the criminal code that criminalizes acts that affect Argentina's international relations); "Diarlo 'Voz del Interior,"' CSJN 170 Fallos 253 (1934)
(confirming Court of Appeals decision in C6rdoba establishing federal jurisdiction in the
case of contemptuous statements against the President by the newspaper "Voz del Inte-

rior"); "Cornejo," CSJN 170 Fallos 137 (1937) (allowing federal jurisdiction in case of
contemptuous statements against the Director of the Postal and Telegraph Service);
"Zamora," CSJN 183 Fallos 49 (1939) (allowing federal jurisdiction for criticizing the
Peruvian government).
222. CONsT. ARG. art. 32 (1860).
223. "Ramos c/Batalla," CSJN 278 Fallos 62, 73-74 (1970).

224. Id. at 78.
225. Quzen es Quien en la Sociedad Argentina 118 (1982).
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islative and judicial jurisdiction, noting that "[ilt is true that art. 32, introduced into the Constitution by the reform of 1860, reveals the historical
intent of its author to reserve the punishment [of the press] to the provinces," and demonstrates "the intent that regulation and repression of
abuses by the press belong to the provincial society where the abuse occurs." Yet he concludes that:
[T]he criteria of the Framer of 1860 responded to the reality of the environment of his time: the press as "local" public opinion had repercussions
only in the place that it reached with its circulation and influence. In
1860 the press did not command the extension of the country, nor was it
distributed outside the locality (at least with the immediacy and speed of
today). Today

printed matter-as local as it may be-has diffusion

(at least potentially) inmediately and throughout the country...
Faced with such a radical change of circumstances, we understand that
the historical will of the author of the rule took into account a situation
distinct from the present. What is to be done then? The rule constituting
the will of the author did not contemplate present reality, and is as
though it does not exist, when the essential change of the situation shows
that the will of the author is not directed toward the changed situation
(which could not be foreseen), that will disappears: there is no will. The
situation is the same as the historical absence of the rule (or a gap). And
there is no rule, because the rule that had been established, according to
the will of its author, governed a now nonexistent situation. For the present situation, we can say that the author of the Constitution expressed no
will. Therefore, one must "integrate" the normative order we have stumbled into with a rule that does not focus on presentmday reality, and for
that reality, we have no rule. [Emphasis in original.]2
He concludes that the traditional rule is "sociologically impeded" and
therefore unofficially derogated. 8 Changed circumstances justify interpreting an article of the Constitution out of existence.
Since the 1930s some of Argentina's most powerful newspapers have
found themselves taken over or shut down by democratically elected governments. The most notable examples were Per6n's takeover of La Prensa
in 1951m and closure of El Mundo in 1974,2 not to mention frequent re-

226.
227.
228.
229.

1 BiDART CAMPOs, supra note 164, at 280.
Id.
Id. at 280-81.

Law No. 14.021, [XI-A] A.D.L.A. 1 (B.O. Apr. 18, 1951);
YOOLL, THEPRESS IN ARGENTMA, 1973-78 18 (2d ed. 1984).
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pression of left-wing and Peronist newspapers during most of the period
from the mid-1950s through 1983.1' While one cannot draw a direct link,
saying that the Supreme Court could have stopped those events, there is no
question that much of the repression that took place would not have been
jurisdictionally permissible under the Supreme Court's traditional caselaw.
The press did suffer from some judicially sanctioned repression prior to
1932. Even before the 1930s, the Argentine Supreme Court never questioned the right of the Executive to place restrictions on the press during a
state of siege, z2 and never questioned provincial government restrictions
on the press beyond noting article 14's ban on prior restraints." 3 But as a
practical matter, the press was usually unmolested.' Significantly, in its
1932 decision allowing federal legislation and repression, the Court offers
obiter dicta to the effect that article 14's reference to prior restraints may
also bar arbitrary penalties imposed on the press after publication, a vague
attempt to move beyond the Constitutional language and increase protection. 5 But this additional protection, designed perhaps to counterbalance
the change in the Court's traditional caselaw, is never applied by the Court
during the years that follow The pre-1932 rule may well have become
"sociologically impeded," but until 1932 the press seems to have benefited
from its inflexibility "'

230. See "Editora Popular Americana SRL (Diano "El Mundo") c/Estado Nacional,"
CSJN 289 Fallos 177 (1974) (dismissing the newspaper's action on procedural grounds).
231. See GRAHAM-YooLL, supra note 229, at 18-20, 152-53.
232. See "Varela c/Anzo," CSJN 23 Fallos 257 (1881) (refusing to question the
authority of the Executive and Congress to declare a state of siege or examine the legality
of the composition of the Congress that approved it). The issue of whether there might
be limits on the authority of the President to close a newspaper during a state of siege
was never heard by the Court during this period.
233. See "Antilli," CSJN 119 Fallos 231, 248 (1914) (holding that the Social Defense
Law, Law No. 7.029, was constitutional as applied to the press in the Federal Capital,
where Congress had the authority to act as a local legislature, the only limit being the
Constitutional prohibition on prior restraints, which was not an issue in the case).
234. Supra note 144 and accompanying text.
235. "Procurador Fiscal c/Diano 'La Provincia,"' CSJN 167 Fallos at 121, 137.
236. Although the Argentine courts ordered the Executive to reopen several newspapers during the later years of the military government of 1966-73, on grounds that the
reason given for the closure of the newspaper was unrelated to the reason given for the
state of siege, e.g., "Primera Plana," CSJN 276 Fallos 72 (1970), certainly an important,
judicially created protection that does not appear in the constitutional text, this rule did
not get applied to the press during the 1976-83 military government and may have been
implicitly disapproved of in "Granada," CSJN 307 Fallos 2284, 2316 (1985) (refusing to
require proof from the Executive of the relationship between a detention and the emer-
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2. Protectionof CommercialActivity and Property
Argentine scholars have probably devoted more space toward analyzing the changes in the Supreme Court's caselaw on freedom to engage
in commercial activity and protection of property than on any other area of
constitutional law"I Argentina has undergone many other important
changes in caselaw since 1930, but its move from strict protection of economic liberties to allowing virtually unlimited State regulation of the
economy veers away from what was previously the central focus of its
Constitution. While most of the Argentine Constitution is modeled after
that of the United States, its vision comes from a book published in 1852
by Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bases y puntos de partidapara la organizaci6n
3 (Bases and Points of Departure for
polftica de la Repablica Argentina"'
the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic, hereinafter Bases).
The book, whose second edition included a draft Constitution, was seized
upon by Argentina's leading political figures as offering the essential guide
for Argentina's future and for the Constitutional Convention held in
1853.239
As Alberdi notes, Argentina in 1852 was largely a wasteland, a country roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi but with
only one million inhabitants, little agriculture, no railroads, and no vibrant
gency that necessitated the declaration of a state of siege-a situation parallel to that of
the closure of newspapers during a state of siege).
237. See, e.g., HoRAcIo A. GARcIA BELSUNCE, GARANFIAs CONsrrrucioNAL~ss 29-115

(1984) (arguing that the original intent of the Argentine Constitution was for strict protection of the economic freedom of the individual); Miguel Angel Ekmekdjian, Desajustes entre la constituci6nformal y la constituci6n materialen el ejerctcio del poder de
policia. (El exceso de lafunci6n reglamentariade los derechos individuales), [1982-B]
La Ley 789; Horacio A. Garcfa Belsunce, La protecci6n constitucionalde las libertades
econ6micas, 105 E.D. 837 (1984); Miguel M. Padilla, Razonabilidadjurfdica y razonabilidadticnica, [1984-D] L.L. 1106.
238. Juan Bautista Alberdi, Bases y puntos de partidapara la orgamzacin poltica
de la Repfiblica Argentina (1852) [hereinafter "Bases"], repnnted in 3 OBRAS
COMPLETAS DE JUANBAUTIsTAALBERDI, supra note 106, at 371.
239. General Justo Jos6 de Urquiza, the leader of the forces that overthrew General
Rosas and the de facto ruler of the country, responded enthusiastically to Bases in a public letter and ordered the printing of a new edition. Jorge M. Mayer, ALBERDI Y Su
TIEMPO 531, 541 (1973). Sarmiento, one of the leaders of the exiles who had been forced
out of the country during Rosas' government, called Bases a "monument" and forecast
that it would become "the Argentine decalogue." Id.at 552. See also Natalio R. Botana,
EL ORDEN CONSERVADOR: LA POLUTICA ARGENTINA ENTRE 1880 Y 1916, at 42-45 (1977)
(describing the Alberdian vision as adopted by the Argentine political elite, particularly
by those in power starting in 1880).
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cities aside from Buenos Aires.' Alberdi's slogan was "to govern is to
populate."' Immigrants were to be lured to Argentina through the money
they could make and the property they could accumulate. Political rights
did not matter, but protection of property and freedom to engage in industry and commerce were central 4 Once enacted, Alberdi would describe
the Constitution as having deliberately adopted the econormc doctrine of
Adam Smith, 3 and State interference with industry violated the Constitution's economic liberties.' "Any regulation that under pretext of organizmg the exercise of economic liberty restricts and confounds it commits a
double wrong, against the Constitution and against national vealth, which
find their deepest principle in this liberty "245 Given Alberdi's central role
in the framing of the Constitution, with most of the provisions dealing with
economic liberties coming from his draft,246 the Argentine Supreme Court
had a platform for striking down economic regulations even stronger than
that of the United States. While Justice Holmes could argue forcefully in
dissent in Lochner v. New York that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics" and that "a.Constitution
is not intended to embody a particular econonuc theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissez
faire,"4 7 the Argentine equivalent of The Federalist is a celebration of

240. Bases, supra note'238, at 451,456.

241. Id. at 527.
242. Juan Bautista Alberdi, Sistema econ6mico y rentistico de la Confederaci6n Ar.
gentina segfin su Constituct6n de 1853 (1854) [hereinafter "Sistema econtmico y rentfstico"], in 4 OBRAS COMPLETAS DE JUAN BAUTISTA ALBERDI, supra note 106, at 143,

188.
243. Id. at 147.
244. Id. at 204-06.

245. Id. at 159.
246. Compare Bases, supra note 238, at 561-62 (arts. 16-18 of Alberdi's draft) with
CONST. ARG. arts. 14, 16-17 (1860).
247. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (Holmes, J. dissenting). There is
little agreement among U.S. scholars as to whether Lochner had a reasonable basis in
original intent. Michael J. Perry, THE CONsTIlTION INTHE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS
164-65 (1994). Bernard Siegan offers an excellent review of the support for Lochner in
the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment, but while he does offer some
authority, it is in the form of isolated comments by legislators. See Bernard H. Siegan,
THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION: AN INQUIRY INTO JUDICIAL REVIEW AND ITS

IMPACT UPON SOCIETY 46-71, 77-81 (1987).

There is nothing even close to matching
Alberdi's work as a compelling statement of economic liberties that clearly guided the
Amendment's framers.
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economic liberty In the Argentine case it is as though the equivalent of
The Federalistwas devoted entirely to laissez faire economic theory.
However, in the 1930s Argentine caselaw on commercial activity and
property went through much the same transformation that U.S. caselaw
went through in the same period, starting from a position similar to that of
substantive due process in the United States but rapidly legitimizing a
vastly expanded state role in the economy Like the United States, accommodation of the changes required a change in the way judges viewed
the law.2
The applicable legal provisions are similar to those of the United
States, but not identical. First, freedom of commercial activity in Argentina was protected not just by the Constitution, but by the Civil Code,
which meant that provincial legislation affecting commerce could be
evaluated not just for consistency with the Constitution, but for consistency with the Civil Code and its own emphasis on unhindered economic
relations.2 9
Second, as one would expect from the Alberdian vision, the Argentine
Constitution of 1853/60 is more explicit than the U.S. Constitution on
protection of commercial activity and property rights. The U.S. Constitution contains a prohibition on government laws "impairing the Obligation
of Contracts,"' two amendments barring the federal government and the
States respectively from depriving persons of their "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,"'" a requirement that the State not deny
any person "equal protection of the laws,"' and a requirement that private
property not be taken for public use without just compensation.p By contrast, Article 14 of the Argentine Constitution of 1860 provides:
All the inhabitants of the Nation enjoy the following rights in conformity with the laws that regulate their exercise; including: to work and
exercise all legitimate industry; to navigation and commerce;,
to use
248. See infra notes 336-40 and accompanying text.
249. See, e.g., "Vd1ez Sdrsfield c/Consejo de Educac16n de la Provincia de Buenos
Aires," CSJN 23 Fallos 647 (1881) (invalidating a 10% inheritance tax established by the
Province of Buenos Airs as inconsistent with the inheritance regime of the Civil Code);
"Mumcipalidad de Federac16n c/Baylina," CSJN 116 Fallos 116 (1912) (invalidating
provincial limitations on cattle grazing unless the province provided for indemnification,
since the activity was permitted under the Civil Code).
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
251. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend IV
252. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. V
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and dispose of their property; to associate for useful purposes;
the first part of article 17 adds:

. and

Property is inviolate, and no inhabitant of the nation may be deprived of
it, except by virtue of a judgment founded in law. Expropriation on
grounds of public utility must be determined by law and previously indemnified.
These articles are in addition to a general prohibition on punishment
without due process of law, 4 a provision similar to that of the U.S. Constitution on equal protection, 2 5 and a special article protecting foreigners,
including their right to "exercise their industry, commerce and profession"
and to own, buy and sell real property 11 The clarity of these norms is
matched by rational consistency in Argentine caselaw up until 1930.
Phrases in the Constitution providing that rights may be regulated by lawu7
so long as the rights are not "altered"" 8 offer some room for judicial maneuver, but the clarity of the constitutional norms, the Alberdian vision and
the Court's own past caselaw made it impossible to hide the break with rationalism once the Court adopted a more tolerant view of government econoimc intervention in the 1930s. Moreover, once the break occurred the
Supreme Court would often ratify government decisions emasculating economic rights.
a. The Caselaw Before 1930
As one would expect with judges increasingly coming from legal educations that focused on the Civil Code, which in turn focused on private
economic relations, the disposition of Argentine judges to protect economic rights increased over the course of the late nineteenth century to
peak in the early twentieth century This movement was contemporaneous
with U.S. Supreme Court caselaw that increasingly protected private economic relations and limited the police power of the state; 9 but the Argen254. CONST. ARG. art. 18 (1860).
255. CONsT. ARG. art. 16 (1860).
256. CONsT. ARO. art. 20 (1860); see also CONsT. ARG.

art 16 (1860).

257. CONsT. ARG. arts. 14 & 28 (1860).
258. CONsT. ARG. art. 28 (1860).
259. See, e.g., Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S.

418 (1890); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The key cases are summarized in
Off. 1987);
Edward Keynes, LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND PRIVACY: TOWARD A JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1474-79, 1484-88 (Gov't Prtg,

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 112-28 (1996).
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trne Supreme Court invoked more explicit Constitutional provisions than
the U.S. Supreme Court, and unlike the United States, applications of those
provisions to the provinces as well as the federal government was never in
doubt.m
While there are many minor precedents, the first case in which the
Court adopted a clear philosophy of a narrow reading of the state's police
power to regulate economic activity was Hileret clProvincta de Tcumdn," decided m 1903 upon the amval of Antonio Bermejo on the
Court.262 The case involved an attempt by the Province of TucumAn to es260. Unlike the United States, where application of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights to the States has been a gradual process based on the Fourteenth Amendment, in
Argentina all individual rights provided for in the Constitution have always been regarded as applicable against the Provinces as well as against the federal government.
See, e.g., GONzALEz, supra note 170, at § 82; Estrada, supra note 172, at 42-43. The argument that the individual liberties in the Argentine Constitution could not be applied
against the Provinces is addressed and discarded in "Hileret c/Provinca de Tucumfn, '
CSJN 98 Fallos at 39, 47-49.
261. 98 Fallos 20 (1903). Many of the same arguments are also developed by the
Court in a companion case, "Nogu6s Hermanos c/Provincia de Tucumfin," CSJN 98 Fallos 52 (1903).
262. In the 1860s and 1870s the only Argentine Supreme Court cases protecting econormc rights involve expropriations and confiscations. See, e.g., "Hu6," CSJN 4 Fallos
320 (1867) (holding that the price paid by the government to expropriate land for a railroad was too low); "Iturraspe c/Montaldo," CSJN 8 Fallos 45 (1869) (holding that a
Province of Santa F6 law declaring earlier provincial land sales null was unconstitutional); "Sociedad de Beneficiencia de Sefioras c/Provincia de San Juan," CSJN 11 Fallos 139 (1871) (holding that the Province of San Juan could not to force a private
women's philanthropic organization to end its activities and turn over its funds to another organization); "Keravenant," CSJN 15 Fallos 254 (1874) (holding that in setting
the amount to be paid for an expropriation for a railroad it was necessary to take into account not only the value of the land actually expropriated, but the manner in which railroad holdings dividing the parcel negatively affect the value of the remaining land and
the owner's activities). In several cases in the 1860s and 1870s the Court allowed some
government interference with private rights. The City of Buenos Aires was permitted to
award a concession creating a central market and to bar competition within a six block
radius, "Vanos puesteros pr6ximos al mercado del centro c/Empresano del rusmo mercado," CSJN 3 Fallos 468 (1866); a provincial legislature was permitted to require provincial banks to repay depositors in gold even though their certificates of deposit permitted payment in Bolivian silver, "Caffarena," CSJN 10 Fallos 427 (1871); and a
provincial legislature was permitted to revoke a Bank's concession to emit currency even
though the concession had initially been granted for three years, "Banco de Londres y
Rio de la Plata c/Provincia de Santa F6," CSJN 17 Fallos 176 (1876); see also "Empresa
'Plaza de Toros' c/Provincia de Buenos Aires," CSJN 7 Fallos 150 (1869) (permitting
the Province of Buenos Aires to refuse perrmission to build a bull fighting ring on
grounds that the Province's police power included the power to provide for the security,
health and morality of the inhabitants of the Province).
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tablish what would essentially have been a state-run cartel for its sugar
producers. The Province of Tucum~n produced most of Argentina's sugar,

and sought to improve the profits of the industry by restricting supply. Its
solution was a sales quota for each producer beyond which he producer

faced a prohibitively high sales tax263 The plaintiff, a producer affected by
the tax, argued that the quota and tax affected its right "to work and exer-

cise all legitimate industry," 2" and that the fixing of quotas that vaned according to the producer violated its right to "equal protection under the
law"2

The Province responded that it was engaged in a reasonable

regulation of the plaintiff's rights, and that the regulations were for the
plaintiff's benefit and the benefit of the provincial economy as a whole.2"
In the 1880s the Court decided two significant cases involving economic rights, one in
which it used the Civil Code to declare a provincial law unconstitutional, and the second
in which it blocked expropriations necessary to finance the creation of the City of Buenos Aires' first modem boulevard. The first case, "Vdlez Sfirsfield c/Ccnsejo de Educac6n de la Provincia de Buenos Aires," CSJN 23 Fallos 647 (1881), involved a provincial estate tax for the benefit of public education that was only applied when a legatee
was not a kin of the deceased. The tax was held to conflict with the inheritance regime
of the Civil Code, which made no provision for participation by the government in the
distribution of an estate. The second case, "Municipalidad de la Capital c/Elortondo,"
CSJN 33 Fallos 162 (1888), involved an expropriation, and was the first Supreme Court
decision to explicitly declare a federal law unconstitutional. Congress had provided that
the construction of Buenos Aires' first Parisian style boulevard was to be financed by
expropriating all parcels of land abutting the proposed boulevard, regardless of whether
all the land was actually required for its construction, and then reselling the land after
construction so that the government could take advantage of the increase in value; Law
No. 1583, arts. 2-4, Nov. 4, 1884, [1881-1888] A.D.L.A. 165, 165-166; 33 Fallos at 16365, 184-86. The Court, citing numerous State court decisions in the U.S. barring similar
schemes, held that an expropriation designed only to provide an economic benefit to the
government did not satisfy the article 17 requirement that expropriations only take place
for "public utility." 33 Fallos at 186-96. Neither Vilez Sdrsfield nor Elortondo established caselaw that would be especially central or enduring, see "Cepeda," CSJN 133
Fallos 216, 232 (1920) (allowing a provincial inheritance tax and holding that provincial
taxation is an administrative issue independent of Civil Code rules as to how an estate
should be distributed); "Gibbs c/Provincia de Mendoza," CSJN 93 Fallos 219, 224
(1901) (the Supreme Court, while not directly overruling Elortondo, avoids asking
whether a provincial law expropriating land for a railroad expropriates more land than is
necessary for the project); but the cases do show early steps to safeguard property in light
of the two main influences on Argentine law at the time, the Civil Code md U.S. constitutional practice.
263. 98 Fallos at 24-26, 36.
264. CONST. ARG.art. 14 (1860).
265. 98 Fallos at 25-26 (citing CONST. ARG.art. 16 (1860)). The plaintiffs also made
an unsuccessful argument that the law unconstitutionally affected the free flow of goods
between provinces. Id. at 25, 35.
266. Id. at 26-27.
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The Argentine Court's decision is strikingly self-assured. The Court,
while discussing the need to focus on the constitutional text and the intent
of its Framers, took a laissez faire economic philosophy for granted. It
offered citations to Alberdi and the Constitutional Convention of 1853
only on the simple secondary issue of the enforceability of individual constitutional rights against the provinces.P The Court also made no reference to any U.S. decision or commentator, a rarity for the Court in such an
important case.79 Instead, the Court simply insisted that a law making
production beyond a determined limit impossible--because the tax rate exceeded the typical sales price of the product--directly conflicted with the
right to engage in legitimate industryY The Court was willing to admit
reasonable limitations on constitutional rights through exercise by the
Province of its police power, but this power was limited to situations affecting public order, morality or hygiene, or harming the well-being of the
Province by affecting the rights of others, none of wich was present.7 1
The Court also agreed with the plaintiff's argument that by creating different quotas for different producers the Province had violated the constitutional right to equal protection under the law.m
The Hilaret decision was not only consistent with Alberdi, but was
consistent with almost all the constitutional thought of its day.m Hileret
267. Id. at 47-48.
268. Id. at 47-49.
269. See Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman, supra note 57, at (describing the use of U.S. law by the Argentine Supreme Court). While the Court was familiar with Thomas Cooley's CONSTrru'ToNAL LiMTATIONS (Boston, Little, Brown, &

Co. 1868), which analyzes substantive due process at 256-294, see, e.g., "Ercolano
c/Lanten de Renshaw," CSJN 136 Fallos 161, 189 (1922) (Bermejo, dissenting) (citing
Cooley); "Avico cdde la Pesa," CSJN 172 Fallos 21, 85 (1934) (Repetto, dissenting)
(citing Cooley), the Court probably felt no need to develop analogies to the less explicit
provisions of the U.S. Constitution. None of the U.S. cases it mght have cited would
have had facts on point. Until Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), all U.S. substantive due process decisions involved rate regulations, and those only date back to Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
270. 98 Fallos at 36,40-41.
271. Id. at 49-50. See also "Nogu6s Hermanos c/Provincia de TucumAn" CSJN 98
Fallos 52, 57-58 (1903) (repeating the same narrow definition of the police power).
272. 98 Fallos at 36,42-44.
273. The decision was applauded by La Prensa. El problema azucarero, LA PRENSA,
Sept. 11, 1903, at 3-4 (attacking the Governor of Tucumfn for his protests against the
decision, and noting that, unlike politicians governed only by personal whim, the Supreme Court was bound by the law, and that in the present case the Court had done
nothing more than apply the Constitution and its libertarian doctrines to the improper
statute); see also El unpuesto a los azdcaresen Tucumdn, LA PRENSA, Sept. 6, 1903, at 4
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did not usher in cases invalidating labor legislation as did Lochner v. New
York in the United States in 1905. 4 There was little legislation of that sort
in Argentina until the 1920s, and most came later still.

5

Hilaretdid, how-

ever, throw up a bulwark against a wide variety of econormc regulations
that had at least some political backing.

The most important cases came from the Province of Mendoza, the
center of Argentine wine production and hence of attempts to manipulate
the wine market. In Grosso clProvinciade Mendoza,276 the Court declared

unconstitutional a Mendoza law that established a tax on all wine production in the Province but offered a bounty in the same amount as the tax to
(giving the basic details of the decision with flattering language about its quality); La
mnconstitucionalidadde [a ley tucumana, LA PRENSA, Sept. 7, 1903, at 5 (noting that La
Prensahad long maintained that the Tucumdn law was unconstitutional). The decision's
statement of the limits on the State's ability to affect Constitutional rights was consistent
not only with Alberdi, but with Joaqufn V Gonzdlez, the leading Constitutional Law
professor of the period. Published only six years earlier, Gonzdlez's treatise likewise describes the State as authorized to limit constitutional rights only when necessary to protect the constitutional rights of a third party, or when necessary "to protect the life, property, security, morality and health" of the public. GONZALEZ, supra note 1712, § 94.
274. See Lochner, 198 U.S. 45; see, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908)
(holding unconstitutional a penalty on interstate carners who disrmssed employees because of membership in a union); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding unconstitutional a Kansas statute barring the firing of employees for membership in a labor
union); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding a minimum wage
law for women in the District of Columbia unconstitutional); Morehead v. New York ex
rel. Tipado, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (holding a New York nummum wage law for women
unconstitutional). These cases, as well as cases where the Court accepted labor legislation are summarized in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 259, at
1485-88; Keynes, supra note 259, at 117-26; BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THIl GROWTH OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALLAW 172-79 (1967 ed.).
275. The first piece of Argentine legislation designed for worker protection was a law
passed in 1905 establishing Sunday as a day of rest in the Federal Capital, Law No.
4661, Sept. 6, 1905, [1889-1919] A.D.L.A. 651; see also id., accompanying note (describing the history behind the law and the precedent it set). This law was challenged
and held constitutional as falling within the state's police power to engage in health and
safety regulation. "Martinez," CSJN 157 Fallos 28 (1930). In 1915, Congress created a
system of workers compensation for workplace accidents, Law No. 9688, [1889-1919]
A.D.L.A. 949 (B.O. Oct. 21, 1915). In the 1920s Argentina established protections such
as the eight hour day and forty-eight hour workweek, Law No. 11.544, [1920-1940]
A.D.L.A. 226 (B.O. Sept. 17, 1929); prohibition on work at night in bakeries, Law No.
11.338, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 198 (B.O. Oct. 23, 1926); and limitations on work by
women and minors, Law No. 11.317, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 191 (B.O. Nov. 19, 1924).
The Supreme Court never ruled on the constitutionality of these provisions.
276. 128 Fallos 435 (1918). The Court also reached the same conclusions in an identical case decided two years later. "Laborde Hermanos c/Provincia de Mendoza," CSJN
131 Fallos 219 (1920).
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those producers who belonged to the Province's wine producers' cooperative.m The cooperative, however, was actually a cartel, open only to producers manufacturing a minmum of five million liters of wine per year tm
and was authorized to establish monthly sales quotas in accordance with
market demand.l The Court's reasoning, citing Hileret, was once again
that the tax violated the Constitutional right to engage in all legitimate industry, since the tax had the effect of eliminating the greater part of the
producer's profits."s The tax also violated the right to equal protection under the law by discriminating between producers without a legitimate public purpose. The Province asserted that it was merely adopting the economic approach of German cartels and that its methods were consistent
with emerging world-wide trendsi but the Court replied that the economic considerations underlying the statute were irrelevant to its decision,
and that in any case the conduct was hardly cutting-edge economics given
the recent counter-example of U.S. antitrust law.' Mendoza did not give
up. The Province responded to the Court's decision by reforming the law
to establish the producers' association as a provincial agency charged with
setting the price of wine, and with authority to establish taxes on producers
both as a penalty for exceeding established quotas and to finance its activities. Presumably the Province thought that by placing the regulatory
authority in government rather than private hands the regulatory activities
might be found more acceptable. But in Passerac/Provnctade Mendoza,
the Court declared this law unconstitutional as well, both as an infringement on the right of individual producers to engage in industry and for establishing unequal taxes not directed toward a public purpose3"
These cases were not unique. In the Court's anti-regulatory zeal, even
zoning regulations were occasionally declared unconstitutional by the
277. 128 Fallos at 435, 437-39, 446. Members of the cooperative did not even have
to pay the tax in cash, but could pay with a voucher from the Province in the amount of
their bounty. Id at 451-52.

278. Id. at 437-38, 446.
279. Id. at 437, 452.
280. CONST. ARG. art. 14 (1860).
281. Id. at 452-53, 455.

282. Ia at 454-55.
283. Id. at 448.

284. Id. at 450.
285. "Passera c/Provincia de Mendoza," CSJN 139 Fallos 358, 362-63, 365, 367

(1923).
286. Id at 367-70.
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Court-in one case on the grounds that the Civil Code placed no such restrictions on the exercise of a legitimate industry,"' and in another, on
grounds that the province failed to show that the regulation, requiring that
hospitals not be placed in the center of a town, was necessary to meet a
public interest." s
Moreover, the Court frequently declared taxes unconstitutional. A
Tucuman tax on sugar sales was declared unconstitutional because all proceeds from the tax were destined to indemnify planters unable to sell their
sugar. 9 The Court held that a tax must be destined to satisfy a public end
to be constitutional and the indemnification scheme in Tucumn was not a
public purpose.' A special tax on landowners and wine producers in the
Province of Mendoza to fund a workers' pension fund was similarly held
unconstitutional on grounds that a tax needed to fall on the population generally2 1 While caring for the old and the handicapped fell within the legitimate purposes of government,' the government could not take from
one segment of society to give to another.2 The Court also held numerous
taxes unconstitutional on grounds that they were too high and therefore
constituted confiscations of property This included an inheritance tax that
reached levels as high as fifty percent of the distribution, 94 a tax on the
transfer of burial plots that wiped out all possible profits from a sale,'"5 and
a licensing fee on physicians in the Province of San Juan designed to force
.them to offer free service to the poor or pay a tax equal to approximately
half of the typical physician's mcome--a tax that violated the right to engage in industry as well. s6
287. "Municipalidad de Federac16n c/Baylina," CSJN 116 Fallos 116, 128-32 (1912)
(involving regulations banning sheep grazing close to the City).
288. "Canale c/Provincia de Mendoza," CSJN 118 Fallos 278, 287-89 (1913).
289. "Griet Hermanos c/Provincia de Tucumdn," CSJN 137 Fallos 212, 236 (1922).
290. Id. at 245.
291. "Vifiedos y Bodegas Anzdi c/Provincia de Mendoza," CSJN 157 Fallos 359, 37176 (1930).
292. Id. at 371.
293. Id. at 373-76.
294. "Melo deCan6," CSJN 115 Fallos 111, 135-37 (1911).
295. "Bourdieu c/Municipalidad de la Capital," CSJN 145 Fallos 307 (1925).
296. "Rizzotti c/Provincia de San Juan," CSJN 150 Fallos 419, 427-31 (1928). In
other tax cases, the Court held unconstitutional an assessment for the construction of a
road on persons living close to the road when the amount of the assessment exceeded the
likely increase in the value of their property, "Pereyra Iraola c/Provincin de Buenos Aires," CSJN 138 Fallos 161 (1923); and an estate tax that taxes distributions not according
to the amount received in the distribution, but according to the size of the total estate, a
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From the 1880s until the 1930s, there was only one Argentine Supreme Court decision, Ercolano ciLanter de Renshin, 9 7 that was inconsistent with the Court's emphasis on strict protection of econonuc liberties.
This case, decided m 1922, held constitutional a statutory freeze on commercial and residential rents. Moreover, the Court in Ercolano adopted an
expressly responsive approach toward law, probably because what it was
doing is widely popular. The Court justified the rent control measure as
necessary to avoid "an irresistible economic oppression" exercised over
"one of the essentials of life!""n and as a situation where "not just considerations of humanity and social justice" require government intervention,
but the effect of high rents on the general health of the economy.' This is
obviously not an autonomous approach toward the law, and Antonio Bermejo, in dissent, continued to insist on a focus on the constitutional text G°
offering extensive quotations from Alberdi on the centrality of economic
liberty in Argentina's constitutional scheme? 1
However, while Ercolano is a precursor of cases to come, the Court
itself saw the case as atypical. The Court emphasized the exceptional
character of the housing shortage brought on by scarcity in labor and materials due to the World War in Europe, 3 and the fact that the freeze was
only a temporary measure?' Further, the Court indicated that it would
continue to evaluate use of the police power for econonuc ends strictly.'
Three years later the Court kept its promise and declared the same rent
control law unconstitutional on grounds that it had now gone on for too
long to be regarded as a temporary measure.w Moreover, even in the same
year that it handed down Ercolano, the Court refused to apply the rent
freeze to situations where a contract already existed that stipulated rents
higher than those permitted under the law. The landlord in those cases

violation according to the Court of the right of persons in similar economic circumstances to be taxed equally, "Drysdale c/Provincia de Buenos Aires," CSJN 149 Fallos
417 (1927).
297. 136 Fallos 161 (1922).
298. I& at 175.
299. Id. at 176.
300. Id at 181.
301. Id. at 181-82, 183, 186.
302. Id. at 174.
303. Id at 177-78.
304. Id at 171, 173.
305. "Mango c/Traba," CSJN 144 Fallos 219 (1925).
306. "Horta c/Harguindeguy," CSJN 137 Fallos 47 (1922).
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had an "acquired right" that could not be disturbed by the legislature."

Perhaps the best explanation for the anomaly of Ercolano is its extensive
citation to a U.S. Supreme Court decision, Block v. Hirsh,10s decided only
the year before, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that the rent control
scheme established by Congress for the District of Columbia was constitutional."° Given the strong social forces clamoring for rent control, the Ar-

gentine Court could hardly hold out when faced with the fact that its historical model, the U.S. Supreme Court, had already accepted similar
legislation.31

307. Id. at 62-63; see also "D'Elfa c/Huespe," CSJN 138 Fallos 56 (1923) (enforcing
a sublease with a fixed term); "Cooke c/Naveira," CSJN 138 Fallos 122 (1923) (enforcing an oral contract); "Carranza de Lawson c/Alvarez, Soto y Cfa," CSJN 137 Fallos 294
(1922) (enforcing a judgment for eviction handed down before the law came into effect).
308. See Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921), cited in "Ercolano," CSJN 161 Fallos
at 183-84.
309. See generally Miller, The Authority of a Foreign Talisman, supra note 57 at _
(analyzing the influence of U.S. caselaw on the Ercolano decision and the rent control
cases that followed).
310. While obviously a popular measure by Hip6lito Ingoyen, the first individual in
Argentine history who might be described as a populist president, the rent freeze was
very controversial within the upper class and among law professors. The freeze was initially enacted in Law No. 11.157, Sept. 19, 1921, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 79, to apply for
a period of two years, was extended for one more year by Law No. 11.231, Oct. 4, 1923,
[1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 115, and then extended for one more year after a two month gap,
by Law No. 11.318, Dec. 5, 1924, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 193. The positions of a number of Argentine constitutional law and civil law professors are noted in Wilmart, supra
note 117, at 440-42 (who opposes the freeze); see also La ley de alquileres, el derecho
de propiedady la Constituci6nNacional, 14 J.A. 25 (1924) (offering an interpretation of
the Constitution in support of the freeze). The issue and the Supreme Court's decisions
were exhaustively reported on in the Argentine press, with La Prensa generally in opposition. E.g., J.A. Gonz.lez Calder6n, Inconstitucionalidadde las leyes sobre alquileres,
LA PRENSA, Sept. 22, 1921, at 6 (lengthy explanation of why the rent control law was
unconstitutional); La cuesti6n de los alquileres, LA PRENSA, Apr. 29, 1922, at 9 (extensively discussing the Ercolano decision); Aplicaci6n de la Ley sobre alquileres, LA
PRENSA, May 6, 1922, at 15 (discussing a lower court decision that cited Ercolano); Las
leyes de alquileres, LA PRENSA, Aug. 22, 1922, at 12 (extensively discussing decision
holding the law unconstitutional when applied retroactively to contracts already signed at
higher prices); La Suprema Corte declar6 que es contrariaa la Constituctun y afecta el
dominio la pr6rrogade la ley de alquileres,LA PRENSA, Aug. 27, 1925, at 15 (extensive
analysis of "Mango c/Traba," CSJN 144 Fallos 219 (1925), which declared the law unconstitutional); La prdrrogade los alquileres, LA PRENSA, Aug. 28, 1925, at 9 (editorial
supporting the Supreme Court's position that the rent control law is unconstitutional).

Judicial Review and Consitutional Stability

1997]

b.

The CaselawAfter 1930

While Ercolano remained an isolated case in the 1920s, it became the
model of the Argentine Court's caselaw in the 1930s and 1940s. Until the
1930s, Argentina's business interests were largely happy with the Alberdian emphasis on economic liberty and avoidance of government regulation. This changed with the onset of the Depression and the effect of the
Depression on Argentina's traditional trading relationships?" Financially,
Argentina suffered the same instability as Europe and the United States,
requiring similar measures to protect borrowers and financial institutions.
In terms of its critical agricultural exports, Argentina faced a sharp fall in
prices,"' and found that Great Britain, hitherto the principal market for its
beef exports, was no longer willing to accept unrestricted imports?1 3 Argentina therefore passed legislation not merely establishing emergency responses to its financial crisis, but creating mechanisms for better control
over the marketing of its agricultural products? 1 4 Congress passed two
major measures in September 1933 that resulted in important litigation.
First, Congress established a three year moratorium on all mortgage payments, capped the rate of interest on mortgages at six percent, and halted
ongoing executions and judicial sales." 5 Second, Congress established a
National Meat Marketing Board and increased controls on the meat packing houses, all of which were foreign owned and the focus of frequent accusations of unfair trading practices.3"' These were only two of a variety of
measures that undercut Argentina's traditional economic liberalism, and
they were embarked upon by a government which enjoyed the support of
most of the economic elite.3 17 The world had changed and the country
clearly needed to respond.

311.

PAUL H. LEis, THE CRISIS OF ARGE INE CAPrrAuSM 79, 86-87 (1990).
312. ROCK, supra note 8, at 220-221.
313. Id. at 223-224.
314. LEWIs, supra note 311, at 91.
315. Law No. 11.741, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 486 (B.O. Oct. 19, 1933).
316. Law No. 11.747, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 489 (B.O. Oct. 17, 1933). Some controls on the meat packing houses had existed since 1923, Law No. 11.226, [1920-1940]
A.D.L.A. 112 (B.O. Oct. 31, 1923), and these controls were now placed in the hands of
the National Meat Board, Law No. 11.747, art. 5, supra, at 490. The Board was also in-

structed to establish its own meat packing house, arts. 7-16, id. at 491-92, and collect up
to a 1.5% fee from all sales to the packing houses, art. 17, id. at 492.
317. See LEwis, supra note 314, at 89-93 (noting the interventionist tendencies of the
conservative government of President Agustfn P Justo that ruled from 1932-1938).
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The Argentine Supreme Court supported essentially all the changes
favored by the economic elite. The changes could not be supported con-

sistently with legal rationalism and the Court's response was exactly the
same as its response in Ercolano: invocation of United States practice as
authority, and recognition that social needs could influence the judicial
function. U.S. Supreme Court decisions on the New Deal were followed in
the Argentine press,31 and U.S. cases such as New York v. Nebbia, 319 a

1934 decision holding that milk price controls were constitutional, were
seized upon to argue that as in the United States, a Constitution must be
interpreted flexibly according to the needs of the times.32

The year 1934 proved to be crucial for the Argentine Court's caselaw,
and the key case, Avico cde la Pesa,32' presents an extraordinarily odd

opinion. The case concerned the constitutionality of the mortgage moratorium, challenging both the moratorium and the interest rate cap, which in
3
this case reduced the interest rate on the loan from nine percent to six. 2 If
the Argentine Supreme Court were to have followed its prior caselaw, it
would have had to have found for the lender. While the Court had approved a rent-freeze in Ercolano for completed leases on which landlords

318. See, e.g., Tiene bases constitucionalesfirmesel plan de la N.R.A., LA NACI6N,
Mar. 7, 1934, at 1 (reporting on New York v. Nebbia, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); El Gobterno
de los Estados Unidos estudia un plan de reglamentactdn de la industria lechera nacronal,LA PRENSA, Mar. 6, 1934, at 8. Dict6 sentencia favorable a medidas de Roosevelt la Corte Suprema de la Umdn, LA NACI6N, Mar. 30, 1937, at 1 (reporting on West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440
(1937), and Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937)); La Suprema
Corte de la Umdn falI6 tres asuntos que conciernen a la nueva poitlica, LA PRENSA,
Mar. 30, 1937, at 10 (same); La C. Suprema de la Uni6n toma una actitud mds liberal,
LA NACI6N, Mar. 31, 1937, at 3 (analyzing West Coast Hotel and Virginia Railway); La
Corte Suprema de la Um6n did un fallo importante, LA NACI6N, Apr. 13, 1937, at 6 (reporting on NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)); La Suprema
Corte de Estados Unedos emitidjuicto favorable a la constitucionalidadde la Ley Wagner, LA PRENSA, Apr. 13, 1937, at 10 (same). Junsprudencia Argentina, the leading Argentine legal journal and case reporter of the time, published the full-text translation of
most of the major U.S. Supreme Court decisions of the 1930s. See, e.g., Home Building
v. Blaisdell in 45 J.A., sec. junsprudencia extranjera 43 (1934); Nebbia v. New York in
48 J.A., sec. junsprudencia extranjera 17 (1934); Schechter v. United States, in 50 J.A.
37 (1935); United States v. Butler, in 52 J.A., sec. junsprudencia extranjera 14 (1936).
319. See New York v. Nebbia, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
320. Nuevos tiempos, nuevajurisprudencia,LA NACI6N, Mar. 9, 193.4, at 6; Flexibilidad constituctonal, LA NACI6N, Mar. 13, 1934, at 4; both editorials applauding the constitutional flexibility shown in New Ybrk v. Nebbia.
321. 172 Fallos 21 (19341.
322. 172 Fallos at 37.
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sought to increase rents, it had held the freeze unconstitutional in situations
where it undercut existing contractual rights 3 The present case not only
affected existing mortgage contracts, but involved lowering the interest
rate provided for m those contracts. Even more importantly, however, the
case was a bellwether as to how the Court would regard New Deal responses to the depression generally.
The Court responded by holding the law constitutional, and did so
almost entirely on the basis of U.S. constitutional law. The Argentine
Court needed U.S. caselaw for two purposes. First, it needed to expand the
concept of the state's police power to allow an economic regulation to interfere with contract rights; and second, it needed to explain the judicial
function given its departure from the Alberdian vision, and hence from rationalism. Of the decision's forty-one printed pages, all but fourteen are
devoted to analysis of U.S. law, including translation of most of the recent
decisions of Nebbra v. New York and Home Building & Loan Ass'n v.
BlatsdelP"---the latter involving thercomparatively similar facts of a Minnesota mortgage moratorium that authorized courts to give borrowers up to
two years in which they could redeem their properties from a judicial
sale.3" The decision invokes a style of reverence for the U.S. Supreme
Court unseen since the early 1890s? U.S. caselaw is not considered
binding, but the decision begins by noting that having the U.S. Constitution
as a model provides an enormous advantage m the interpretation of borrowed principles, including right to property,3 2 and that if reasonable, U.S.
Supreme Court caselaw should be adopted "as the most authentic learned
interpretation of the principle that we have incorporated in [our own Constitution]."' Moreover, Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell is repeatedly identified as a decision written by Cluef Justice Hughes, "the
President of the Court,"3 and the cases relied upon by Hughes are decisions by Oliver Wendell Holmes, described as a man "whose wisdom has
been compared with that of Marshall and who has been called the 'prophet

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

"Horta c/Harguindeguy," CSJN 137 Fallos 47, 60-63 (1922).
290 U.S. 398 (1934).
Id.at 416-18.
See Miller, The Authority of a ForeignTalisman, supra note 57, at
172 Fallos at 40-41.
Id.at 41.
Id. at 43, 54, 55.
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of the Constitution,"' 33 -- convement adulation not just of the U.S. Supreme Court, but of the authors of the new doctrine.
On the issue of the police power, the two U.S. cases were used to establish the general principle that the state could engage in economic regulation for the general benefit of society even when private contract rights
" ' and that so long as the end
were affected,33
of the measure was legitimate,
the measure would be held constitutional if it was reasonably directed toward that end.33 Moreover, when Avico is read alongside a case decided
several weeks earlier that upheld accounting and reporting requirements
33 it does not appear that the Court's
imposed on the meat packing industry,"
newly flexible approach toward economic regulation is lirdted to emergency situations.
The Court in Avico c/de la Pesa could not reasonably maintain that it
was engaged in legal rationalism. The dissent, by the Court's leading civil
law scholar, Roberto Repetto,3 4 focused on the Constitutional text and the
Court's old caselaw, 35 and insisted that judicial review exists to ensure
that legislation does not "change the juridical order" established by the
Constitution. 36 The Court's majority, however, quotes extensively from
the portions of Home Building & Loan v. Blaisdell where Chief Justice

330. Id. at 52.
331. Id. at 50-51, 62-64, 67.
332. Id. at 57, 72.
333. "Compafifas Swift de la Plata S.A. c/Gobierno Nacional," CSJN 171 Fallos 348,
359-63 (1934) (offering a broad description of the police power with only limited judicial scrutiny of its use).
334. Repetto taught Civil Law at the University of Buenos Aires and began his judicial career as a first instance judge in civil matters and then as a judge of the Federal
Capital's Court of Appeals in Civil Matters. In 1926 he also presided over a government
commission charged with drafting reforms to the Civil Code. IN MEMORIAM: ROBERTO
REPMrro 298-299 (Buenos Aires, privately published, 1981).
335. 172 Fallos at 80-82, 88, 96. Repetto also correctly points out that Home Build.
ing & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, the case relied upon so heavily by the Court, deals only
with a moratorium on judicial executions on unpaid mortgages, and not with legislation
where the interest rate to be paid on the mortgage is changed by legislative fiat. Id. at 96,
The Court, however, responds in a later case that Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blalsdell involved a property that had already been sold at a judicial auction, and hence affected rights even more firmly incorporated into the patrimony of the party affected by
the legislation than was true under the Argentine law. "Yaben c/Lavallen," CSJN 172
Fallos 291, 302 (1935).
336. 172 Fallos at 86; see also id. at 83-84 (quoting Alberdi on the need to respect
Constitutional rights regardless of the pressures and policies that might call for undercutting them).
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Hughes discusses the need to adapt constitutional interpretation to social
needs. 3' Hughes notes the "growing appreciation of public needs and of
the necessity of finding ground for a rational compromise between individual rights and public welfare."33 ' Econonic interests were more complex
than at the time that the Constitution was framed?39 "It is no answer.. to
insist that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that
day it must mean to the vision of our time."' Hughes, and the Argentine
Court, then note Cluef Justice Marshall's words in McCulloch that "we
must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."'" The Argentme Court subsequently follows with a brief detour to modem French
commentators who admit the need to examine social needs when interpreting the law, 2 before returning to a final explanation by Chief Justice
Hughes of how the law on protection of contract rights must be seen as
evolving since some of the U.S. Supreme Court's earliest cases." U.S.
constitutionalism, with a little help from the French, offers the justification
for a new, responsive approach toward constitutional interpretation by the
Argentine Court.
The acceptance of responsive constitutional interpretation does not
mean that the Court completely abandoned rational authority in the 1930s.
As the Court's invocation of U.S. caselaw implies, its initial steps in the
direction of responsive constitutionalism were sufficiently weak that it
needed a boost of authority from U.S. caselaw. Moreover, there are instances in the 1930s and 1940s where the Court relied upon and perhaps
felt bound by legal rationalism to challenge the Executive in politically difficult cases.' However, the change in favor of responsive law and broad
337. Id. at 54-55, 56-57 (quoting Home Building, 290 U.S. at 442-44).
338. Id. at 54 (quoting 290 U.S. at 442).
339. Id. at 54 (quoting 290 U.S. at 442).
340. Id. at 54-55 (quoting 290 U.S. at 442).
341. Id. at 55 (quoting 220 U.S. at 443, quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316,407 (1819)) (emphasis added).
342. Id. at 55-56.
343. Id. at 56-57 (quoting 290 U.S. 443-44).
344. The best examples are "Alvear," CSJN 167 Fallos 267 (1933) and "Cfa. Dock
Sud de Buenos Aires Ltda.," CSJN 204 Fallos 43 (1946). Alvear concerned the detention under the President's powers during a state of siege of Marcelo T. de Alvear, the
leader of the Radical Party-which would have been running the country if not for the
1930 coup and the Party's decision to abstain from the elections that followed because of
the likelihood of fraud. The Court ordered the Executive to allow Alvear to exercise his
constitutional right under article 23 to opt for exile rather than detention, 167 Fallos at
326; though the Court also accommodated the Executive by including dicta indicating
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interpretation of the police power continued in other cases involving economic regulation. For example, in 1944 in Inchauspe Hnos. c/Junta Nacional de Cames,15 the Supreme Court held constitutional legislation governing the National Meat Marketing Board. The legislation authorized the
Board, a body chosen to represent the industry, 346 to collect fees from all
meat producers to establish a meat packing house and other ventures, with
the fees treated as mandatory capital contributions. 7 According to the
Court, the legislation was a proper exercise of the government's police
power that did not unreasonably affect either the right to engage in commerce and industry,' or freedom of association (which in this case meant
freedom to not associate with Board endeavors),349 Moreover, the Court
began its decision with a convenient bit of amnesia, claiming that it had
always "interpreted the Constitution so that its limitations do not come to
destroy or hinder the efficient exercise of the powers attributed to the State
to allow it to accomplish its elevated ends in the most beneficial manner
for the community "3 In other decisions, the Court upheld the use of

that if the Executive wished it could limit Alvear's choice of possible destinations. 167

Fallos at 320-21. Cla. Dock Sud de Buenos Aires Ltda. concerned the constitutionality
of administrative labor tribunals created by the federal government. Theso tribunals were
held unconstitutional on grounds that labor disputes were a matter for provincial jurisdiction under article 67, section 11 of the Constitution, which clearly provides that matters falling within the scope of the national Civil Code were to fall within the judicial
jurisdiction of the provincial courts, and with the Court also indicating concern with the
delegation of judicial functions to administrative tribunals. This decuion created an
enormous political uproar. The decision was handed down only a few weeks before the
extremely combative presidential elections of February 24, 1946, and the winner, Juan
Per6n, lashed out at the Court in a major campaign speech, calling the decision "the first
step to undo the social improvements achieved by the workers." Congreso de IaNac16n,
Cd.mara de Senadores, Diano de sesiones del Honorable Senado de la Nacidn constiturdo en Tribunal 89-90 (defense of Francisco Ramos Mejfa) (1947) [hereinafter "Impeachment Proceedings"]; id. at 352 (defense of Antonio Sagarna). The Secretary of Labor, Captain Hdctor Russo, accused the Court of engaging in politics and warned of
possible violence. Juzga un Reciente Fallo de la Corte el Secretarxo lie Trabajo, LA
PRENSA, Feb. 4, 1946, at 13; Sorprendente comentanos sobre un fallo de la Corte, LA
PRENSA, Feb. 5, 1946, at 8.
345. 199 Fallos 483 (1944).
346. Law No. 11.747, art. 1, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 489, 489-90 (B.O. Oct. 13, 1933).
347. Law No. 11.747, arts. 6, 17 & 18, [1920-1940] A.D.L.A. 489, 491,492-93 (B.O.
Oct. 13, 1933); 199 Fallos 522-23.
348. 199 Fallos at 530-31.
349. Id. at 535.
350. Id. at 523.
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taxes to achieve social policy goals,35' provided the taxes were not so high
as to be confiscatory in nature,3" and upheld price controls imposed during
World War IL3
Almost no limits on State economic regulation survived after 1947,
regardless of the political philosophy of the government in power and the
degree to which it tended to directly intrude on the Supreme Court's independence. It is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court upheld all aspects
of President Per6n's interventionist economic programs from the time
Per6n's allies had all but one member impeached and removed from office
m 1947 11 From that point until the military coup of 1955 the Argentine
Supreme Court never held any action of the federal government unconsti-

351. See "Mordn c/Provincia de Entre Rfos," CSJN 171 Fallos 390 (1934) (allowing a
Provincial rural land tax calibrated according to the size of the property); "Cobo de Macclu Di Cellere c/Provincia de C6rdoba," CSJN 190 Fallos 231, 249-51 (1941) (finding no
problem with a rural land tax calibrated according to the size of the property to further
redistributive ends, though the tax is held unconstitutional as so high that it is confiscatory).
352. "Cobo de Macchi Di Cellere c/Provincia de C6rdoba," CSJN 190 Fallos at 256.
353. "Martini e Hijos, S.R.L.," CSJN 200 Fallos 450 (1944).
354. The judges that were installed after the Court's 1947 impeachment took a much
more flexible approach toward econormc regulations designed to assist workers or to redistribute income than the previous Court. For example, in "Castellanos clQuintana,"
208 Fallos 430 (1947), the court held that the decree of the de facto government that established the mandatory payment of an extra one half of a month of salary at the end of
the year as a bonus was constitutional, even though the decree was handed down on December 21, 1945 and applied to that year, id. at 448-53, with the Court insisting that
property rights needed to be viewed against the needs of the "general welfare." Id. at
452. Previous caselaw of the Court had held that the government could not create new
obligations on the basis of prior contractual relationships, but only create obligations to
apply to future relationships. "Saltamartim c/Compaftia de Tranvias "La Nacional," 176
Fallos 22 (1936) (holding unconstitutional a law that required employers to pay indemmzation for dismissals without case because the indemnization were calculated on the basis
of the length of time during which the individual had been employed and hence applied
to a past contractual relationship); 'Taccan /F.C.O.," 178 Fallos 343 (1937) (same).
The ideology of the Court named in 1947 comes across particularly clearly in "Banco
Hipotecano Franco Argentino c/Provincia de Crdoba," 210 Fallos 1208 (1948), in
which the Court takes a much more flexible approach than in the past on the question of
when a tax is unconstitutionally excessive. Cf.cases gathered supra notes 294-96 and
accompanying text. In Banco HipotecartoFrancoArgentino, the Court held constitutional the application of a land tax of the Province of C6rdoba that amounted to a very
high percentage of the value of production of the land affected, 210 Fallos at 1220-25,
not only because the tax could be based on the efficient use rather than actual use of the
land, id. at 1225, but because the Court could consider in light of general social and econormc needs. Id. at 1226-28.
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tutional. 3"5 But the years that followed hardly saw any greater willingness
to limit State economic regulation. The Supreme Court has upheld numerous government measures designed to deal with economic: emergencies,
including a presidential decree that established a new currency and reformulated contract terms between private parties to limit interest payments
and adjustments for inflation, 56 and a 1990 presidential decree that turned
most bank accounts with over one million australes (approximately $600
U.S. dollars) into long-term government bonds 35l--both cases taking place
during civilian governments. Perhaps the most striking case, however,
given the complete absence of an emergency situation, is Cine Callao,5

decided in 1960 during a civilian government. In that case, the Court held
that Congress could constitutionally impose an obligation on movie theater
owners to include a thirty to forty minute show with live actors before afternoon and evening movies, 39 since the State had a legitimate interest in
ensuring that actors remained employed and there was a causal nexus between imposing this requirement on theater owners and finding employment for actors.3w The Alberdian vision of untrammeled economic liberty
is certainly dead.36'

The interesting question, however, is not whether the Argentine Supreme Court has moved away from its early caselaw and the intent of the
framers of its Constitution, but whether it has been able to do so and still
retain its authority and sufficient independence to rule important government measures unconstitutional. The answer to that question is no. The
355. Based on the index of the collection of Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia,
there is not a single instance of the Supreme Court declaring a federal law or decree unconstitutional during this penod.
356. "Porcelli c/Banco de Ia Nac16n Argentina," CSJN 312 Falios 555, 566 (1989).

357. "Peralta c/Nac16n Argentina," 313 Fallos 1513 (1990). Decree No. 36, art. 1,
Jan. 3, 1990, [1990-A] A.L.J.A. 74, 74. The exchange rate fluctuated wildly during the
early days of January 1990, with the Argentine austral trading at $2,150-2,200 to the

U.S. dollar in New York on January 8, 1990, but at substantially lower levels in Buenos
Aires. Exchange Market Stabilizes, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., Jan. 18, 1990, available in
LEXIS, NSAMER Library, ALLNSA File.
358. 247 Fallos 121 (1960).
359. Id. at 134.
360. Id. at 130-32.

361. Virtually the only case that stands out where the court held that a government
economic regulation went too far was "Empresa Mate Larangeira Mendes S.A.," 269
Fallos 393 (1967), in which the Court held unconstitutional an Executive decree that
prohibited the harvest of yerba mate tea during 1966 to end an oversupply. This decision
was handed down during an economically conservative military government against a
decree issued by an earlier civilian government.
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U.S. Supreme Court has adopted a perrmssive approach towards economic
legislation very similar to the Argentine --and it was U.S. caselaw that
provided the initial justification for the Argentine approach. However,
unlike the United States, where a "responsive" approach toward law has
not seriously undermined judicial authority,3 in Argentina the consequences for judicial authority have been catastrophic.
C. The Argentine Court'sLoss of Authority
The previous sections of this case study establish that the Argentine
Supreme Court prior to the 1930s enjoyed substantial power from its
authority as a rational interpreter of the Constitution and legislation, and
that starting in the 1930s changing social needs led it to gradually abandon
autonomous law and rational authority in favor of responsive law. A move
toward responsive law, however, does not automatically augur a judiciary's decline. For at least the past half-century, the U.S. Supreme Court
has weathered the dangers of responsive law relatively well. Public opinion polls show strong support for the Supreme Court's institutional legitimacy 31 Polls place the U.S. Supreme Court above the Executive and
Congress in popular esteem?3 The cost in political capital if a President
were to defy a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court would be so high that it
is virtually unthinkable on most issues. Argentina has experienced the op-posite. Public opinion polls in recent years have indicated that over two
thirds of respondents consider the Supreme Court as politicized and lack362. The United States has virtually abandoned substantive due process in the field of
economic regulation since its restriction of the doctrine in West Coast Hotel, leaving

nothing but an extremely deferential analysis of whether the measure enacted is related to
a constitutionally permssible purpose. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483,487-88 (1955).
363. Rather than a loss of authority, the effect of responsive judicial review in the
United States has been a changed agenda. As the U.S. Supreme Court relaxed its analysis of economic legislation on substantive due process and federalism grounds, it successfully developed a new agenda protecting civil liberties, minorities, and the integrity
of the political process. DAvID CURRIE, THlE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT. THE
SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986, at xiv (1990); see also RIcHARD L. PACEU.LE, JR., THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA: FROM THE NEw DEAL TO THE
REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

62-93 (1991) (noting the waning of economic issues before the

Supreme Court); id. at 135-92 (analyzing the growth of the Court's civil liberties
agenda).
364. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
DUKE L.J. 703, 755 (1994).
365. Id. at 754.
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Ing independence from the Executive, almost the same number consider it
"very corrupt" or "corrupt", and a plurality of forty seven percent even
consider the Court institutionally "obsolete." 3" On the rare occasions
when the Executive has not initially obtained the decisions it requires, it
has not hesitated to either defy the Court or engage in such gross pressure
for a change in the Court's position as to leave the tribunal with no sense
of dignity 367
While Argentina has enjoyed democratic elections and effective transfers of power since 1983, the situation of the Supreme Court has declined.
In 1990, President Carlos Menem successfully packed the Supreme Court
36
by obtaining legislation that increased its membership from five to nine, 1
and with the resignations of two justices, President Menem was able to appoint six Justices in all. Since the packing of the Court, its obedience to
the'Executive has sometimes bordered on the burlesque. For example, in
1993 in Banco Patagdmnco S.A. c/MelaargicaSkay Soc. de Hecho, the Supreme Court ordered the Central Bank to pay fees to attorneys who assisted it in liquidating a bank.369 The Central Bank then asked for a rehearing, which was denied by six judges and registered in the Clerk's
office as a final judgment. 7° According to press reports, the Minister of
the Economy then learned of the demal of the rehearing, and considering
the fee award of approximately $100,000 excessive and a dangerous
precedent, responded by calling up the President of the Court and asking

366. Chnstopher Larkins, The Judiciaryand DelegativeDemocracy in Argentina,_
COMPARATIVE POLITICS (forthcoming 1997). See also Una corte y una quebrada,
SOMOS, Dec. 12, 1993, at 10, 14 (showing polling data by the Centro de listudios Un16n

para la Nueva Mayorfa from three dates in 1993 indicating that between 12.7% and
14.6% of the population had a.positive image of the judiciary, and a 1993 poll by Graciela R6mer y Asociados indicating the Supreme Court as the institution that most frustrated the public compared with Congress, the.police, the public schools, the Catholic
Church, and other cultural and political institutions); La calle dice
, CLARIN, Sept.

29, 1995, at 24 (poll conducted by Graciela R6mer y Asociados in August 1995 showing
that the Supreme Court enjoyed the confidence of only 23% of the Argenline population
compared with 62% for the public schools, 57% for the Catholic Church, 36% for the
Armed Forces, 28% for the police, and 26% for Congress).
367. See infra notes 369-374, 432-436, and accompanying text.
368. Law No. 23.774, art. 1, (B.O. Apr. 16, 1990) [1990-A] A.L.J.A. 64, 64.
369. Conmueve al PoderJudicialel caso del expediente sustrat(do, LA NAC16N, Sept.
30, 1993, at 22.

370. Id. (including a photograph of a photocopy of the "stolen" decision with the signature of the six judges); RAOL BAGLINI ET AL., JUICIO A LA CORTE 182 (1993).
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him to solve the problem?" The President of the Supreme Court then
asked Ins law clerk to remove the case file from the Clerk's office and had

a new decision circulated that favored the government. m The old decision
simply disappeared---"stolen" as described by the presspm The Court's
majority only backed down after a judge (from the pre-packmg minority)
protested to the rest of the Court when his secretary advised him that he

was deciding the same case twice, and after news of Ins protests became
public

4

The Supreme Court has been marked by relative weakness during all
democratically elected governments since its 1947 impeachment, particularly m comparison with the many decisions in which it challenged the
government m previous years. Moreover, President Menem's decision to
pack the Court is as much a symptom as a cause of the Supreme Court's
problems. Every civilian President since Per6n has tried to choose a docile
Supreme Court. The case of the "stolen" decision is only one example of
the weakness of the present Court. 5 Although the present Supreme Court
371. BAGLIN ET AL., supra note 370, at 184-85, 194-95; Los que avecmnan no serdn
precisamente diasde vno y rosas,LA NACION, Oct. 3, 1993, at 18.
372. BAGLINi Er AL., supra note 370, at 182-84; Reconocieron en [a Corte el robo de
la sentencia, LA NAcI6N, Nov. 10, 1993, at 22.
373. BAGLIn Er AL., supra note 370, at 183-84; Investigan en [a Corte el robo de una
sentencia, LANAcI6N, Sept. 30, 1993, at 1.
374. See BAGIIM ET AL., supra note 370, at 183-85, 200-03; Los que avecnan no
serdnprecisamente dfas de vmno y rosas,LA NAc16N, Oct. 3, 1993, at 18. The final decision of the Supreme Court, which simply rejects the request for a rehearing, may be
found at "Banco Patag6mco S.A. c/Metaltrgica Skay Soc. de Hecho," [1994-11] J.A.
518.
375. Several examples of the Court creating new doctrine in extraordinary ways or
simply acting in unprincipled fashion are:
(1) ' Drorm (Mnistro de Obras y Servicios Pdblicos de la Nac16n)," CSJN 313
Fallos 630 (1990) (temporarily staying the lower court's preliminary injunction), and 313
Fallos 863 (1990), in which the Supreme Court judicially created the "per saltum" appeal
to allow an appeal directly from the court of first instance of a measure that would have
temporarily blocked the sale of Aerolines Argentinas, the government owned airline.
313 Fallos at 868-76. As noted by one of Argentina's leading constitutional law scholars, the Court's unprecedented decision to allow an appeal to slap the Court of Appeals
lacked any legislative foundation, and given that the Constitution charges Congress with
establishing the legislation controlling the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and the existing
legislation only provided for appeals to the Supreme Court after exhaustion of all other
appeals, the decision is impossible to justify in legal terms. Germn, J. Bidart Campos, El
"persaftum," 138 ELDERECHO 598, 598-600 (1990).
(2) "Molinas clPoder Ejecutivo Nacional," CSJN 314 Fallos 1091 (1991), in
which the Court upheld the removal of the Fiscal General de Investigaciones Adnumistrativas-the chief prosecutor for investigations of the public admimstration. Not only
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is one of the weakest in Argentine history, virtually every Argentine President since Per6n has been able to choose a majority of the Court's members early in his term-either because a previous Court chosen by a military government was removed, because new members were added, or
both. 76 While it is striking that no President prior to Per6n, civilian or
military, was able to pack the Court, it is not surprising, because the Court
restrained itself to and benefitted from the rational authority of autonomous law As noted at the beginning of this article, it is relatively easy for
two parties to decide on an arbitrator when that arbitrator will engage in
the autonomous interpretation of pre-established rules, focusing only on
did the Court overrule an earlier decision that treated this prosecutor as a figure that
could only be removed though an impeachment proceeding, 314 Fallos at 1104-05 (overruling "Cagliotti c/Molinas," 311 Fallos 2195, 2201-02 (1988)), but the Court, without
explanation, denied the prokecutor the right to an administrative disciplinary hearing
prior to dismissal. 314 Fallos at 1108. Both of these points are raised in Judge Augusto
Bellusci's dissent. 314 Fallos at 1120-21 (Belluscio, J., dissenting).
(3) "Rossi Cibils," CSJN 315 Fallos 2074 (1992), in which the Court denied an
amparo action brought by members of the provincial legislature of the Province of Cornentes seeking to block the federal intervention of the provincial leglislature and judiciary,
315 Fallos as 2077, on grounds that the President lacked constitutional authority to decree a federal intervention of his own authority if Congress was in session. 315 Fallos at
2087-89 (Bellusci, J., & Petracchl, J.,
dissenting). The response of the majority of the
Court was to hold that since the action had been brought when the intervention decree
was threatened but noy yet issued or carried out, the circumstances of the case had
changed, and in any casem the President had now submitted the decree to Congress for
its consideration. 315 Fallos at 2077-78. Given that the Court did not question the fact
that the legality of a federal intervention that exceeds the authority of the executive may
be justiciable, and had earlier considered the constitutionality of the issuance of emergency decrees by the executive with the force of law, 315 Fallos at 2086 (Belluscio, J.,
&
Petracchi, J., dissenting), Professor Bidart Campos' characterization of the Supreme
Court's arguments as "burlesque" seem appropriate. See GermAn J. Bidart Campos,
jCuesti6n abstractay competencia del Congreso en la intervenci6nfederal al PoderJudicial de Comentes?, 149 ELDERECHo 459, 459 (1992).
(4) "Peralta c/Nac16n Argentina," CSJN 313 Fallos 1513 (1990), in which the
Court held constitutional a Presidential decree turning most bank accounts over one million australes (approximately 600 dollars) into long-term government bonds, supra not
356, is striking not just for its outcome in favor of the government, but its acceptance of
the authority of the Executive to issue emergency decrees with the legal force of a law
passed by Congress, with virtually no standards limiting the exercise of this power. 313
Fallos at 1538-43. As the Court implicitly recognizes, the Constitution of 1860 makes
no mention of such authority. See id. at 1536-38.
See also Jonathan M. Miller, LEGALImEs, August 14, 1995, at 51.

376. See 2 JONATHAN M. MILLER ET AL., CONsTrrucI6N Y DERECHOS HUMANOS, 179597 (1991) (chart compiled by the librarians of the Argentine Supreme Court showing the
periods of service of every judge who has served on the Argentine Supreme Court and
the President making the appointment).
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the rules. Under such circumstances, unless the governing rules are clearly
unacceptable to the President and his allies, an Argentine President has
less need to capture the Court, because the Court's conduct will be fairly
predictable. However, President Menem, as well as all Presidents since
Per6n, has faced a situation where the goveming rules of mutual security
have lost much of their old clarity and where the Court theoretically is capable of virtually anything. A Court that sees itself as enjoying chansmatic authority to decide cases outside the bounds of the text is a Court
that an Executive needs to control. Responsive law that fails to respond to
the Executive is simply too great a political risk to that Executive. n
It is not a simple matter to illustrate the link between the Argentine
Supreme Court's changed interpretive techniques and its loss of authority.
However, one can certainly note that before the 1930s some rights enjoyed
consistent judicial protection, and this protection declined when the Court
adopted a responsive approach toward law. Further, the Court's prestige
as an institution has clearly declined. Perhaps the most visible difference
is in the type of person interested in serving on the Court. Of the forty-one
judges who served on the Court between 1862 and 1946, twelve (twenty
nie percent) had previously served as Cabinet Ministers, the most powerful political positions after the Presidency. Five of these judges had served
as Minister of the Interior, the most important Cabinet post for domestic
affairs. In addition, eight judges had previously served as provincial governors (twenty percent), and twenty-eight judges had sat in one or both
Houses of Congress (sixty eight percent)--thirteen (thirty two percent) in
the Senate and twenty-four (fifty nine percent) in the House of Deputies.
In contrast, of the sixty-one judges that have served since 1947, only one,
Felipe S. Perez, had previously served in the House of Deputies, and one,
Pablo Ramella, m the Senate. None served in the Cabinet prior to appomtment3 7 ' It is also possible to point to specific statements and events,
however, such as the Court's 1947 impeachment, to make the connection

377. The openly expressed attitude of the Menem Administration toward the Argentine Supreme Court has been that every President over the previous fifty years has had
his own Supreme Court and a Court out of line with the policies of the Executive would
cause instability. See Larlkns, supra note 366; Una corte y una quebrada, supra note
366, at 12, 14-15.

378. Data collected by the author from Vicnam OsvALDo CtrroLo, Nutvo
DICCIONARIO BIOGRAFCO ARGENTINO (1968), obituaries published in La Naci6n and La
Prensa,and resumes kept on file in the Library of the Argentine Supreme Court.
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explicit between the- Court's available sources of authority and its institutional decline.
1. The Supreme Court's Impeachment and Removal From Office
The impeachment proceedings against the Court lasted over nine
months, from the introduction of a bill calling for the Court's impeachment
in the House of Deputies on July 8, 1946, until the Senate's final vote on
April 30, 1947 All of the members of the Court were charged except for
Tomfis Casares, a recently appointed member who largely shared the Peroist movement's worker oriented and corporativist philosophy379 The
Senate devoted all or part of twenty two public sessions to the trial of the
Court, plus an additional eight secret sessions, and the debate in the House
of Deputies was almost as extensive. Given a two-thirds Peronist majority
in the House of Deputies3" and control of every seat in the Senate,"8 ' the
outcome of the impeachment was never in doubt, but the proceedings were
not a quick exercise to remove the Court as quickly as possible. The majority observed the constitutional requirements of a bill of impeachment
approved by two-thirds of the House of Deputies followed by a Senate trial
with a two-thirds vote in favor of removal,382 and even the vehemently antiPeromst newspaper La Prensa, while militantly defensive of the Court,383
recognized that the procedures used in the Senate were basically fair.'U
The Senate made no attempt to suspend the judges from continuing to exercise their functions during the trial.
The Supreme Court's impeachment and Senate trial may be understood both in political terms and as a crisis in the nature of the judicial
function. The political aspects of the impeachment proceedings are mani379. In fact, the charges included both Juan Alvarez, the Procurador General, and the
President of the Court, Roberto Repetto, who had resigned shortly before Per6n's inauguration. The final vote removed Juan Alvarez and Judges Antonio Sugarna, Francisco
Ramos Mejfa, and Benito Nazar Anchorena, but ruled that Robert Repetto was not subject to the Senate's jurisdiction. Impeachment Proceedings, supra note 344, at 375.
380. Hoy se tratardeljuicio politico a la Corte Suprema, LA NACI6N, Sept. 18, 1946,
at 4.

381. Fueron destitudos los ministros de la Corte y el Procurador General, LA
NAcI6N, May 2, 1947, at 1.
382. CONST. ARG. arts. 45 & 51 (1860).
383. E.g., Herejfias constitucionales,LA PRENSA, Sept. 25, 1946, at 6; Acusacidn sin
eco, LA PRENSA, Nov. 10, 1946, at 6; La acusacdn a jueces de la Corte Suprema y a su
procuradorgeneral, LA PRENSA, Apr. 7, 1947, at 5; El Senado ante la histona, LA
PRENSA, Apr. 26, 1947, at 5; Repercust6n de unfallo, LA PRENSA, May 4, 1947, at 6.
384. Renuncta a una defensa en el juicto a la Corte, LAPRENSA, Feb. 12, 1947 at 8.
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fest. Per6n was democratically elected president of Argentina in February
1946, and had faced serious confrontations with the Court in 1945 and
early 1946 when he was the Vice President and most powerful political
figure of the military government that ruled from 1943 until 1946.' Given
the past confrontations and his own authoritarian tendencies, Per6n undoubtedly wished to eliminate the Court as a source of opposition. Likewise, the labor elements in Per6n's coalition wanted revenge for a decision
in early 1946, Dock Sud,3' that declared unconstitutional the Argentine
equivalent of the U.S. National Labor Relations Board, one of the most
prominent initiatives of the military government.w The Dock Sud decision
0

385. On Per6n's rise within the military government, see generally 1 ROBERT A.
POTASH, THE ARMY AND PoLrics IN ARGENTINA 209-216,227-228,238-282 (1969). The
Supreme Court's clashes with the military government began in 1944 and reached a peak
in late 1945 and early 1946. First, the Supreme Court insisted on the right of individuals
detained during a state of siege to leave the country, as provided in article 23 of the Argentine Constitution of 1860. "Attos Villegas," 199 Fallos 177 (1944); "Rodriguez
Araya," 200 Fallos 253 (1944); "Gallardo," 200 Fallos 264 (1944). Then in "Municipalidad de la Capital c/Mayer," 201 Fallos 249 (1945), the Court held unconstitutional a
decree designed to speed up and lower the cost of expropriations that, among other
things, eliminated all expert testimony regarding the value of the property beyond a
statement of its dimensions. Id. at 266, 271, analyzing Decree No. 17.920, July 6, 1944,
[IV] A.D.L.A. 399. In another case, the Court refused to swear in judges named to a new
Court of Appeals on grounds that establishing a new tribunal exceeded the authority of a
de facto government that had sworn to abide by the Constitution. "Acordada sobre ]a
creacifn de la Cdmara de Apelaciones del Norte," 201 Fallos 239, 241-42 (1945). The
same day, the Court also blocked punitive action against federal judges by holding that
the government could not transfer judges between judicial districts without their consent.
"Acordada sobre traslado de jueces federales," 201 Fallos 245, 245-46 (1945). When a
federal judge was detained and removed from office by the military for granting habeas
corpus petitions for detained protesters and personally going to the jail to ensure their
release, the Supreme Court ordered that he be freed and restored to his position. "Acordada sobre remoc16n dejueces federales," 203 Fallos 5 (1945); see also El PoderEjecutivo Dej6 Sin Efecto el Decreto que Separ6 al Juez Federalde Cdrdoba Dr. Barraco
Mdrmol, LA PRENSA, Oct. 15, 1945, at 7 (explaining why the Executive removed the
Judge). The Supreme Court also voided a military courtjudgment finding a retired major
guilty of conspiracy to engage in rebellion, on grounds that the military courts generally
lacked jurisdiction over retired officers and a recent decree expanding that jurisdiction
fell beyond the powers of the de facto government. "De Lezica," 202 Fallos 405,417-19
(1945). The most important decision by the Court against the government was "Cfa.
Dock Sud de Buenos Aires Ltda.," 204 Fallos 23 (1946) (discussed in the text).
386. "Cfa. Dock Sud de Buenos Aires Ltda.," CSJN 204 Fallos 23 (1946).
387. A portion of the House of Deputies committee report recommending impeachment includes letters supporting impeachment by various unions and the Confederaci6n
General del Trabajo (the national confederation of unions, CGT), with the two most important statements, that of the CGT and the Unifn Obrera Metaldrgica (the metalworkers
umon) both explicitly citing the Dock Sud decision as a primary reason for their position.
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was based on a provision of the Argentine Constitution that established

federal legislative jurisdiction to promulgate civil, commercial, criminal
and rmning codes, but that generally left judicial jurisdiction over such
matters m the hands of the provinces. 8 The decision in some ways is a

throwback to the Court's rational, pre-1930 past, and is partly explained by
the clarity of the applicable Constitutional provision which unrmstakably
places matters involving civil relations, such as labor disputes, in the hands
of the provincial courts. 89 The bill for the impeachment of the Court was
introduced by Rodolfo Decker, the head of the Peronist block in the House
of Deputies. The block made attendance and a vote in favor of impeachment mandatory for all block members. 39° At the same time, La Nacidn, La

Prensa,the traditional bar association of the Federal Capital, and the liberals and socialists who had always opposed Per6n, all opposed the Court's
391
impeachment and were not likely to be convinced otherwise.
There was, however, an important audience whom Per6n needed to

convince or at least assuage. The Catholic Church, some conservatives,
and some old Radical Party supporters of former President Hip6lito
Two letters sent by the CGT to the de facto government protesting the Dock Sud decision
are also included. Cfimara de Diputados de ]a Nac16n, Dianr de seswnes, Sept. 18 & 19,

1946, at 714-19.
388. 204 Fallos at 28-29 (citing article 67, section 11 of the Argentine Constitution of
1860). This section provides that the Congress will enact the codes "without such codes
altering local jurisdiction, their application corresponding to federal or provincial tribunals according to the things or persons falling under their respective jurisdictions ......
Arg. Const. art. 67, § 11 (1860). This section must be read together with art. 100 of the
Argentine Constitution of 1860, which provides for federal jurisdiction along much the
same terms as Article III of the U.S. Constitution, but notes that the codes are not to be
treated as federal law for jurisdictional purposes.
389. Id.
390. Hoy se tratardel juicia politico a la Corte Suprema, supra note 379, at 1; Herejias constitucionales,supra note 382, at 6.
391. La Prensaardently supported the Court, supra note 382; as did La Naci6n, e.g.,
Enjurciamiento de ministros de la Corte Suprema, July 12, 1946, at 4; Una inmensa responsabilidad,Sept. 17, 1946, at 6; La segunda parte de la acusact6n, Nov. 2, 1946, at
4; La primera defensa, Nov. 20, 1946, at 4; Las defensas, Dec. 7, 1946, at 4; Hacia elfin
de un proceso, Apr. 24, 1947, at 4; Repercusi6n de unfallo, May 4, 1947, at 6. The Colegio de Abogados de Buenos Aires, the mainstream bar association of the City of Buenos Aires, sent a letter to the House of Deputies supporting the Court, Cdnara de Diputados de la Nac16n, Diana de sesiones, Sept. 18 & 19, 1946, at 712-13. The two-thirds
vote in the House of Deputies in favor of impeachment was made up exclusively of Peronists. Herejfas constitucionales,Sept. 26, 1946, at 6. Also typical of the breadth of political support for the Court among Per6n's opponents, the defense attorney in the Senate
for two of the judges was Alfredo Palacios, a former Deputy for the Socialist Party and
former Dean of the Law School of the University of Buenos Aires.
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Yrigoyen also formed important parts of Per6n's coalition in addition to
labor, and the position of the Church and persons closely affiliated with it
was particularly important. Judging from the Catholic magazine Critero
and the position taken by the Senators most closely affiliated with the
Church, the Catholic sector of the Peromst coalition was not enthusiastic
about impeaching the Court?' Per6n would likely have had to pay a political price had he simply replaced the members of the Court without the
formalities of the impeachment process?"9 Given that the government considered and rejected the alternative of simply increasing the number of
members of the Court to guarantee political subservience,"' it is possible
that the government even welcomed the opportunity to debate the Court's
past conduct through the impeachment process.
The arguments presented during the Court's impeachment demonstrate that the Court's removal was both a political showdown and the end
product of a crisis in the sources of the Court's authority. Numerous minor
issues are raised m the bill of impeachment, but m broad terms the Court
was accused of two sets of nusdeeds: political improprieties and prejudice
against labor. The Court's greatest political impropriety was its response
to the military coups of 1930 and 1943, when it issued administrative pronouncements that recognized that de facto governments had been established. In each case, the Court indicated that because the de facto governments had sworn to uphold the Constitution, the Court would continue to

392. La Justicia,C.rraPro, Aug. 15, 1946, at 147, 151 (offering a lengthy editorial on
the need for an independent judiciary and concluding with the argument that the members of thejudiciary should be maintained in their posts. While not explicitly discussing
the Supreme Court's impeachment, the reference is clear.). Senator Pablo Ramella, then
a young Senator from the Province of San Juan, offers a good barometer of the approach
of Peromst politicians with close ties to the Church. Senator Ramella wrote an explanation of his vote on each of the counts against the members of the Court, and while he
votes against the Court on several counts, he defends the Court for issuing the Acordadas
and developing de facto doctrine and only criticizes the Court in a very restrained fash-

ion. PABLO A. RAMELLA, LABOR PARLAMENTARIA 263-68 (1988).
393. Per6n could have argued that all constitutional appointments automatically take
on a de facto status when a de facto government takes over the Executive and Congress,

and could therefore now be removed. He could also have noted that the Court had not
required compensation in "Avellaneda Huergo," 172 Fallos 344 (1935), a case in which a
federal judge sought compensation for his removal from office by the military government of 1930.

394. See Composici6n de la Suprema Corte, LA PRENSA, Sept. 14, 1946, at 6. The
government also considered establishing an age limit for federal judges as a way of taking control of the judiciary generally, Causas para la remoci6n de los jueces, LA
PRENSA, May 7, 1946, at 9.
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go about its functions and engage m judicial review, but would treat the de
facto nature of the Executive as a nonjusticiable political question.39 The
first count in the bill of impeachment charges the Court with "mixing into
political issues through the Pronouncements of 1930 and 1943, legitinmzing the de facto governments," 396 and the fifth count charges the Court with
failure to insist on assumption of the Presidency by the President of the
Court upon the removal of all other authorities who mght have ascended
to the Presidency under the law of presidential succession .31" Not surprisingly, the Court's accusers also harp on the paradox of the Court having
recognized usurpers in the government with the justification that the
usurpers had sworn to uphold the Constitution.398 In broader terms, however, the committee report in the House of Deputies holds the Court responsible both for the de facto governments and the scandalous electoral
fraud that domnated Argentine politics during the 1930s and early 1940s.
"[S]ixteen long years during which all the basic principles of our constitutional regime were nullified in plain view and with the forbearance of
those charged with maintaining them with the integrity with which they
were established. '3 9
The Pronouncements of 1930 and 1943 were not the only political
impropriety, however. The accusations against the Court also focus on the
Court's judicial review of the acts of the de facto governments as an improper intromission into politics. The second count in the bill of impeachment charges the Court with "having assumed political powers outside.of the judicial function by controlling and impeding fulfillment of the
social goals of the revolution of 1943 and writing judgments with political
designs."' Separate counts focus on the Court's attempts to prevent the
de facto government from asserting all of the authority enjoyed by a Constitutional government, through nusdeeds such as refusing to swear in the
judges of new courts of appeals 4" and improperly protecting a judge from

395. "Acordada sobre reconocimuento del Gobierno Provisional de la Nac16n," CSJN
158 Fallos 290 (1930); "Acordada sobre reconocimento del Gobierno Provisional do la
Nac16n," 196 Fallos 5 (1943).
396. Impeachment Proceedings, supra note 344, at 14 (House of Deputies accusation
presented to the Senate).
397. Id. at 17.
398. Id. at 12, 36.
399. Id. at 29; see also id. at 57 (repeating the accusation of complicity).
400. .Id. at 12.
401. Id. at 15, 17.
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removal.' By seeking to limit the activities of a de facto government on
grounds that it could not exercise broad legislative powers, merely executive functions, the Court allegedly entered into a purely political function. Defenders of the Court argued that there was a contradiction between charging that the Court had acted improperly when it recognized the
revolutions, yet also charging that the Court exceeded its authority when it
sought to limit the power of these governments.' The underlying theme
of the Court's accusers, however, that the judges of the Court exceeded the
judicial function, is consistent in both charges. Both the Acordadas and de
facto doctrine took the Court out of its established role as a rational interpreter of the Constitution.
The allegations that the Court exceeded the judicial function is only a
part of debate. Much of the proceedings focus instead on the issue of
whether the Court was unfair in its treatment of labor. Here, there is a difference between the counts in the bill of impeachment and the focus of debate. Apparently the Peromists felt that they could not use excessive rationalism by the Court as a formal grounds for impeachment. The bill of
impeachment's complaint on labor issues focuses entirely on a small number of cases where allegedly the Court seriously misinterpreted statutes designed to protect workers and thereby denied them their rights.O However, the reason for the impeachment proceedings, at least as perceived by
the defense, was concern on the part of the Peronists that the Court would
thwart their social agenda as it did in Dock Sud.' The defense, therefore,
repeatedly argues that the Court was in fact socially progressive during the

1930s and had demonstrated a willingness to reinterpret the Constitution in
light of new social needs.

402. Id. at 16.
403. Id. at 13.
404. Compareat. at 12 with id. at 14-17 (the first attacking the Acordada and the second attacking de facto doctrine); see also td. at 147-48 (defense by Alfredo Palacios, arguing that it is contradictory to both attack the Acordada for recognizing the de facto
government and to attack the Court's de facto doctrine, which limited the powers of that
government); Argumentacidn contradictonaparaacusara los mamnstros de Ia Corte Suprema,LA PRENSA, Sept. 4, 1946, at 5 (noting the same contradiction).
405. Id. at 23-27.
406. See id. at 89-90 (defense of Francisco Ramos Meffa); ad. at 171-73 (defense by
Alfredo Palacios of Antoio Sagarna).

407. See, e.g., id. at 139 (defense by Mariano Drago of Nazar Anchorena); id. at 15970 (defense by Alfredo Palacios of Antonio Sagarna).
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Strangely, the Court that emerges from the impeachment debate is
both too "political" in that it developed de facto doctnne with no constitutional authority, but also not "political" enough, since it failed to consider
important social needs when interpreting the Constitution. Regardless of
the specific political motivations for the Court's impeachment, this tension
between responsive law and exercise of charismatic authority on the one
hand and autonomous law supported by rational authority on the other
demonstrates a crisis in judicial review The Court's accusers emphasize
that Argentina needed to avoid becoming "a country governed by its
judges," like the United States, °8 and that the Court chose to adopt a political function and therefore must accept political responsibility for its
acts.' However, Dock Sud, the decision that most provoked labor to attack the Court, was an example of the Court invoking its rational authority.
Thus, while the Supreme Court's removal was a function of the political
moment, it was also a function of the lack of support for judicial review as
then formulated. Autonomous law and invocation of rational authority
were no longer acceptable to the political majority in power, because
autonomous law would have blocked important programmatic goals; yet
responsive judicial review was equally unacceptable if it could be used to
the political detriment of those in power.
2.

Open Admissions of Unlimited Yet Limited Power

Since the Supreme Court's 1947 impeachment and the rejection of judicial review that the impeachment implied, two tendencies have existed
side by side in Argentine constitutional scholarship and in Argentine
caselaw On the one hand, Argentine scholarship has been willing to attribute unlimited power to the Court to. engage in Constitutional interpretation that moves beyond textual restraints. Charles Evans Hughes' remark
that "[w]e are governed by a Constitution, but that Constitution is what the
judges say it is" gets cited constantly to explain the enormous flexibility
that the judiciary enjoys in judicial review 410 Moreover, the Argentine
408. Id. at 7 (statement of Senator Molinari).
409. Id. at 32.
410. E.g., Jorge Remaldo Vanossi, El poder constitucional de los jueces, con particular referencia al control de constitucionalidad,[1977-D] L.L., Sec. Doctnna 1019;
Alfredo Orgaz, PoderJudicial, in ARGENTINA, 1930-1960, at 124 (Revista Sur 1962); M.
Christina Seghesso de Lopez Arag6n, Ginesis Histdrico del Poder JudicialArgentino
(1810-1853), in DARDO PEREZ GUiLHOU ET AL., EL PODER JUDICIAL 1, 10 (1989);
SEGUNDO V LINARES QUINTANA, LA CONSTITUCI6N INTERPRETADA at dedicatory quote &
25 (1960).
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Court itself has affirmed in numerous cases that the Argentine Constitution
is "conceptualized as a political instrument endowed with extreme flexibility to adapt itself to all times and all future circumstances." ' " Noting
that the origins of a flexible approach toward constitutional interpretation
go back to Chief Justice John Marshall"' and Chief Justice Hughes,' 3 the
Court insists that the Constitution must be read as "a living creation impregnatedwith Argentine reality, so that within its elasticity and generality
that prevents it from aging with changes in ideas, growth or redistribution
of interests, it continues to be the instrument of the political and moral order of the Nation."4 4
At the same time, the Supreme Court has also emphasized that separation of powers should be understood not as a situation where each branch
acts in isolation from the other, but as a "functional division of political
power;"4 5 that the division of authority between branches of government
'4t
must be understood m terms of their "natural functional interrelation"
and their "harmonious development."4 7 At a recent Senate confirmation
hearing for ins appointment to the Court, one nominee, who was easily
confirmed, described himself as "a friend of the President,""" and described his judicial philosophy as "the functions are three, but the power is
one," 4 9-- m other words, that all branches of government are involved in
the exercise of what is m essence political power. Another individual, who
served on the Court on two different occasions during democratic governments, wrote a book between his two periods on the Court, in which he
emphasized the need to give a President the freedom to impose his plan of

411. 'Peralta c/Nac16n Argentina," 313 Fallos 1513, 1537 (1990). See also
"S.R.L. Samuel Kot," 241 Fallos 291, 300 (1958); "Sejean c/Zaks de Sejean," 308 Fallos
2268, 2292-93 (1986) (both cases emphasizing the need for dynarmc constitutional interpretation in light of present-day needs).
412. 313 Fallos at 1538, 1547, 1548.
413. Id. at 1547.
414. Id. at 1537 (quoting "Bressam c/Provincia de Mendoza," 178 Fallos 9. 23
(1937), emphasis in original).
415. 313 Fallos at 1536.
416. Id.
417. Id. at 1537.
418. Decide hoy el Senado st Vdzquez va a la Corte, LA NACION, Dec. 7, 1995, at

1.

419. Otro amigo de Menem para la Corte Suprema, LA NAClON, Nov. 29, 1995, at
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420 and the dangers if judges improperly interfere with this
government
1

plan.

42

The one case since the reestablishment of democracy in 1983 in
which the Supreme Court challenged an important government policy is in

many ways the exception that proves the rule of rational law leading to responsive law which leads to subservience. In Roln Zappa,422 the plaintiff
attacked the constitutionality of the Executive decrees that set his social

security pension. 41 The plaintiff's pension was initially set by law at
eighty two percent of the inflation adjusted salary that he would have been

receiving were he still working,4 ' with a later law applicable to most
workers modifying payments to create a floor of seventy percent of inflation-adjusted salary 4 The pension levels set by the Executive were far
below eighty two or even seventy percent of inflation adjusted salary,426
and according to the Executive, raising pensions to this level would bankrupt the social security system.4' The Court's response, however, was to

insist that any adjustment m the pensions levels below those provided for
by statute needed to be made by Congress42 (where the Executive at this
time lacked a majority in the Senate).4 In a truly uncharacteristic state-

ment, the Court insisted that "[i]t is not licit for Argentine judicial authorities to act in disregard of their character as organs applying the law 'in effect', or that they attribute to themselves, whether for reasons of
'emergency,' or of 'great public interests affected,' legislative power that
420. JuLIo OYHANARTE, PODER POLfTICO Y CAMBIO ESTRUCTURAL EN LA ARGENTINA 60,
62, 69 (1969). Julio Oyhanarte served on the Supreme Court from 1958-1962 and from
1990-1991.
421. Id. at 69-80.
422. 308 Fallos 1848 (1986).
423. Id. at 1850-51 (opinion of the Procurador Fiscal); id. at 1853.
424. Law No. 14.473, art. 52, sect. ch., (B.O. Sept. 27, 1958). [XVHI-A] A.D.L.A.
98, 110.
425. Law No. 18.037, arts. 27 & 45, changed the rate for most ordinary pensions to
70% of salary for men retiring at age 60 and women at age 55, but increasing the rate by
one percent of salary for every year worked beyond retirement age, and for many employees, for every year beyond 30 years of employee contributions to the: system. (B.O.
Jan. 10, 1969) [XXIX-A] A.D.L.A. 47,52.
426. This is recognized by the Executive in the preamble to Decree No. 2196/86,
[1987-A] A.L.J.A. 303, 304-05 (B.O. Dec. 2, 1986).
427. 308 Fallos at 1851 (opimon of the Procurador Fiscal).
428. 308 Fallos at 1855.
429. In the Senate in 1986 and 1987, the Peronist Party held 21 seats, the Radical
Party 18 seats, and smaller parties 7 seats. See Shirley Christensen, Reborn Peronists
Flex Their Muscles, N.Y. TIMES., Oct. 11, 1987, at D3.
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they lack."4' Examination of the resources of the pension system was
"outside the orbit of the Judiciary 3
It is impossible to determine precisely what led the Supreme Court to

suddenly insist on a rational approach toward law. Perhaps even here the
Court was showing "responsiveness"--o the unprecedented levels of dep-

rivation that many pensioners had sunk to. No one living in Argentina at
the time could have been unaware of the poverty of its pensioners.' But
even Roldn Zappa failed to result in a victory for judicial independence.
The Executive responded to the decision with a decree declaring a state of

emergency in the pensions system, temporarily establishing pensions at
twenty seven percent of inflation-adjusted salary,433 freezing all litigation
and execution of judgments against the State for failure to pay the amounts
required by law,4 and suspending the filing of any new administrative or
judicial actions.435 Moreover, the Court implicitly recognized the validity
of these measures, though virtually without explanation!' The freeze on

litigation lasted from publication of the decree on December 2, 1986 until
May 4, 1987,43 and the freeze on measures to execute judgments lasted
until June 24, 1988, when Congress finally derogated the decree with legislation designed to reorgamze the pensions system n.4 Thus, the Court's

430. 308 Fallos at 1854.
431. Id. at 1855.
432. See MARIO STRUBBIA, LPOR QUA FRACAS6 ALFONSN? 120-24 (1989); Private
Pensions Now Available; The State Owes US$25BN to Pensioners, LATIN AM. WKLY.
REP., Dec. 4, 1986, available in LEXIS, NSAMER Library, SAMER File.
433. Decree No. 2196/86, art. 4, (B.O. Feb. 12, 1986) [1987-A] A.L.J.A. 303,
306).
434. Id. art. 2, at 306.
435. Id.
436. The Court avoided ruling on the validity of the suspension of litigation while
the suspension was in effect and held off deciding any of the cases it had pending before
it. Once the suspension was ended, the Court held that since the suspension was over
there was no reason why a pensions case could not continue forward, "Labusta," 310
Fallos 2274, 2274-75 (1987). Once a law was passed that reorganized the pensions system the Court treated the issue of both the suspension on litigation and the suspension on
execution of judgments as moot. "Gomez," 311 Fallos 2238, 2238 (1988); "Crocco,'
311 Fallos 2338, 2338 (1988); "Aguilar,"311 Fallos 2385, 2385 (1988).
437. Decree No. 648/87, art. 10, 369 (B.O. May 4, 1987) [1987-A] A.L.J.A. 368,)
derogated art. 2 of Decree No. 2196/86, which suspended all pension adjustment litigation, but maintained a suspension on execution ofjudgments, id., art. 7, at 369.
438. Law No. 23.568, art. 1, (B.O. June 24, 1988) [1988-B] A.LJ.A. 1515, 1516
(derogating Decree No. 2196/86 and subsequent decrees).
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brief return to rationalism accomplished nothing but to set up an unsuccessful confrontation with the Executive where the Court caved in.
3.

Comparing the U.S. Experience

The above description of the history of the Argentine Supreme Court
strongly correlates with the sociological model developed in the first part
of this article. From 1862 through the rmd-1940s, Argentina enjoyed a
number of important, clearly defined rules of mutual security which it had
imported from the United States, and a Supreme Court that. played a significant role as arbiter of those rules. The Supreme Court was successful
in its role precisely because it avoided instrumentalist temptations, and
therefore enjoyed substantial respect from politically powerful groups in
society as a tribunal able to resolve constitutional disputes with substantial
neutrality, even in the face of political pressure.439 In the long-run, however, the Argentine system failed for the very reason the model indicates
that it should-a need arose for modification of the traditional rules of
mutual security, but the Court found itself unable to ratify the changes in a
way that also allowed it to preserve its independence. For the Peronists
who impeached it, the Court's remaining sense of autonomous law based
on rational authority meant that it might block their political program,
while the Court's attempts at responsive law made it dangerous for its unpredictability After the impeachment and removal from office of all but
one justice in 1947, the Court frequently and openly moved beyond the
constitutional text in its interpretation. However, as the model would predict, because the Court lacked charismatic authority in the eyes of Argentine society, it rarely acted independently of the Executive in cases with
political significance, and lost the ability to act as a widely accepted arbiter
of rules of mutual security
Although the Argentine Supreme Court's instrumentalism was imported from the United States in Avico ci de la Pesa,440 its use of responsive law has always involved responsiveness to the demands of the Execufive, not an independent exercise of charismatic authority, and the public
has therefore seen it as politically irrelevant. In contrast, in recent years,
while the U.S. public has occasionally become distressed by a particular

439. For further examples of the Argentine Supreme Court's independence in the
face of political pressure, see generally, Miller, Courts and the Creation of a "Spirit of
Moderation,"supranote 8.
440. 172 Fallos 21 (1934), analyzed supra notes 322-344 and accompanying text.
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decision of the Supreme Court, the Court's legitimacy as an institution remarns high and does not depend on public expectations that it will focus on
the original intent of the Constitution. Its charismatic authority remains
secure, and with it, its authority to move beyond the constitutional text, legitimated by a long history of acting as a custodian of civil and political
rights, as well as acting as moderator of power both between the states and
the federal government and between branches of the federal government.
Social science surveys have found that the general public values the U.S.
Supreme Court as an institution for its own sake, beyond the specific conm " The Court that the public values is a Court which
tent of its decisions.
has usually acted with a great deal of political prudence," but is certainly
not a Court which has restricted itself to interpreting the intent of the fram&"3
ers.
The United States has enjoyed tremendous benefits in the form of institutional stability from having a charismatic yet cautious Supreme Court.
In the nineteenth century the Court was essential for legitimizing a broad
interpretation of the powers of the federal government and limiting the
powers of the states." In the 1930s, while the Supreme Court initially
clashed with President Roosevelt, it ultimately imparted some additional
legitimacy to the New Deal which may have been important in quieting
conservative opponents." 5 In the 1950s and 1960s the Supreme Court
broke the Congressional gridlock that paralyzed efforts to end governmen441. See James Gibson, Understandingsof Justice: InstitutionalLegitimacy, Procedural Justice, and PoliticalTolerance, 23 L. & SOC'Y REV. 469, 483-89 (1989); Walter F Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, Publicity, Public Opinion, and the Court, 84 Nw.U.

L. REV. 985, 997-1004 (1990); Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 364, at 754-55. Tyler &
Mitchell's findings disagree with those of Gibson on the importance of the process by

which the Supreme Court decides cases for its authority as an institution, with Tyler &
Mitchell noting that unlike Gibson, they found that process is central, id. at 725-26, 784.
However, while Tyler & Mitchell emphasize that it is "principled" decision making that

gains public support, id. at 786-88, their work does not offer a basis for finding that this
decisionmaking must be rational as opposed to responsive in its approach towards law.
442. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGERoUs BRANCH: THE
StPEME COURT AT THE BAR oF PoLrncs 111-98 (1962) (describing the multiple techmques the Court has used to avoid exceeding its political possibilities without appearing

weak or sacrificing principle).
443. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Dectsts and ConstitutionalAdjudication,

88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 727-39 (1988), for a summary of some of the instances where
the Supreme Court has sharply strayed from original intent by someone generally sympathetic to a focus on the constitutional text and the intent of the Framers.
444. BLACK, supra note 4, at 80-86.
445. Id. at 65-66.
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tally sanctioned race discrimination and used its authority to help legitimize the civil rights movement's aim of ending racial discrimination.A4
Only changing law can confer legitimacy on change, and the U.S. Supreme
Court, by changing its interpretation of the U.S. Constitution at critical
times, has often legitimized fundamental change in the United States and
occasionally helped provoke it. 7
The hearings held by the Senate Judiciary Committee on Judge Robert
Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court are the closest the United States
has come in recent years to a referendum on whether the Supreme Court
has acted appropriately in taking a responsive approach toward law. Two
primary points were conveyed to viewers of the hearings. First, the hearmgs showed that Judge Bork believed in interpreting the Constitution according to the original intent of the framers."' Second, the hearings emphasized that Judge Bork, in giving effect to his preference for onginal
intent, would likely seek to overrule U.S. Supreme Court precedents in
many areas-with the right to privacy established in Griswold v. Connecticut"9 and the Court's decisions on school desegregation receiving the
greatest attention.45 By the conclusion of the hearings public opinion polls
showed far more Americans opposed to confirmation than in favor,43' and
several members of the President's own party voted against recommending
Judge Bork's confirmation. 52 While no surveys indicate whether the
Senators and the public were more influenced by Judge Bork's views on
the role of the Supreme Court or by concerns for specific Supreme Court

446. Choper, supra note 32, at 92-93.
447. See HUNTINGTON, supra note 50, at 101.
448. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 100th Cong.
103-05 (1987) (opening statement of Robert H. Bork); S. EXEC. REP. No. 100-7, at 9
(1987).

449. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); discussed at S. ExEc.
REP. No. 100-7, at 22-25, 32-34 (1987).
450. S. EXEC. REP. No. 100-7, at 38 (1987); Robert F Nagel, Advice, Consent,
and Influence, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 858, 872 n.44 (1990).
451. See Murphy & Tanenhaus, supra note 441, at 986 n.4 (noting that a Gallup
poll before the hearings showed the public supporting confirmation by a margin of 31%
to 25%, but, that after the hearings, 51% opposed confirmation compared with 32% in
favor).
452. On October 6, 1987, the Committee voted nine to five in favor of a motion to
report the nomination with a negative recommendation. S. EXEc. REPT. No. 100-7, at 3
(1987). On October 23, 1987, the Senate voted 58 to 42 to reject the nomination of
Judge Bork. S15011, 133 CONG. REc. 749 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987).
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precedents which he would have wished to overrule, it is reasonable to interpret the episode as an affirmation by Americans that they do not desire a
wholesale shift in the Supreme Court's function. While many Americans
may strongly disagree with individual Supreme Court precedents, Americans during the Bork hearings did not express sympathy toward a revolutionary retrenching of the Court. Certainly Judge Bork's calls for a return
to original intent failed to strike a responsive chord able to carry his nomination forward.
What is much more difficult to establish is how the U.S. Supreme
Court has developed a capacity to independently exercise charismatic
authority. Three features of the United States and its courts have particularly facilitated the exercise of the U.S. Supreme Court's charismatic,
authority First, judicial review in the United States is a natural outgrowth
of the common law tradition transplanted to the United States from Great
Britain. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court's very longevity as an institution
has increased its authority by establishing a tradition of respect for its decisions. Third, the Supreme Court does not exercise an unlimited charismatic authority but one both aided and limited by the interpretive techniques accepted in the U.S. legal profession.
The common law tradition has long involved a mixture of traditional
and charismatic authority in addition to rational legal authority. Not only
was most English and Colonial American law judge-made law, but it was
presumptively taken from the natural law of the common law.' While it
is no longer common to invoke natural law as grounds for constitutional
innovation in the United States, the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court to
move beyond the constitutional text lies in direct line of descent from the
natural law tradition of the common law,4 a tradition which Justice Chase
believed did not require a constitutional text in order to find a law unconstitutional, merely a natural law principle. Further, the common law has
never approached the law as autonomous in nature but has always insisted
on interpreting it in light of social needs--though sometimes calling it
custom4 56 The basic nature of the legal system in common law countries
453. See 1 WLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 6871 (Umv. Chicago Press 1979) (1765).
454. ARCHIBALD Cox, TIE ROLE OFTHE SUPREME COURT INTHE AMERICAN SYSTEM
OF GOVERNMENT (1976); Thomas Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27
STAN. L. REv. 703, 717 (1975).
455. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798).
456. CARDOZO, supra note 66, at 59-60.
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has never been exclusively "legal" m the Webenan sense of autonomous
from nonlegal influences.457
Complementing the Supreme Court's common law roots is the importance of its longevity as an institution and the willingness of its members to think in institutional terms. Over two hundred years of continuous
functioning have surrounded the Supreme Court with reverence as one of
the great elements of the U.S. political tradition. 48 Historical success may
well create its own reinforcing dynamic, and the Court's authority as a
moderator of power was built up only gradually, first as a mediator between the states and the federal government and only later with respect to
the other branches of the federal government.459 Congress has not tampered with the size of the Supreme Court since fixing it at nine members in
1869, and successful attempts at limiting its jurisdiction have likewise
been rare and in the distant past.' Further, the Court has always been
careful to lirmt the frequency of its clashes with other branches of government and preserve its power.46' The justices will often act to maximize the
influence of the Court as an institution as opposed to seeking immediate
political influence, only acting when they know they can win 62
Perhaps most important to the U.S. Supreme Court's; charismatic
authority, however, is the fact that it is a highly confined authority and its
exercise will often not be perceived by either the general public or much of
the legal profession as charismatic. Because the nature of legal authority is
more flexible under the common law, the scope of what is acceptable as
"legal" reasoning is broader than in civil law countries.463 The doctrine of
457. See DAMASKA, supra note 74, at 46; MAURO CAPELLETTI, JUDICIAL REVIEW INTHE
62-63 (1971).
458. CHOPER, supra note 32, at 138.
459. Cox, supra note 454, at 105.
460. While there have been many bills introduced seeking to limit the power of the
Court to review specific controversial issues, only two court-curbing bills have been successful. In 1802 the Judiciary Repeal Act accompanied repeal of new federal courts created by the previous Federalist Congress with a reordenng of the Supreme Court's sessions so that it would not sit dunng the following year and would be unable to timely
,question the repeal, and in 1868 Congress abolished the Supreme Court's jurisdiction
CONTEMPORARY WORLD

over aspects of Reconstruction. BLACK, supra note 4, at 187. A limited additional exception is section 208(a)(3) of The Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996), eliunating judicial review of
certain asylum decisions by the Attorney General.
461. BICKEL, supranote 442, at 132.
462. HUNTINGTON, supra note 50, at 25-26.
463. Cf. DAMASKA, supra note 74, at 48-49.
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stare decisis when applied by the Supreme Court to its own decisions allows it to act through rational authority after the initial charismatic act of
establishing a new constitutional precedent. Both constitutional scholars
and the Court itself have recognized the importance of fidelity to politically prominent precedents as important for the Court to maintain public
respect as a neutral decision making body.' As a general rule, the U.S.
Supreme Court, even with changes in membership, only reluctantly overturns past precedents, particularly recent ones, and by so limiting its conduct it increases its reputation as an institution with interests beyond ordinary partisan concerns.'
By contrast, the Argentine Supreme Court,
lacking a tradition of stare decisis as a limit on its own interpretive options,
has often taken an about face on hot political issues as a result of a change
in membership. ' Further, the reasoning processes used by the U.S. Su464. The clearest elaboration of this by the supreme Court is in PlannedParenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864-69 (1992).
465. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-69. For commentators taking the position that stare
decisis helps maintain public confidence in the Supreme Court, see, e.g., ARTHUR J.
GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE 75-76 (1971); Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled,37 ARiz. L. REV. 1107, 1108, 1110-12 (1995); Michael J. Gerhardt, The

Role of Precedentin ConstitutionalDecisionmakingand Theory, 60 GFO. WASH. L. REv.
68, 76-77 (1991); Lewis F Powell, Stare Dectsis and JudicialRestraint, 1991 J. SuP.
CT. HIST. 13, 16; Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Dectsis: Overruling Hans v. Louisiana,57 U. CHL L. REv. 1260, 1262-63 (1990).
466. Perhaps the clearest example in recent years of sharp shifts in Argentine Supreme
Court precedent is on the issue of whether the State may constitutionally criunalize possession of a small amount of narcotics when clearly intended for personal use. Defendants questioned the constitutionality of such a prosecution as inconsistent with the first
sentence of article 19 of the Argentine Constitution of 1860, which provides: "Private
actions of men that in no manner offend public order and morality or prejudice others are
reserved [for the judgment of] God, and are exempt from the authority of judges." The
Argentine Supreme Court first heard the issue in "Colavint," 300 Fallos 254,267 (1978),
during a military government, and held in favor of prosecution. Id. at 286-70. In 1986,
two years after a new Supreme Court was named by a democratically elected, civilian
government, the Supreme Court overruled itself, holding that possession of a small
amount of a drug for personal use was constitutionally protected, 'Baztemca," 308 Fallos 1392, 1416-21 (1986). However in 1990, only a few months after having its membership increased from five to nine by President Menem, the Supreme Court overruled
itself once again and returned to the position that no constitutional protection applied.
"Montalvo," 313 Fallos 1333, 1349 (1990). What is particularly striking, however, is the
way the Court phrases its change, stating, "this Court, in its present composition, decides
to return to the doctrine established through the 'Colavini' case." Id. (emphasis added).
The Court makes a point of distancing itself from the prior caselaw, and by implication,
feels no obligation toward it because its membership has now changed. This is not to say
that the Argentine Supreme Court does not cite itself and maintain consistent caselaw on
many issues, but it is precisely when the issue is a particularly prominent one that the
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preme Court are key The Court must expound principles to justify its decisions, must demonstrate its reasoning process and must draw on sources
generally acceptable to the legal community to justify its conclusions.467
Even when the U.S. Supreme Court decides to act responsively and change
existing precedent, its charismatic authority is limited by its ability to
couch the change in the rhetoric and reasoning of the legad profession.
Moreover, common law appellate courts are extraordinarily adept at writing decisions that both leave large grey areas and make use of the grey areas left behind by earlier decisions. Writing decisions with grey areas
which nevertheless provide some binding rules for lower courts allows
careful step-by-step modification of the rules of mutual security and more
measured accommodation of changes being sought by other branches of
the govemment.O8 The techniques which accompany stare decisis-distinguishing precedents on what may be quite minor factual differences, and
the provision of useful but nonbinding guidance in the form of obiter
dicta-allow appellate courts to present areas of the law as stable for the
near term but leave room for future evolution of the law The U.S. Supreme Court has thus been extraordinarily well equipped to simultaneously
retreat and lay down new legal frameworks at the same time. Finally, the
Court's charismatic authority if increased through its use of adversarial
procedures that ensure that each side will be heard and neither side will be
permitted to approach the justices informally, in the absence of the other
party The judiciary's procedural fairness helps contribute to societal acceptance of its decisions.469
The combination of common law and natural law traditions, a long
history, and particularly flexible yet resilient interpretive techniques, all of
judges most feel a need to express their personal positions. See al;o "Ekmekdjian
c/Sofovich," CSJN 315 Fallos 1492, 1518 (1992) (broadening the availability of the
"right of reply" under the American Convention on Human Rights and noting that its
"present composition" did not share the Court's earlier caselaw); "Molinas." 314 Fallos
1091 (1991) (noting that the "present composition" of the Court did not share the Court's
prior caselaw on the status of the Fiscal General de Investigaciones Adnuistrativas-the
chief prosecutor for investigations of the public admimstration-holding that he could be
dismissed at the President's discretion).
467. BICKEL, supra note 442, at 199; CHARLES BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW
20, 21, 27 (1981); Cox, supra note 454, at 108-09.
468. Karl E.Klare, JudicialDeradicalizationof the Wagner Act and the Origins of
Modem Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 310-25 (1978) (offering an excellent description of this process in the context of the Wagner Act).
469. Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth Rasinska, ProceduralJustice, InstitutionalLegitimacy,
and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions:A Reply to Gibson, 25
L. & Soc'Y REv. 621, 627 (1991).
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which have aided the U.S. Supreme Court, are neither the only possible
elements able to assist a court m establishing charismatic authority, nor
elements that one would expect to encounter in every judicial system.
Moreover, many countries lack the great variety of politically active institutions enjoyed by the United States, ranging from the press and NGOs to
the Federal Reserve, the strength of which relieve pressure on the U.S. Supreme Court from having to act as the sole check on arbitrary government
action. Certainly judicial review becomes more difficult in societies accustomed to an Executive even more powerful than that of the United
States. One would thnk that attempts to copy judicial review would be
destined to fail m countries lacking the political and social stability enjoyed by the United States and lacking many of the elements of the U.S.
legal tradition. Particularly if the executive branch is strong in such societies, the popular expectation will be that it is the Executive's role to impose its program of government and to deal with every crisis-hence it will
be the Executive that will be endowed with any charisma that might be
thought necessary to lead society beyond its constitutional text. What is
fascinating in the Argentine case is that the failure of judicial review only
occurs after a long period of success.
IV.

Conclusions

While the sociological model developed at the start of this article has
enormous explanatory value for understanding the initial success and subsequent failure of Argentine judicial review, a single case study is insufficient to regard it as proved. The model does, however, offer a different
perspective for viewing the process of judicial review. Rather than focusing on U.S. discussions of the countermajoritarian difficulty of non-elected
judges checking the actions of elected representatives of the people, the
more basic question asked by students of judicial review in any society
should be of the nature of the authority exercised by its courts. There is no
guarantee that even rational authority will enjoy automatic success in
countries without a tradition of acceptance of rational authority, and every
society will face pressures for "responsive" interpretation of the lawwhich requires judges to be able to exercise charismatic authority.
The model may explain some of the failures of the law and development movement. In the 1960s and early 1970s, when large numbers of
U.S. legal scholars traveled to Africa and. parts of Latin America on projects to reform legal education, U.S. reformers saw increased legal instrumentalism by judges and lawyers as important to economic development
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and social change.47 However, many of the reformers came to evaluate
their projects as failures.47 David Trubek, writing of his own efforts in
Brazil, concluded that "liberally motivated efforts to assist educational reform may have actually aided in the consolidation of the authoritarian regime" of the military government because lawyers no longer felt restrictions in the arguments which they could make on the regime's behalf.7
The U.S. professors had hoped to spread U.S. style legal insixumentalism,
turning lawyers in Africa and Latin America into problem solvers who
could overcome formalist legal obstacles blocking econonuc projects and
design the legal structures necessary to promote development. They failed,
however, to take into account that legal instrumentalism will be used on
behalf of the governing regime's interests, and that unlike the United
States, where an underlying pluralist, democratic, political system would
be more likely to direct instrumentalist approaches toward common needs
while respecting basic rights, the political system in most developing
countries could not be counted on to produce such a happy result.4" Legal
'
instrumentalism became "all power to the generals."474
Moreover, once it has been abandoned, it is by no means a simple
matter to return to rational constitutional interpretation even if there has
been a constitutional reform. Faith in rationalism, while perhaps more intuitive than faith in the charismatic authority of judges, is nevertheless an
acquired taste that can hardly be reestablished absent a special societal
consensus on the need for a new legal model. While societies can decide
to establish laws and follow them, the tendency in many developing coun-

470. JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM 10, 14-15 (1980); John Henry Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of

the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 465-66 (1977).
471. See, e.g., GARDNER, supra note 470, at 11; Merryman, supranote .470, at 481.
472. David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An essay on the Study of Law
and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 47 (1972); see also GARDNER, supra note 470, at 117.
473. See David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974
WIs. L. REV. 1062, 1070-72.
474. This phrase is the title of an article published by two U.S. law professors who
spent substantial time on U.S. projects to reform legal education in Brazil, and who de-

scribe the ability of the military government to write its own rules without any principled
limitations, Henry J. Steiner & David M. Trubek, Brazil-All Power to the Generals, 49
FOREIGN A .464, 472 (1971).
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tries is to adopt idealistic legal norms that cannot possible be followed.'75
Such norms make open-ended constitutional interpretation and inconsistent
law enforcement inevitable.

The common law tradition, political history and interpretive techmques that combine to support charismatic, responsive approaches toward

judicial decision-making m the United States obviously will not exist in
identical fashion in other countries. This does not mean that those countries cannot successfully adopt judicial review-many countries have. But
it means that analysis of judicial review in those countries should consider
the nature of judicial authority, and where part of that authority is wielded

charismatically, the elements contributing to its political acceptance. The
authority of respected treatise writers, of international or regional institutions, of a respected foreign model, or of respected political, religious or
cultural figures may in the proper circumstances provide courts with the
vital support they need to act chansmatically. While no country has apparently done so for its national Supreme Court, in a country where elections
are seen as the primary means for anointing leaders, an elected Supreme
Court may be the solution if the Supreme Court is to exercise authority independently of a popular Executive. In other countries perhaps only a religious or hereditary judicial authority can sufficiently counterbalance
other branches of government. At a minimum one would expect a need for
more transparent judicial procedures and the selection of judges with
greater personal prestige than in systems governed by autonomous law and
its narrower scope for judicial discretion. The U.S. anoints its judges with
an element of charismatic authority through the weight of established political tradition, but once it is admitted that judicial review involves a
charismatic element, each society must be examined individually for the
elements that most readily confer charismatic authority
Finally, the model and case study developed in this article offer a tale
of caution for the United States. If nothing else, Argentina shows that responsive law created by independent, charismatic judges is a fragile political development. Stare decisis protects the U.S. Supreme Court as an institution so that decisions on hot political issues do not instantly shift with
every change of government and the appointment of justices who pass a
litmus test on the critical issues. Yet one can easily imagine an ideologi475. One of the best descriptions of the gap between law and practice in a Latin
American country is Ketih Rosenn, Brazil's Legal Culture: The Jeito Revisited. 1 FLA.
INT'LL. J. 1, 1, 17-25 (1984).
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cally motivated Court losing authority as its ideological membership
changes and it presents an ever-shifting body of Constitutional law.
Moreover, not all confirmation heanngs have involved high minded debates over the nature of judicial review476 Like every political institution,
the U.S. Supreme Court has undergone shifts in its public prestige. The
Court's ability to invoke charismatic authority to interpret the Constitution
responsively, yet independently, has been and will continue: to be a function of its political condition.

476. One recent study indicates that public perceptions of the U.S, Supreme Court's
legitimacy suffered as a result of the Senate hearings on Clarence Thomas' nonunation to
the Supreme Court. Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 364, at 714, 779-80

